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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigated cross-modal selective attention in children and 
adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and typically developing (TD) 
individuals using the Load Theory of Selective Attention and Cognitive Control 
(Lavie, 1995). Perceptual load theory states that perception of irrelevant stimuli 
depends on the perceptual load of the task (the amount of task relevant 
information).  At low levels of perceptual load, when finite perceptual capacity is not 
reached, remaining resources ‘spill over’ and irrelevant stimuli are automatically 
processed; when perceptual load exhausts capacity, irrelevant stimuli are no longer 
processed. 
In ASD, there is some evidence that on visual attention tasks, individuals 
with ASD continue to process visual information at higher levels of perceptual load 
than controls, indicative of an increased perceptual capacity (Remington, 
Swettenham, & Lavie, 2012; Remington, Swettenham, Campbell, & Coleman, 2009; 
Swettenham, Remington, Murphy, Feuerstein, Grim, & Lavie, 2014). 
This thesis tested novel predictions derived from these findings for contexts 
of cross-modal selective attention. Using behavioural measures, the extent to which 
participants were able to attend to auditory information was examined as a function 
of the perceptual demands of a visual task. It was shown that individuals with ASD 
continued to report awareness of auditory information at higher levels of visual 
perceptual load than matched typically developing individuals. This was evident on 
tasks that measured both awareness for an unexpected, as well as expected auditory 
stimulus. Together, these findings suggest that individuals with ASD are 
characterised by an increased perceptual capacity that operates across sensory 
modalities. 
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Chapter 1 Autism 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are a set of life-long, neurodevelopmental 
conditions that were first described by Leo Kanner (1943) and Hans Asperger 
(1944), who independently of each other observed a group of individuals unable to 
form normal relationships with their peers, had a desire for sameness and revealed 
peculiar patterns of communication. Although both authors differed in their 
description of autism, they acknowledged that these individuals shared certain 
features that were not part of other known child psychiatric disorders. Confirmation 
that the syndrome they observed was indeed a distinct psychopathological entity was 
provided on the basis of a large epidemiological study in Camberwell, London by 
Wing and Gould (1979).  They found a history of ‘typical, Kanner-type autism’ in 4 
out of 10,000 children, which increased to 21.2 in 10,000 children when a broader 
definition of impaired reciprocal social interaction was used. As a result of this study, 
the syndrome described by Kanner was considered a particular manifestation of a 
spectrum of conditions, with individuals on this spectrum sharing common 
impairments in social, imaginative and symbolic functioning, as well as 
repetitive/restrictive behaviour, yet the individual expression of these symptom 
domains can differ substantially from one subject to another (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-V: American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). 
Diagnosis 
Deficits in social communication can include deficits in reciprocity (inability 
to interact appropriately with others using social norms), as well as atypical 
nonverbal communication (such as eye contact and gestures) and a difficulty building 
and maintaining relationships. Restrictive and repetitive patterns of behaviour or 
interests in individuals with ASD are often reflected in over-dependence on routines, 
an insistence on sameness, focussing on very specific objects or topics, or a high 
sensitivity to changes in the environment (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Within the category of restrictive/repetitive interests, sensory symptoms were 
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recently introduced as a new diagnostic criterion which have long been observed in 
individuals with autism but were not part of the diagnostic criteria under DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). This new criterion describes 
hypersensitivity or hyposensitivity to sensory input or an unusual interest in sensory 
cues. To receive a diagnosis of autism, symptoms must be present in early childhood 
(they may however not manifest themselves until later life), should cause significant 
impairment in everyday functioning, and should not be attributable to any other 
medical or neurological condition or be explained by intellectual disability (DSM-V; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In the absence of established biomarkers, 
diagnosis of autism relies on behavioural assessments, reviews of a child’s history 
and interviews with family members and parents (Volkmar, Siegel, Woodbury-
Smith, King, McCracken, & State, 2014). 
Autism has previously been conceptualised as a range of separate disorders 
including autistic disorder, Asperger’s syndrome, childhood disintegrative disorder 
and Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS; 
DSM-IV,  American Psychiatric Association, 1994) that share common core features 
of autism. However, as research was unsuccessful in validating these diagnoses as 
separate constructs (for a review see Grzadzinski, Huerta, & Lord, 2013; Lord et al., 
2012), the introduction of the DSM-5 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) has replaced these diagnostic categories by a single umbrella disorder – 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Throughout this thesis, the term ASD will 
therefore be used to include all autism spectrum conditions. 
It has now also been proposed by some researchers that autistic traits are 
present in the general population, with these traits thought to lie on a continuum 
across the whole population with individuals with ASD forming the extreme end of 
this distribution (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001; 
Constantino & Todd, 2003). Consequently, some studies measure autistic traits in the 
population using questionnaire measures such as the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ, 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and relate these differences in autistic traits to behaviour 
on a range of tasks. The view that the distribution of autistic traits is continuous in 
nature has been supported by genetic studies (Robinson, Munir, Munafò, Hughes, 
McCormick, & Koenen, 2011) and findings indicating that outcome measures for 
autistic traits in the general population map well onto ‘gold standard’ diagnostic tools 
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such as the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) (Constantino et al., 2003). 
Others in contrast have argued that AQ scores are an unreliable proxy for autism and 
therefore any conclusions derived from these studies should be taken with caution 
(Gregory & Plaisted-Grant, 2013). 
Prevalence 
Although current estimates vary across studies, autism spectrum disorders are 
considered to be one of the most common neurodevelopmental disorders, with an 
estimated prevalence rate of ~1% worldwide (CDC, 2014; Saemundsen, Magnússon, 
Georgsdóttir, Egilsson, & Rafnsson, 2013) and 1.1% in the United Kingdom (Baird 
et al., 2006; Baron-Cohen, Scott, et al., 2009; Brugha et al., 2009). It is more 
commonly diagnosed in males than in females with a reported sex ratio of 
approximately 4:1 (Baird et al., 2006; Fombonne, 2003). Females also often receive 
a diagnosis of autism later in life than their male counterparts (Begeer et al., 2013) 
and are less likely to be diagnosed than males even if they display the same level of 
autism severity (Russell, Steer, & Golding, 2011). It has been proposed that autism 
may be underdiagnosed in girls (Baird, Douglas, & Murphy, 2011), particularly in 
those at the higher end of the spectrum (Begeer et al., 2013). 
Nonetheless, a male predominance in autism has important aetiological 
implications. For example, the presence of female-specific biological factors might 
reduce the risk in females to develop autism (Werling & Geschwind, 2013), whereas 
male-specific risk factors might heighten susceptibility to develop autism (Baron-
Cohen, Lombardo, Auyeung, Ashwin, Chakrabarti, & Knickmeyer, 2011). 
Theories on ASD 
A great body of research has attempted to identify the underlying causes of 
autism. Biological theories point towards a range of factors that are associated with 
autism. For example, it is now widely accepted that autism has a strong genetic 
component (Bailey et al., 1995; Folstein & Rutter, 1977). Twin studies (Hallmayer et 
al., 2011), recurrence rates in siblings (Constantino, Zhang, Frazier, Abbacchi, & 
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Law, 2010) and high-risk infant sibling studies (Ozonoff et al., 2011) all point 
towards important genetic factors in the aetiology of autism. However, which 
particular genes are implicated in autism remains controversial (O'Roak, 2008; 
Scherer et al., 2003). Physical brain abnormalities such as macrocephaly (Webb, 
Nalty, Munson, Brock, Abbott, & Dawson, 2007), abnormal dopamine metabolism 
(Ernst, Zametkin, Matochik, Pascualvaca, & Cohen, 1997) and neuroanatomical 
abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex (Prior & Hoffmann, 1990), parietal lobes 
(Courchesne, Press, & Yeung-Courchesne, 1993), prefrontal cortex medial temporal 
lobe structures (Salmond, Ashburner, Connelly, Friston, Gadian, & Vargha‐
Khadem, 2005) and the cerebellum (Courchesne, 1997) have also been associated 
with the condition. However, no accepted biological aetiology has emerged from this 
work. 
Findings from structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for example 
indicate that toddlers with ASD (aged 2 – 4 years) demonstrate on average larger 
brain volumes than typically developing children (Carper & Courchesne, 2005; 
Courchesne, 2002; Courchesne et al., 2001), although with development, this 
difference in brain volume between subject groups seems to decline (Courchesne, 
Campbell, & Solso, 2011). These findings, among others, suggested that brain 
maturation is atypical in ASD and involves a period of early overgrowth in both 
white matter and grey matter (Courchesne et al., 2001; Ecker, Bookheimer, & 
Murphy, 2015), followed by a stagnating growth phase and possibly decline in older 
ages  (Courchesne et al., 2011). The finding of increased brain volume also 
converges with reports of larger head circumference in ASD (Lainhart et al., 1997), 
increased brain weight in post-mortem brains of individuals with autism (Bailey et 
al., 1998) and an increase in cortical thickness, particularly in temporal and parietal 
cortices in children with ASD compared to controls (Hardan, Muddasani, 
Vemulapalli, Keshavan, & Minshew, 2006). A wide variety of brain regions have 
been reported to be structurally abnormal in individuals with ASD. This includes a 
reduction in cell size and cell density in the limbic system, Purkinje cells in the 
cerebellum and enlargement of the amygdala  (see Amaral, Schumann, & Nordahl, 
2008 for a review). 
Studies using diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) have also shown atypical 
patterns of white matter circuitry in individuals with ASD (Keller, Kana, & Just, 
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2007), with these abnormalities already observable in early development (Wolff et 
al., 2012). Wolff et al. (2012) for example showed that those infants that later went 
on to develop autism had accelerated white matter development at 6 months 
compared to unaffected infants. This pattern however reversed over time such that at 
24 months, the infants with ASD showed decreased white matter fibre tracts (Wolff 
et al., 2012). 
Apart from structural differences, functional brain connectivity also seems to 
be different in individuals with ASD. One prominent view suggests that ASD is 
characterised by local over-connectivity and long distance under-connectivity of the 
frontal cortex (Courchesne & Pierce, 2005). Evidence for this claim derived from an 
early study using positron emission tomography (PET) (Horwitz, Rumsey, Grady, & 
Rapoport, 1988), as well as later post-mortem (Vargas, Nascimbene, Krishnan, 
Zimmerman, & Pardo, 2005) and fMRI studies (e.g. Carper & Courchesne, 2005). 
While the finding of long-range under-connectivity seems to be generally supported 
in the literature (Abrams et al., 2013), only little evidence also points towards 
increased local connectivity in ASD (Vissers, Cohen, & Geurts, 2012). The reasons 
for differences between these studies could potentially be driven by developmental 
changes in individuals with ASD given the large variability in age of participants 
studied (Uddin, Supekar, & Menon, 2013), or in the oversampling of high-
functioning individuals with ASD in some studies. 
Psychological theories 
The most influential psychological theories; theory of mind, executive 
dysfunction and weak central coherence aimed to provide a cognitive perspective of 
autism and associated core symptoms.  I am now going to outline each of these 
theories separately. 
Difficulties with Theory of Mind 
The term “theory of mind” (ToM) was first coined by Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) and refers to the ability to attribute mental states to self and others. It relates 
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both to the capacity to understand that other people know and understand the world 
differently than oneself, as well as to use these representations to predict and 
describe the behaviour and motivations of others (Brownell & Martino, 1998). An 
intact ToM mechanism allows individuals to make inferences about what another 
person feels, thinks, and desires. This process of “mentalising” describes the 
automatic attribution of mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour (Frith, 
1989a). It has therefore been suggested that ToM is crucial in successfully engaging 
in social situations (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and an overarching deficit 
in ToM might account for the pattern of impairments seen in communication, 
socialisation and imagination that characterise ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Frith, 
1989a; Leslie & Frith, 1987). 
The hypothesis that an impaired ToM is a fundamental deficit in ASD was 
first tested using false belief tasks. In these tasks, participants are required to predict 
the behaviour of another person who holds a false belief. Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) 
presented children with ASD with the ‘Sally Anne’ task, where two dolls, Sally and 
Anne acted out a scenario in which Sally hid a marble in a basket and then left the 
room. While Sally is absent from the room, Anne moves the marble into a box. The 
children are then asked where Sally will look for her marble. In order to pass this 
false belief task, the children need to understand that Sally’s beliefs of the location of 
the marble are false and different to one’s own, i.e. Sally would look in the basket for 
her marble and not in the box. It has been shown that typically developing (TD) 
children pass this test between the ages of 4 and 6 (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Yet, 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) found that only 20 % of children with ASD predicted 
correctly Sally’s behaviour, even though they had an average verbal mental age of 5 
years and 5 months. The authors also demonstrated that this was not due to their low 
IQ, as 80% of mental-aged matched children with Down’s syndrome also passed the 
test. An explanation in terms of a general mental handicap that could account for this 
difference in performance was therefore ruled out. 
This study also inspired subsequent work investigating why some of the 
children with ASD who are able to pass first-order false belief tasks nonetheless fail 
second-order false belief tasks (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989; Happé, 1994). Whereas 
first-order false belief tasks require an understanding of the relationship between a 
person’s belief and reality, second-order false belief tasks measure the ability to 
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understand the belief of one person about another person’s belief (e.g. “John thinks 
that Mary thinks X”). Baron-Cohen (1989) found that while most typically 
developing children (chronological age of 7.5) and children with Down syndrome 
(mean verbal mental age of 7.5) passed this task, none of the children with ASD 
(mean verbal mental age of 12.2) passed this second-order false belief task, although 
being able to successfully attribute first-order false beliefs. Happé (1994) further 
extended these findings using a more naturalistic test of theory of mind by 
embedding a test of theory of mind in a realistic context. She presented participants 
with a set of vignettes or stories that described everyday situations where people 
would say things which they do not literally mean (e.g. someone says a dress looks 
pretty although it is actually ugly to not hurt the other person’s feelings). Subjects 
were subsequently asked to describe what was being said and why. The results 
indicated that although passing first and second-order false belief tasks, individuals 
with ASD were still severely impaired at performing in these more naturalistic 
contexts. This provided further evidence that individuals with ASD continue to 
experience difficulties attributing mental states even after they are able to pass more 
traditional first and second-order beliefs tasks. 
Deficits in the acquisition of a theory of mind in ASD, it was argued, 
provided a convincing explanation for the core symptoms seen in autism, particularly 
in relation to the impairments seen in social reciprocity and communication. The 
robustness with which these findings have been replicated over the years leaves little 
doubt that individuals with ASD experience difficulties attributing mental states to 
themselves and others.  
However, the theory of mind hypothesis has also received criticism. Apart 
from methodological limitations in administering false belief tasks, particularly in 
respect to children (Birch & Bloom, 2003), questions about the universality of the 
theory of mind hypothesis have been raised (Tager-Flusberg, 2007). This concerns 
the idea that whilst a ToM deficit is able to account well for some of the core 
symptoms in autism, it cannot sufficiently explain the other areas of impairments in 
ASD, notably restricted and repetitive behaviours. Even within the domain of social-
communication impairments, a ToM deficit can only account for a fraction of the 
behavioural phenotype seen in autism (Tager-Flusberg, 2007). One caveat of the 
theory of mind hypothesis is also that many individuals with ASD are still able to 
20 
 
pass false belief tasks, suggesting that a theory of mind deficit is not universal in 
ASD. For example, Bowler (1992) found that adults with Asperger syndrome (AS) 
were as capable as typically developing adults at solving second-order false belief 
tasks, suggesting that an intact theory of mind mechanism does not shield against 
impairments in social communication and interaction. This indicated that deficits of 
individuals with ASD on ToM tasks may not be the only explanation for the social 
impairments in ASD, but may constitute one cause. 
Executive Dysfunction 
The second major theory seeks to explain the core cognitive symptoms in 
ASD according to an impairment in executive function. Executive function refers to 
the cognitive operations related to planning, working memory, inhibition, flexibility, 
as well as the initiation and monitoring of action (Duncan, 1986), and are thought to 
be controlled by the frontal lobes (Hill, 2004). This theory sees executive 
dysfunction as the primary deficit of ASD (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) that 
underlie many of the features of autism both in the social and non-social domain 
(Hill, 2004). For example, the restrictive and repetitive interests might be a result of 
poor mental flexibility that results in perseverative, stereotyped behaviours and 
impaired regulation of motor behaviour. Conversely, the social difficulties observed 
in ASD could reflect a deficit in regulating social behaviour and emotional reactions 
that in turn is the result of impaired functioning of the prefrontal cortex (Bennetto, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1996).  
As social interaction relies on the abilities of individuals to keep subtle verbal 
and non-verbal information in mind and then plan and respond in a flexible manner, 
disruption of executive function would make it difficult for individuals with ASD to 
interact appropriately in a social situation. One strength of this approach compared to 
the other theories therefore is that it is able to account for multiple core symptom 
domains in ASD. Early studies have revealed significant impairments in children, 
adolescents and adults with ASD on a range of tasks that are considered to tap into 
executive function. For example, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) is 
regarded to be a test of mental flexibility or set shifting and requires participants to 
sort cards according to three possible dimensions (colour, number, shape) and an 
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unknown rule. Participants receive direct feedback whether a card was sorted 
according to the correct rule, although without being told the exact rule. At some 
point, and without the knowledge of the participant, the rule is changed and the 
number of perseverative errors (i.e. sorting by the old criterion) is measured. A high 
number of errors is indicative of a failure to shift set to a new sorting rule. 
Individuals with ASD have generally been observed to perform worse than controls 
on the WCST, reflected by increased rates of perseveration and shifting between 
different sorting criteria (Bennetto et al., 1996; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Prior & 
Hoffmann, 1990; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1990). Similar findings have been reported 
for the Tower of Hanoi (Bennetto et al., 1996; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994), and 
Tower of London test (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 
1991). 
However, one problem with this account is that executive function deficits 
are not consistently reported in individuals with ASD (Geurts, Corbett, & Solomon, 
2009). For example, Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, and Rogers (1999) showed that 
children with ASD did not differ from mental-age matched controls on eight 
different executive function tasks, thereby questioning the specificity of executive 
function to explain the underlying causes of this condition. Adding to this study, 
Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, and Lai (2005) also showed that only some aspects of 
executive functions (i.e. working memory, cognitive flexibility, and response 
inhibition) were related to repetitive behaviours in ASD and not others such as 
mental planning and fluency. While it has been claimed that executive dysfunction is 
universal within the ASD population (Ozonoff et al., 1991), is has been shown that it 
is not specific to ASD but is also associated with ADHD (Geurts, Verte, Oosterlaan, 
Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004) and Tourette’s syndrome (Channon, Pratt, & Robertson, 
2003). This led some to suggest that strong skills in executive functions might reduce 
the susceptibility of at-risk individuals to develop autism or other 
neurodevelopmental disorders by compensating for brain atypicalities in other 
domains (Johnson, 2012). 
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Weak Central Coherence 
The third theory, weak central coherence, attempts to account for the 
behaviour patterns in ASD in terms of an atypical cognitive style that involves 
higher-level processes (Frith, 1989a). According to Frith, autism is characterised by 
weak central coherence, which relates to the weakness of higher-order cognitive 
systems to integrate component parts to form a coherent whole, resulting in a 
tendency or cognitive bias to process local parts of information at the expense of the 
overall context or “Gestalt”. The evidence to support this theory derived from 
observations that described impairments in contextual processing at the “Gestalt” 
level in individuals with ASD (Brosnan, Scott, Fox, & Pye, 2004), yet advantages to 
process local, low-level information or scene-detail in stimuli. 
For example, individuals with ASD perform exceptionally well on the 
embedded figures task (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983) where 
participants are required to locate a hidden shape (e.g. triangle) within a complex 
drawing. Similarly, individuals with ASD consistently outperform controls on the 
block design sub-test of the Wechsler intelligence scale (Happé, Briskman, & Frith, 
2001; Shah & Frith, 1993). According to the weak central coherence account, 
superior performance of individuals with ASD on these tasks (e.g. shorter latencies 
to find the target stimulus) reflects a tendency to process information at the local 
level.  
Conversely, people with ASD are less susceptible to visual illusions that 
require global processing (Happé, 1996), and show a deficit in grouping according to 
the gestalt (Brosnan et al., 2004). Superior local and impaired global performance on 
these tasks has also been found in neurotypical individuals with higher autistic traits, 
suggesting that this cognitive style may be observable across the autism spectrum 
(Grinter, Maybery, Van Beek, Pellicano, Badcock, & Badcock, 2009; Sutherland & 
Crewther, 2010).  
A local processing style has also been suggested to contribute to the 
exceptional abilities in individuals with ASD that are occurring disproportionally in 
this population (Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, Tavassoli, & Chakrabarti, 2009; 
Mottron et al., 2013). For example, in the auditory domain, a local processing style 
could be reflected by a higher incidence of perfect pitch (e.g. Heaton, 2003) and 
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enhanced frequency discrimination skills, at least in a subgroup of those with ASD 
(Bonnel et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2009). 
It has also been suggested that weak central coherence is associated with the 
behaviour patterns seen in ASD, particularly in relation to the social and language 
deficits (Happé & Frith, 2006). For example, a deficient ability to integrate local 
parts into a coherent role and attribute meaning could impede the ability to 
understand mental states of other people and their behaviour. Without central 
coherence, the multitude of verbal and non-verbal cues and emotional reactions that 
make up social situations are not integrated successfully and are instead processed in 
a ‘piecemeal’ approach. Weak central coherence may also be responsible for the 
pragmatic difficulties experienced by individuals with ASD. This was demonstrated 
in both children (Frith & Snowling, 1983) and adults with ASD (Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999), who were less likely than controls to use the context of a sentence to 
determine the meaning and therefore pronunciation of a word.  
However, not all studies investigating weak central coherence in ASD have 
produced the same pattern of observations. On a range of tasks including the 
embedded figures task and Block design task (Ropar & Mitchell, 2001), as well as 
the Navon task (Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, & Filloux, 1994), individuals with 
ASD can show intact central coherence under certain conditions. Plaisted, 
Swettenham, and Rees (1999) for example examined these findings further by 
presenting participants with two versions of the Navon task. In the Navon task, 
participants are presented with a compound stimulus that is comprised of a large 
shape made up of small shapes, with the smaller shapes being either compatible (e.g. 
a large H made up of small H’s) or incompatible (e.g. a large ‘H’ made up of small 
‘X’s’, see Figure 1.1) to the larger shape. As soon as the stimulus is shown, 
participants are required to indicate the identity of the letter at either the global 
and/or local level (Navon, 1977). On this task, subjects typically show a ‘global 
advantage’, i.e. faster and more accurate responses to the global form compared to 
the local form, as well as a ‘global interference’ effect. The latter effect relates to the 
finding that when required to respond to the local but not global form, slower target 
responses in incompatible conditions are observed that indicate response interference 
from processing of the global shape.  
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Figure 1.1 Illustration of stimuli used in the Navon task (incompatible condition) 
 
 
Plaisted et al. (1999) observed that in a divided attention condition 
(participants were required to focus on both the local or global form to detect the 
target), children with ASD demonstrated a local advantage compared to controls as 
predicted by weak central coherence. In the selective attention condition however 
(focus on either the local or global form), children with ASD showed the same global 
advantage and global interference effect as typically developing children. These 
results supported earlier findings by Ozonoff et al. (1994) and demonstrated that 
global processing is generally intact in autism, at least when being overtly primed. 
A related theory to weak central coherence in autism is the Enhanced 
Perceptual Functioning (EPF) account (Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, Dawson, 
Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006). This model proposes that individuals with ASD 
also show a more locally biased perceptual style (as posited by weak central 
coherence). In contrast to the weak central coherence account however, the EPF 
model does not predict a weakness in global processing in individuals with ASD. 
Instead, the EPF account proposes that lower-order cognitive processes take 
precedence over the development of higher-order processes. According to this 
theory, superior performance in individuals with ASD is the result of enhanced low-
level perception rather than a weak global processing style. 
In summary, unlike the two theories (ToM and executive function) mentioned 
above, the weak central coherence account of ASD attempts to explain not only the 
deficits but also the superior performance of individuals with ASD on some 
behavioural tasks. Some of these phenomena that inspired the development of weak 
central coherence have also led to a great body of research investigating atypical 
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attentional and perceptual processes in this population, which is going to be the focus 
of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 Selective attention and perceptual load theory 
Our ability to effectively select those aspects of the environment which are 
important in guiding our behaviour whilst ignoring other potentially distracting 
information is a fundamental component of human information processing. This 
ability is crucial given that we only possess limited processing systems (Broadbent, 
1958), yet are constantly bombarded with a multitude of information, often 
originating from different senses. Selective attention is the generic term used to 
describe the cognitive mechanisms responsible that allow us to focus on what is 
relevant and ignore what is irrelevant (Portas, Rees, Howseman, Josephs, Turner, & 
Frith, 1998).  Indeed, without this ability, the experience of our world would be quite 
different, maybe even to the point of being chaotic. 
In individuals with ASD however, self- and parent reports point to a 
distinctively different phenomenological experience of the world. These observations 
led some to suggest that perceptual and attentional atypicalities are a central feature 
in individuals with ASD (Allen & Courchesne, 2001). Patterns of attention and 
perception have also been the subject of some of the earliest and most influential 
experimental research in autism. In a series of meticulously controlled experiments, 
Hermelin, O’Connor and colleagues studied the psychophysical aspects of sensation 
and perception in individuals with ASD and revealed cross-modal information 
processing deficits in ASD. This included deficits in cross-modal integration, low-
level sensory and perceptual impairments, as well as problems with associative 
thinking and deriving meaning from language (Hermelin and O’Connor, 1970). 
Interestingly, these deficits were less pronounced on tasks that used proximal sensory 
input (i.e. smelling or touching) than those that involved distal sensory input (i.e. 
vision or hearing), suggesting that cross-modal processing is intact in some 
situations. These by-now classic experiments used paradigms from mainstream 
experimental psychology to further understand underlying cognitive patterns in 
individuals with ASD. Mottron, Dawson and Soulières (2008) made an interesting 
point in this respect by drawing on findings in memory research, relating descriptions 
of the cognitive profile of individuals with autism to ‘normocentrism’. This term 
describes the tendency to evaluate autistics in relation to the performance profile of 
non-autistics (i.e. impaired/spared, reduced/increased). Criticising normocentrism, 
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the authors suggested using a ‘difference’ rather than a ‘deficit’ approach to describe 
autistic patterns of behaviour and accept autism as a variant within human species 
and not as a defect.  
While a great deal of subsequent research has investigated attentional 
abnormalities in ASD, particularly in the visual domain, relatively little work has 
focused on selective attention or indeed cross-modal selective attention in ASD. 
Based on recent advances in research on visual selective attention in ASD that 
applied Lavie’s perceptual load theory of attention (Lavie, 1995), this thesis seeks to 
investigate cross-modal selective attention in ASD. The relevant mainstream 
literature on selective attention and perceptual load theory will first be discussed, 
before considering the issues of attentional abnormalities in individuals with ASD. 
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Early selection vs. late selection 
A central question that has pervaded research on selective attention concerns 
the locus of attentional selection. This pertains to the idea that at some stage in the 
information processing stream, irrelevant information needs to be disregarded.  
Decades of research have shaped two opposing views about the locus of attentional 
selection, that is, whether selection of attended items occurs at an early or late 
processing stage. Proponents of the early selection view argue that attention is 
characterised by a limited capacity system that restricts processing to attended items 
only. As a result, unattended items are filtered out at an early processing stage (e.g. 
Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1969). The opposing late selection view posits that 
perception is an automatic process in which all incoming stimuli are processed 
regardless of relevance, with selective attention proceeding thereafter (Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963). According to this theory, selection of the most relevant stimuli 
occurs relatively late in the processing stages after full perception and identification 
is completed. 
The early selection view was mainly formed by data from dichotic listening 
tasks that found that focusing attention on one auditory stream over another can 
impair perception and identification of information in the unattended stream. In a 
classic study by Cherry (1953), participants were presented with different auditory 
streams (spoken words) played to each ear via headphones and were asked to shadow 
the input to one ear only (i.e. verbally repeating those words aloud) whilst ignoring 
the other stream. After completing the task, participants were asked about the 
information presented in the unattended channel. Interestingly, participants were 
only aware of the physical properties of the unattended message (e.g. pitch, volume), 
but not the semantic content of the unattended message even if the language was 
changed (from English to reversed speech), or when single words were frequently 
repeated. On the basis of these findings, Broadbent (1958) proposed that selection of 
information occurs at an early temporal sequence within information-processing 
stages in order to account for the observation that participants were only able to 
report drastic physical changes in pitch and volume, but not the actual content of the 
unattended message. Broadbent proposed that stimuli undergo a two-stage model of 
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processing. In the first stage, stimuli are extracted and processed in terms of their 
physical properties in a ‘parallel’ fashion, and are subsequently filtered out according 
to particularly salient physical properties. He argued that the second processing stage 
for semantic identification has a much smaller capacity than the first processing 
stage, and therefore not all stimuli can be processed simultaneously. Instead, any 
incoming sensory information has to pass a bottleneck to not overload processing at 
the second stage. Only stimuli passing this bottleneck are further passed on to extract 
semantic meaning (see Figure 2.1). This explanation was able to account well for the 
finding that on dichotic listening tasks, participants experienced limited awareness of 
semantic information in the unattended message, yet were able to distinguish 
between physical properties of the unattended auditory stream. According to the 
early selection view, physically distinct information is selected early in the 
information processing stream, whereas semantic information in the unattended 
stream is not processed beyond the first processing stage (i.e. the sensory register). 
 
Figure 2.1 Filter theory according to the early selection view (Broadbent, 1958) 
 
 
However, not all observations could be reconciled with this early selection 
account of attention. Moray (1959) for instance found that participants showed own-
name recognition in the unattended channel, suggesting that the semantic content of 
words in the unattended stream is processed even if it is not physically salient. In a 
related finding, Treisman (1960) presented participants with a dichotic listening task 
that featured two sentences, one in each ear, with participants being asked to shadow 
one of two sentences. When the content of the shadowed channel changed to the 
other ear, participants would continue to repeat the same sentence, although it was 
now being presented in the to-be-ignored channel. The tendency of participants to 
track the sentence across channels based on syntactic structure and semantic content 
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suggested that the message in the unattended channel was processed at a semantic 
level rather than just being restricted to its physical features-only as predicted by 
Broadbent’s early selection theory.  Finally, Corteen and Dunn (1974) demonstrated 
that conditioning for feared words elicited a galvanic skin response even if they were 
played to the non-shadowed ear. It was also claimed that this effect generalises to 
synonyms of the conditioned words (Von Wright, Anderson, Stenman, Rabbitt, & 
Dorric, 1975), indicating that the meaning of the fear-conditioned words was 
processed to some extent. Together, this evidence therefore directly contradicted the 
predictions of the early selection theory. 
Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) took on these results and proposed a late 
selection model, directly opposing the early selection model advanced by Broadbent. 
According to this view, all incoming stimuli are analysed in terms of their semantic 
meaning but only the most relevant stimuli are selected to be passed on to further 
processing (see Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 Late-selection theory of attention (Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963) 
 
 
If the late selection model holds, then it would predict that detection rates for 
target words in the attended and unattended channel would be similar, as the 
semantic meaning is fully processed across the two income streams before selection 
occurs. However, this was shown to not be the case, as detection rates for target 
words in the shadowed message reached 87% and only 8% for the unattended 
message (Treisman & Geffen, 1967, as cited in Treisman, 1969). 
Treisman (1960, 1964) in turn, offered a less drastic version of Broadbent’s 
filter theory in her ‘Filter Attenuation Model’ (Treisman, 1964) to account for some 
of the findings that indicated that unattended information is processed to a deeper 
semantic level than predicted by the early selection theory. While adopting the early 
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selection view of a perceptual filter mechanism that selects stimuli based on physical 
properties, the theory proposes that this filter does not completely discard irrelevant 
information, but rather attenuates it. Although these attenuated stimuli only have a 
weak perceptual trace, they can for example be activated if participants are primed to 
a sufficient extent (e.g. as in fear conditioning studies, Corteen & Dunn, 1974) or if 
the words hold a special personal significance (e.g. your own name, Moray, 1959). 
According to Treisman, these attenuated stimuli in the unattended channel activate 
detector units, which in turn lower the threshold for recognition, and thus selection of 
information originating from the unattended channel. 
 
Figure 2.3 Filter Attenuation Theory of Attention (Treisman, 1964) 
 
 
Although these theories were mainly based on research within the auditory 
modality, they were also influential in providing the theoretical framework for 
selective attention research in the visual domain.  Neisser (1969) for example used 
the selective reading paradigm that was closely modelled on the original dichotic 
listening tasks to measure visual information processing for unattended content. In 
this task, participants were required to read the lines of text consisting of one colour 
whilst ignoring alternating lines of text printed in a different colour. The results 
indicated that as in the dichotic listening paradigms, little content presented within 
the unattended text could be retained. Furthermore, Sperling (1960) showed that 
when presented with many letters in a set (e.g. four rows of three letters each) for a 
very short period of time (50ms), participant’s recall of the whole set was generally 
poor, suggesting a limited processing capacity. Yet when cued to a particular row 
(e.g. the top row), recall was much improved. This suggested that only relevant 
letters able to pass through a filtering bottleneck were processed at the semantic 
level, therefore providing support for the early selection model of attention. Further 
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work by Von Wright (1970) that used a similar experimental design presented 
subjects with a display of eight characters and asked them to recall a subset of four 
items according to varying criteria. It was shown that performance was excellent 
when selection was based on location, colour, size or brightness, yet was 
considerably impaired when asked to select according to identity (e.g. orientation, 
letter vs. digit, vowel vs. consonant). This finding again suggested the presence of a 
filter mechanism that allows physical attributes to be passed on for further 
processing, possibly as a result of selecting this information early on in the 
information-processing stream.  
Other work however found evidence for the late selection theory. Tipper 
(1985) for example showed that using a priming paradigm, participants are still 
processing the unattended visual content. In this study, participants were shown 
superimposed images of two objects, of which one object was the target and the 
other a distractor. Following this display, a third picture (the probe) was presented 
and participants had to name the probe. Response latencies for naming the probe 
were shown to be longer when the probe was identical or semantically related to the 
distractor compared to when it was unrelated to the distractor. This indicated that the 
to-be-ignored prime object (the distractor) was processed to a semantic level in order 
to have this effect on reaction times. Studies using the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 
1935) have also provided strong evidence in favour of the alternative late selection 
view. In the classic Stroop colour-word task (e.g. Stroop, 1935), participants are 
presented with a colour word printed in a conflicting hue (e.g. the word ‘Blue’ 
printed in red: Blue) and asked to name the colour of the ink whilst ignoring to read 
the word. Response latencies as measured by reaction times in this condition (i.e. 
incongruent condition) are typically longer compared to control conditions in which, 
for example, the written text is congruent with the colour ink (e.g. the word ‘Blue’ 
printed in blue: Blue). The fact that the ignored dimension (the colour of the word) 
has an influence on participant’s reaction time suggests that although being irrelevant 
to the task, it is nonetheless processed to a semantic level. This therefore provides 
evidence for late selection. 
Taken together, the debate whether early or late selection determines 
selective attention still remained unsolved, as several streams of research provided 
convincing evidence for both accounts. 
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Perceptual load theory 
Nilli Lavie (1995, 2000) put forward a model that can potentially resolve the 
‘early’ vs. ‘late’ selection debate. Based on the observation that evidence for the 
early selection view was generated throughout the 1950’s, 60’s and early 70’s, 
whereas from the mid-70’s most research supported the late selection model, she 
inferred that these diverging conclusions are a result of differences in methodologies 
(Lavie & Tsal, 1994). Lavie and Tsal (1994) noted that earlier studies mainly 
employed filtering paradigms in form of dichotic listening tasks (e.g. Cherry, 1953) 
that typically presented a more demanding task with multiple stimuli to participants. 
These experiments were designed to overload attention of participants to see which 
specific stimuli are processed or ignored. In contrast, later studies used tasks such as 
the ‘selective set paradigm’ that confronted participants with only a limited amount 
of information (e.g. a single target and distractor), which was presumably less 
demanding on attention. 
Lavie (1995) concluded from this observation that it is the level of 
‘perceptual load’ of the task that determined these findings. She proposed that early 
selection occurs (i.e. unattended items are not perceived) under conditions of high 
perceptual load that exhaust capacity, yet late selection (i.e. perception of unwanted 
information) proceeds in less capacity-taxing low perceptual load conditions. Crucial 
to the perceptual load model is the assumption that selective attention is limited in 
capacity as proposed by the early selection view, yet perception proceeds 
automatically and involuntarily on all stimuli falling within this limit even if they are 
not relevant to the task (reflecting the late selection view). This implies that when 
attentional capacity is available, as in low perceptual load conditions, any spare 
capacity of the processing of task-relevant stimuli automatically “spills-over” into 
processing of irrelevant information. The implication of the perceptual load model is 
that one cannot refrain from processing items if the relevant capacity is not 
consumed. In tasks of high perceptual load however, all processing capacity is 
engaged in the primary task, leaving no additional capacity to process irrelevant 
information (Lavie, 1995). 
The perceptual load of a task is operationally defined as either (i) an increase 
in the number of relevant items/units in a display for the same task, or (ii) an increase 
in the complexity of perceptual operations/perceptual processing requirements 
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involved in the relevant task for the same number of items (Lavie, 1995). Attentional 
capacity is therefore consumed by the additional processing of these items or by 
imposing additional and/or more complex perceptual processing requirements on 
participants. 
In a series of studies, Lavie (1995) and Lavie and Cox (1997) provided 
preliminary support for the perceptual load theory of attention. These studies used 
the Eriksen response competition paradigm (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) to assess the 
extent to which visual distractors were processed under different levels of perceptual 
load via interference effects on target reaction times (RTs). The general design 
involved participants identifying a relevant target letter (e.g. X or Z) presented within 
a central display of letters. On the periphery, either a compatible (i.e. X when the 
target in the ring was X), incompatible (e.g. X when the target in the ring was Z, or 
vice versa) or neutral (e.g. P) distractor letter was also presented. The perceptual load 
of the task was subsequently manipulated by adding non-target letters to the central 
display (e.g. K, S, V, M, and N). This meant that participants either performed a low 
perceptual load condition with a search set size of one (only target letter was 
presented) or a high perceptual load condition with a set size of six (target letter + 
five non-target letters). The extent to which distractors were processed at different 
levels of perceptual load was measured by comparing trials that featured an 
incompatible distractor compared to a neutral distractor. If the distractor was indeed 
processed, then a slowing of response times would be observed on incompatible 
trials that activated the opposite response category. Lavie found that when the 
perceptual load of the task was low, that is, when the display featured fewer attended 
objects, distractors were processed (evidence for late selection). In contrast, in high 
perceptual load conditions, distractor interference was eliminated, indicating that 
they were not processed (early selection) (Lavie, 1995).  
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Figure 2.4 Example of displays used by Lavie & Cox, 1997  
 
 
Note: Participants were required to make a speeded target letter response (X or N) in 
either a low perceptual load condition (left box) or high perceptual load condition 
(right box) with, as in this example, an irrelevant incompatible distractor shown in 
the periphery 
 
Note that it is not just the number of units in a task-relevant display (e.g. 
extra non-target letters) which constitutes perceptual load. Perceptual load is also 
conceptualised in terms of variations in processing demands in the relevant task 
whilst maintaining identical displays across conditions. To examine distractor 
processing using this manipulation of perceptual load, Lavie (1995) presented 
participants with either a single feature search task (colour) or a conjunction feature 
search task (colour + shape). Other manipulations of perceptual load according to 
this definition of perceptual load involved a more demanding size and position 
judgment relative to a simple presence judgment. Using these manipulations of the 
perceptual load of the task, Lavie (1995) again found greater distractor effects on 
response times when the perceptual load of the task was low (e.g. single feature 
search task) than when the perceptual load was high (e.g. conjunction search task). 
Since these initial observations, the theory that perceptual load affects 
attention has been supported by various behavioural and neuroimaging findings. For 
example, when distractors were presented in subsequent trials in a priming paradigm, 
a negative priming effect (i.e. slowing of responses on the subsequent trial) was 
observed in low perceptual load trials, but not in high perceptual load trials (Lavie & 
Fox, 2000). This suggests that distractors were processed in low perceptual load, but 
not high perceptual load displays. Evidence from neuroimaging studies also point to 
perceptual load effects at the neural level. Rees, Frith, and Lavie (1997) found that 
cortical responses in the visual cortex to motion distractors were only evoked in low 
perceptual load conditions whereas distractor words did not provoke a neuronal 
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response when participants were engaged in a central picture task with high 
perceptual load. Other studies have shown that high perceptual load attenuates visual 
cortex activity in response to task-irrelevant checkerboards (Schwartz, Vuilleumier, 
Hutton, Maravita, Dolan, & Driver, 2005), and reduces parahippocampal activity 
related to images of places (Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun, 2004). In 
summary, over the past decade, the predictions of load theory have converged across 
a range of tasks and distractor measures suggesting that the extent of distractor 
processing is dependent on the level of perceptual load in the relevant task (for 
reviews see Lavie, 2005, 2010).  
In an important experiment for perceptual load theory, Lavie and de Fockert 
(2003) also delineated the boundary conditions of perceptual load effects on attention 
by contrasting these effects with the effects of task difficulty on attention. Perceptual 
load can be manipulated by increasing the number of task-relevant items or by 
increasing perceptual processing requirements, thereby placing higher attentional 
demands on available resources (i.e. increasing data “resource limits” (Lavie, 2005, 
2010). Task difficulty on the other hand can be increased by manipulations of 
extreme sensory degradation, altering sensory “data limits” (e.g. by manipulating 
contrast or size of a target) without increasing perceptual load (Lavie & de Fockert, 
2003). Lavie and de Fockert (2003) demonstrated that whereas an increase in 
perceptual load resulted in reduced distractor processing, task difficulty (as defined 
above) disrupts task performance while having no effect on distractor processing. 
The effect of perceptual load on attention can therefore not simply be attributed to 
general task difficulty and instead reflect load-specific effects on perceptual 
resources.  
Conscious awareness and perceptual load theory 
The majority of studies that were published following the initial proposal of 
perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994), including the ones 
mentioned above, have typically investigated the effects of visual perceptual load on 
distractor processing via response interference effects. In these studies, the extent to 
which a distractor was processed was reflected in the RT costs associated with the 
presence of a response-incongruent distractor (requiring the opposite target 
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response). Conversely, the absence of RT differences between incompatible 
compared to neutral or compatible trials was taken as evidence that distractors were 
not processed. Although these studies clearly demonstrated that distractor processing 
is reduced or even eliminated in conditions of high perceptual load, this cannot 
provide information on the effects of perceptual load on conscious awareness of 
those distractors. Perceptual load theory would suggest that the elimination of 
interference effects seen at high levels of perceptual load is a result of a reduction in 
distractor perception. By extension, this may then indicate that there is no conscious 
perception of distractors at high levels of perceptual load. Alternative explanations 
are however also viable. For example, greater reaction time costs incurred on 
incompatible versus compatible trials could reflect post-perceptual processes such as 
response selection. Alternatively, distractors may never enter awareness regardless of 
load, but activate more strongly unconscious recognition processes of distractor-
/target-response associations under low perceptual load. The effects of reaction times 
can therefore potentially be attributed to a range of mechanisms and cannot provide 
clear evidence whether distractors were actually consciously perceived and thus 
entered awareness. 
Specific evidence that perceptual load can determine unconscious processing 
was provided by several studies (Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & Lavie, 2008; 
Bahrami, Lavie, & Rees, 2007). Bahrami et al. (2007) for example presented 
participants with a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task that featured a central 
stream of letters presented at fixation whilst measuring V1 responses (neural 
response in the primary visual cortex) to invisible irrelevant stimuli that participants 
did not consciously perceive (using the continuous flash suppression method). 
Although these stimuli were invisible in both perceptual load conditions, V1 
responses to these invisible gratings were significantly diminished under higher 
perceptual load of the task. These findings indicate that increasing perceptual load 
can reduce unconscious processing at very early stages of visual input. Clearly, any 
evidence from studies on the neural effects of perceptual load on processing 
irrelevant information cannot provide information on conscious experience. 
Several studies have now begun to investigate how the level of perceptual 
load of a visual task affects perception and awareness of an additional visual 
stimulus using the inattentional blindness paradigm. Inattentional blindness refers to 
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the phenomenon that participants often fail to notice an unexpected visual stimulus 
on a critical trial when their attention is engaged in the primary task, yet report 
awareness on a following control trial when they are told not to engage in the 
primary task (Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser, 1979). The term awareness in this 
context refers to the conscious and perceptual awareness of an additional visual 
stimulus that is accessible for report by an individual (Lavie, Beck, & Konstantinou, 
2014). In a typical inattentional blindness task, participants perform a task (e.g. 
judging which line of a cross is longer) for some trials (Mack & Rock, 1998). On a 
‘critical trial’ (also known as the ‘inattention trial’), an unexpected, additional visual 
stimulus (the critical stimulus, e.g. a shape) is presented together with the cross 
stimulus. Once participants have responded to the primary task on this critical trial, 
participants are asked whether they have noticed anything else. The critical trial is 
followed by a control trial (referred to as the ‘full attention trial’) that also features 
the critical stimulus, yet requires participants to not pay attention to the primary task 
and instead pay attention to anything else that might appear. The term ‘inattentional 
blindness’ was coined by the observation that on the critical trial, most participants 
were not aware of the critical stimulus, yet reported awareness of the critical stimulus 
on a subsequent fully-attended control trial. The difference in awareness, or 
‘blindness’ in relation to the critical stimulus between the critical and control trial 
must therefore be a result of a lack of attention towards it, hence the term 
inattentional blindness. 
Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) investigated whether the level of 
perceptual load modulated the incidence of inattentional blindness. The general 
design involved participants performing a central task featuring a cross stimulus for a 
short number of trials. The cross target was characterised by two arms of different 
colour (blue and green) and of different length. Perceptual load of the task was 
manipulated by presenting the same cross display across load conditions, yet 
depending on the condition, participants had to perform a different perceptual 
judgment task. In the low perceptual load condition, participants were required to 
make a simple judgment of colour (indicate which arm of the cross is blue), whereas 
in the high perceptual load condition, participants had to indicate which arm of the 
cross was longer, requiring a more subtle discrimination judgment. On a critical trial, 
together with the central cross stimulus, an unexpected visual stimulus in form of a 
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black square appeared at the periphery of the screen and participants were 
subsequently asked whether they had noticed any other stimulus. The results 
indicated that performing in the high perceptual load condition resulted in higher 
failure rates of detecting the additional visual stimulus than in the low perceptual 
load condition, suggesting that attention and thus awareness of the critical stimulus 
was dependent on the level of perceptual load. The authors also demonstrated 
reduced awareness on a critical trial at higher levels of perceptual load in a task 
intermixing low- and high-load trials, and in a letter search task manipulating 
perceptual load by adding similar items to the display (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 
2007). 
Apart from these effects of perceptual load on awareness when the additional 
stimulus was unexpected, Macdonald and Lavie (2008) also measured awareness for 
a critical stimulus that participants expected and were instructed to detect. This 
design allowed measuring detection sensitivity for the critical stimulus, which has 
the advantage that its value does not depend upon the response criterion the subject is 
adopting, thereby providing a true measure of a subject’s sensitivity. Participants 
were required to perform a visual search task in form of a letter identification task 
(identify whether an X or N is present in the central display) at varying levels of 
perceptual load. Perceptual load of the central letter task was manipulated by varying 
the similarity between target letters (X or N) and non-target letters. The low 
perceptual load condition featured apart from the target letter other small letters that 
were not similar to the target (i.e. small o’s), whereas in the high perceptual load 
condition, similar letters to the target (e.g. H, K, M, V, and Z) were presented. On 
each trial, participants also had to report the presence of a grey meaningless shape 
presented in the periphery (the critical stimulus). The results showed that despite 
participants anticipating and actively trying to detect the additional shape, 
performing the task at a high level of perceptual load resulted in a reduction in 
sensitivity, while having no effect on response bias. The same findings were also 
reported in an experiment in which participants had to make the detection response 
prior to the letter search task response, therefore ruling out the possibility of rapid 
forgetting or poorer encoding into memory during prolonged response times in the 
high perceptual load condition. 
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Carmel, Saker, Rees, and Lavie (2007) further extended these findings by 
measuring conscious flicker perception using the same manipulation of perceptual 
load in a visual search task. The results suggested that performing the task at a high 
perceptual load level reduced the detection of a flicker stimulus presented at fixation. 
Similar findings were also observed on a task that manipulated the processing 
requirements of the relevant task that either involved a  simple feature discrimination 
task  (low perceptual load) or a task requiring discrimination along a conjunction of 
features (high perceptual load) (Carmel, Thorne, Rees, & Lavie, 2011). In summary, 
various streams of research provided evidence for the role of perceptual load for 
conscious awareness in the visual domain, both when the additional stimulus was 
unexpected as in inattentional blindness paradigms, and when it was expected and 
repeated on multiple trials as in variants of a response competition (Eriksen flanker 
paradigm) and visual search task. 
Cross-modal selective attention and perceptual load 
Several studies have now also begun to examine whether the level of visual 
perceptual load modulates the extent to which participants can attend to additional 
auditory information. These studies have contributed to the much wider debate in 
attention research on whether there exist a central processing capacity for both vision 
and hearing that distributes processing resources across sensory modalities 
(Broadbent, 1958), or whether perceptual capacity is modality specific (Allport, 
Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997). This debate concerns 
the question of whether performing in one modality can affect performance in 
another modality. 
In favour of a shared attentional capacity between senses, Sinnett, Costa, and 
Soto-Faraco (2006) showed that recognition memory for task-irrelevant words 
presented to both ears was reduced while monitoring either a rapid stream of pictures 
or sounds. This was the case for both within- (target and cue were presented in the 
same modality) and between modality conditions. These findings clearly show that 
word recognition depends on a capacity-limited resource common to vision and 
hearing. Santangelo, Olivetti Belardinelli, and Spence (2007), using a peripheral 
cuing paradigm, also found that a high perceptually demanding task of focusing 
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attention on a central stream of visual characters reduced cuing effects for auditory 
peripheral cues relative to a  less demanding spatial cuing task that served as a 
control condition. The authors concluded that performing the perceptually more 
demanding task of focussing on the central stream exhausted processing resources 
and reduced auditory cueing effects. 
While the above studies hinted at an effect of visual demands on auditory 
processing, the level of visual perceptual load has also been specifically manipulated 
in a range of studies. For example, there is some evidence that the level of perceptual 
load in a visual task determines the incidence of inattentional deafness. Inattentional 
deafness is the auditory equivalent of the inattentional blindness phenomenon 
described earlier and relates to the failure to notice an unexpected auditory stimulus 
on a critical trial. Macdonald and Lavie (2011) adopted the inattentional blindness 
paradigm used previously by Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007) to show that 
awareness rates for an unexpected pure tone were significantly reduced under high 
visual perceptual load compared to low perceptual load (Macdonald and Lavie, 
2011). Importantly, these effects remained when high- and low perceptual load trials 
were intermixed, therefore ruling out other explanations in terms of top-down factors 
such as load anticipation (c.f. Handy & Mangun, 2000; Murray & Jones, 2002; 
Theeuwes, Kramer, & Belopolsky, 2004). This suggested to the authors that vision 
and hearing share a common attentional resource, as performing a visual task with 
high perceptual load exhausted all available attentional capacity and led to reduced 
awareness. In the low perceptual load task however, attentional resources were not 
fully depleted and available resources automatically spilled-over into processing of 
the auditory stimulus. 
Apart from these cross-modal effects on awareness for an unexpected 
auditory stimulus, Raveh and Lavie (2015) demonstrated that visual perceptual load 
can also modulate detection sensitivity for an expected auditory stimulus. In this 
study, participants were presented with a dual-task paradigm that involved a speeded 
visual classification task (i.e. indicate whether an ‘X’ or ‘N’ is present in a central 
ring) whilst also indicating whether an auditory stimulus was played simultaneously. 
The extent to which participants were able to also attend to the auditory stimulus was 
manipulated by adding non-target letters to the central task display. The results 
indicated that detection sensitivity for the auditory stimulus was significantly 
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reduced under high visual perceptual load (featuring five non-target letters + target 
letter), both when the detection response was made prior to or after the visual target 
response and when the auditory stimulus was presented frequently (presented on 
50% of all trials). Across different task paradigms, these studies have demonstrated 
that visual perceptual load modulates the extent to which participants can attend to 
other additional auditory information, providing evidence for a shared attentional 
capacity between visual and auditory sensory modalities. 
There are however also some conflicting findings. Tellinghuisen and Nowak 
(2003) found that searching for a target letter in a high perceptual load condition (set 
size six) did not reduce interference effects from simultaneously presented response-
incongruent auditory distractor letters. This in turn would suggest modality-specific 
capacity resources. However, the auditory distractor was presented for a longer 
period than the search task, finishing 200ms after the offset of the search task, 
suggesting that the longer temporal overlap between visual and auditory stimuli in 
the high load condition (due to longer search times) could have offset any perceptual 
load effect. 
Matusz, Broadbent, Ferrari, Forrest, Merkley, and Scerif (2015), in a recent 
study, provided evidence that at least in adults, a longer temporal overlap between 
visual and auditory stimuli cannot account for these findings. They asked participants 
to search for a coloured shape according to a conjunction of features (a red square or 
a green circle) amongst other non-target shapes (red and green triangles, circles, and 
squares). The perceptual load of the task was manipulated by either presenting the 
target shape alone (low perceptual load), or together with three non-target shapes 
(high perceptual load) in one of six possible locations. Distractors were either 
compatible or incompatible with the target response and participants performed in 
three distractor conditions: (1) visual (visual flanker presented in the periphery), (2) 
auditory (voice recordings of a person saying “red” or “green”), or (3) audio-visual 
(visual flanker + voice recording). When the presentation time of the auditory 
distractor and visual search display was equal, adults still displayed interference by 
auditory distractors at all levels of perceptual load. These results therefore indicated 
that visual perceptual load did not affect the extent to which auditory distractors were 
processed. 
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Using steady-state evoked potentials, a study by Parks, Hilimire, and 
Corballis (2011) examined how visual perceptual load can modulate the neural 
response to task-irrelevant auditory stimuli. Subjects were required to monitor a 
stream of crosses in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task according to either 
a single feature (colour) or a conjunction of features (colour and orientation). 
Simultaneously, irrelevant auditory distractors were also presented. The results 
indicated that auditory steady-state signals remained unchanged when the level of 
visual perceptual load increased. However, in an earlier study using a similar 
manipulation of visual perceptual load, reduced amplitude of an auditory-evoked 
microreflex was found at high perceptual load, suggesting the opposite effect of 
perceptual load on auditory processing (Parks, Hilimire, & Corballis, 2009). 
Overall, the pattern of results for the cross-modal effects of perceptual load 
on attention is mixed. Whilst in some cases these effects may by study-specific, as in 
Tellinghuisen and Nowak (2003), the paucity of research in this area suggests the 
need for further investigation. In order to expand on the existing literature, the first 
experiment in this thesis examined how development affects the interaction between 
attention and awareness in cross-modal contexts of attention by adopting the 
framework of perceptual load theory. 
Dilution theory 
The main competing account to Load theory is Dilution theory (Tsal & 
Benoni, 2010a, 2010b). On this account, the reduction in distractor interference 
observed under high perceptual load (in tasks manipulating search set size) occurs as 
a result of the diluting effect of the distractor by neutral items. According to Tsal and 
Benoni (2010a, 2010b), the features of the non-target search items (e.g. neutral 
letters) competed with those of the distractor, thus degrading the quality of its visual 
representation and leading to reduced distractor processing. To demonstrate this, Tsal 
and Benoni (2010a) presented participants with a low perceptual load/high dilution 
search task, where the number of non-target items matched a typical high perceptual 
load display, but with these non-target items being clearly distinguishable from the 
target item (i.e. red target among white non-targets; see Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5 Examples of stimulus displays used by Tsal and Benoni (2010a) 
 
 
 
A low perceptual load in the relevant task was achieved by presenting the 
target letter in red among white non-target letters resulting in a stimulus ‘pop-out’ 
effect. In all conditions, participants had to identify a target letter (C or S) presented 
in the central array, whilst ignoring either a congruent (same response category as the 
target) or incongruent (opposite response category) peripheral distractor. The results 
revealed that in the low load/high dilution condition, although having a low 
perceptual load on attentional resources, the mere presence of non-target items 
(neutral letters) was sufficient to eliminate distractor processing. This dilution effect 
was subsequently replicated across other visual search paradigms (Fitousi & Wenger, 
2011; Wilson, Muroi, & MacLeod, 2011). 
Lavie however has countered this claim by demonstrating that in low 
perceptual load/high search set size displays, capacity in fact spills over into 
processing the non-target items in the search array, therefore ruling out an alternative 
explanation in terms of dilution (Lavie & Torralbo, 2010). They compared a high 
search set size condition with two peripheral distractors and a singleton colour target 
with a new non-target distractor condition. In this condition, two of the neutral non-
target letters (e.g. V, H, U, J) were replaced with response competing distractor 
letters. These distractor letters were placed on either side of a green target letter (X or 
Z) and could be either response-congruent (e.g. target X, then distractor letters were 
X as well) or response-incongruent (e.g. target X, then distractor letters were Z) (see 
Figure 2.6 for an illustration). 
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Figure 2.6 Example of stimulus displays used by Lavie and Torralbo (2010) 
  
Note: 
On the left, example of a non-target distractor condition (target X in green colour 
with adjacent non-target letters replaced by response incompatible distractor letters Z 
and response neutral peripheral letter L in black). On the right, example of a 
peripheral distractor condition (target X in green with adjacent neutral non-target 
letters and response incompatible peripheral distractor Z in black). 
 
Whenever compatible or incompatible distractors were presented in the non-
target distractor condition, the peripheral distractor was response neutral (e.g. letter 
L). The results indicated that in this new non-target distractor condition, participants 
recorded significantly slower RTs when response incompatible non-target letters 
were presented in the circle compared to response compatible letters. No RT 
compatibility effects were seen for the peripheral distractor condition. Together, this 
suggested to the authors that spare capacity is allocated to some of the non-target 
items in the display and not the peripheral distractor. Distractor interference effects 
are again restored when these can be measured via response interference effects on 
RTs once the non-target letters are response incongruent.  
Lavie and Torralbo (2010) also point out that their interpretation of 
perceptual load effects in terms of dilution only pertain to one specific manipulation 
of perceptual load. That is, manipulating the relevant search set size and measuring 
its effect on distractor response competition effects. However, recall that apart from 
increasing the number of relevant items in a search task (e.g. by increasing the search 
set size), perceptual load can be manipulated by increasing the processing 
requirements of items in the relevant task (Lavie, 1995, 2005). The previous section 
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outlined a number of published studies that have manipulated the perceptual load of 
a single-element display (e.g. line discrimination) and which have demonstrated 
reduced processing of task-irrelevant stimuli with increased perceptual load either 
behaviourally (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Macdonald & Lavie, 2011) or by 
reduced neural responses evoked by task-irrelevant information in high perceptual 
load single element displays (Carmel et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2005). The 
observation that the effects of perceptual load on attention has been robustly shown 
acrros a range of tasks, paradigms, and modalities suggests that perceptual load 
theory still remains the most plausible explanation for these findings. 
Selective attention and autism 
Lavie’s perceptual load theory has recently been applied in a number of 
studies to examine visual selective attention in individuals with ASD (e.g. 
Remington, Swettenham, et al., 2012; Remington et al., 2009; Swettenham et al., 
2014). The results obtained from these studies demonstrated that individuals with 
ASD continue to process other, additional information at higher levels of perceptual 
load than TD controls. Within the resource framework of perceptual load theory, this 
was interpreted as evidence that individuals with ASD are characterised by an 
increased perceptual capacity. 
Before describing those studies, I will first outline the broader literature on 
selective attention in autism. Attentional atypicalities in individuals with ASD have 
been observed across a range of attentional components and the literature can be 
broadly divided on this basis. This includes arousal, sustained attention and shifting 
attention, as well as selectivity/filtering and visual search. It should be noted that a 
number of studies on attention and ASD have included a social component. Social 
attention in ASD will be discussed later in chapter five; therefore all studies 
presented here have only included socially neutral stimuli. 
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Arousal 
A number of early studies proposed that the pattern in behaviour seen in 
individuals with ASD is related to a deficit in modulating arousal (see Bryson, 
Wainwright-Sharp, & Smith, 1990; Rogers & Ozonoff, 2005 for reviews). This 
literature however has yet to reach a consensus. While some have argued that 
individuals with ASD are characterised by hyperarousal (Hutt, Hutt, Lee, & Ounsted, 
1964), others suggested that autism involves hypoarousal (Rimland, 1964). Evidence 
for hyperarousal was for example derived by the observation that children with ASD 
recorded elevated levels of desynchronised electroencephalography (EEG) (Hutt et 
al., 1964). Studies measuring skin conductance levels (SCL), frequency of skin 
conductance rate (SCR) (Palkovitz & Wiesenfeld, 1980) and differences in baseline 
heart rates (Ming, Julu, Brimacombe, Connor, & Daniels, 2005) further supported 
this hypothesis. However, others also reported normal or even reduced SCR levels 
and heart rate levels in high-functioning adults with ASD (Zahn, Rumsey, & Van 
Kammen, 1987), suggesting abnormal modulation of arousal. Rimland (1964) in fact 
proposed that individuals with ASD are characterised by hypoarousal, based on the 
observation that children with ASD preferred situations of greater stimulation. 
Others modified these two proposals by putting forward the idea of dysfunctional 
modulation of arousal (Ornitz & Ritvo, 1976). This theory attempts to account for 
the heterogeneity in reactivity often seen within the same individual with ASD by 
proposing that variability in response to sensory input is directly linked to the 
individual’s state of arousal. This means that in some situations, individuals would 
experience under-arousal and in other situation over-arousal. Support for this view 
also comes from Kinsbourne (1987), who observed both hyper-and hypo-
responsiveness within the same child. Research into the role and influence of arousal 
in ASD has now however been largely abandoned, due to inconsistencies in findings 
(Burack, Enns, Stauder, Mottron, & Randolph, 1997; Goldstein, Johnson, & 
Minshew, 2001). 
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Sustained attention 
Another important attentional component is sustained attention. This refers to 
the “capacity to maintain attentional focus on a task over an extended period of time” 
(Bowler, 2007, p. 115) and is typically measured using continuous performance tests 
(CPT, see Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome Jr, & Beck, 1956). On this task, 
subjects are required to respond to a pre-defined target presented within a stream of 
irrelevant stimuli. Casey, Gordon, Mannheim, and Rumsey (1993) for instance 
showed that autistic savants were less accurate (i.e. made more omission errors) than 
age-, and gender-matched controls at detecting visual and auditory target stimuli 
presented simultaneously in a continuous performance test (CPT). This suggested to 
the authors that autistic savants are impaired in their ability to respond to more than 
one task simultaneously. However, the small sample size in each group (n=10), 
substantially lower IQ scores in the ASD group, lower hearing thresholds than 
normal in 3 out of 10 autistic subjects, and ceiling performance of TD participants on 
both unisensory visual/auditory and cross-modal CPT tasks suggests that these 
results should be taken with caution. Indeed, when administering a visual CPT, 
Garretson, Fein, and Waterhouse (1990) found no difference between individuals 
with ASD and mental-age (MA) matched controls. Pascualvaca, Fantie, 
Papageorgiou, and Mirsky (1998) also demonstrated that when continuous shifts are 
required, as on continuous performance tasks, task performance between groups is 
similar. Yet when sudden shifts of attention are required, individuals with ASD 
experience more difficulty than controls. This literature on attention shifting will be 
considered next.  
Orienting, Disengaging and Shifting attention  
Orienting towards a new stimulus can be either exogenous (bottom-up, 
involuntary orienting) or endogenous (top-down, voluntary orienting) and can occur 
overtly, with corresponding head/eye movements or covertly, without these 
movements (Burack et al., 1997).  Posner and Cohen (1984) proposed that orienting 
involves disengaging, shifting, and reengaging attention. In ASD, the functioning of 
some of these components, particularly voluntary endogenous orienting has been 
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reported to be atypical (see Bowler, 2007 for a review; Townsend, Harris, & 
Courchesne, 1996; Townsend, Courchesne, & Egaas, 1996; Wainwright-Sharp & 
Bryson, 1993), while exogeneous orienting seems to be relatively spared (Burack & 
Iarocci, 1995; Iarocci & Burack, 2004). Generally, deficits in orienting present 
themselves as a larger RT difference between presentation of the cue and target 
response (Townsend, Harris, et al., 1996; Townsend, Courchesne, et al., 1996; 
Wainwright-Sharp & Bryson, 1993). Difficulties in endogenous shifts of attention in 
ASD have been suggested to be at the response selection level, where individuals 
with ASD have been found to be impaired in selecting the appropriate response and 
require more time than TD individuals to direct the shift of attention (Landry, 
Mitchell, & Burack, 2009). 
Disengaging and shifting attention in individuals with ASD has also been 
specifically investigated. Courchesne and colleagues for example have demonstrated 
that individuals with ASD are slower at shifting attention between stimuli within a 
single modality, as well as between different sensory modalities (Courchesne, 
Townsend, Akshoomoff, et al., 1994; Courchesne, Townsend, & Saitoh, 1994). In 
one of their studies, Courchesne, Townsend, Akshoomoff, et al. (1994) presented 
subjects with ASD and a mental age and chronological age-matched TD group with a 
task that required shifting attention between visual and auditory modalities and a task 
that required focused attention. While the group with autism had no difficulties with 
the focused attention task, they were significantly slower and less accurate when they 
quickly had to shift attention between sensory modalities. Reed and McCarthy 
(2012) in a more recent study also found similar evidence. They demonstrated that 
children with ASD performed worse than TD controls on a visual-only switching 
task, but were particularly impaired when required to switch attention between an 
auditory and visual task. 
Selectivity & filtering 
Individuals with ASD are frequently observed to focus obsessively on certain 
items or details in their environment. One mechanism that was suggested to give rise 
to this behaviour is ‘stimulus overselectivity’ (Lovaas & Schreibman, 1971). This 
idea was based on the finding that individuals with ASD only used and responded to 
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a limited number of stimuli in their environment. In their study, Lovaas and 
Schreibman (1971) trained autistic, developmentally delayed and typically 
developing children on a successive discrimination paradigm (similar to a go/no-go 
task) that involved responding to a complex stimuli made up of visual, auditory and 
tactile information. Once participants responded reliably to this compound stimulus, 
the individual components were presented separately (i.e. visual, auditory or tactile 
information alone), and responses were recorded. The authors found that children 
with ASD tended to only respond to one of the component cues, whereas control 
participants responded to each stimulus cue equally. From these findings it was 
concluded that individuals with ASD show overly selective attention, giving rise to 
behaviour patterns which are too restricted (Lovaas & Schreibman, 1971). While this 
initial study demonstrated overselectivity when all stimulus cues fell in different 
sensory modalities, subsequent studies confirmed this effect for situations in which 
multiple cues fall within the same sensory modality. For example, overselective 
response patterns in individuals with ASD have been shown for multicomponent 
visual stimuli (Fein, Tinder, & Waterhouse, 1979; Schreibman & Lovaas, 1973), 
dual-component auditory stimuli (Reynolds, Newsom, & Lovaas, 1974), and 
compound-tactile stimuli (Ploog & Kim, 2007). 
Following on from these observations, Rincover and Ducharme (1987) 
proposed that stimulus overselectivity is second only to an overly selective gaze or 
“tunnel vision” in ASD – characterised by a focus of attention that is too narrow and 
that restricts processing to only some of the relevant information. This was based on 
the finding that the spatial distance between two visual cues determined the 
occurrence of overselectivity in ASD. When two features of a stimulus (colour and 
shape) were separated in space, children with ASD, but not controls, responded to 
only one stimulus feature (Rincover & Ducharme, 1987), suggesting that autism is 
characterised by an overly focussed attention. Mann and Walker (2003) however 
proposed that overfocus of attention in autism might be more readily explainable by 
a deficit in broadening the existing spread of visual attention. In their study, children 
with autism, in contrast to typically developing and intellectually impaired controls, 
were slower and less accurate to respond when a large crosshair was presented after a 
small crosshair, but not vice versa. This suggests that rather than having constant 
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narrowed attention, the difficulty of individuals with ASD is to broaden visual 
attention again once it has been narrowed.  
Other investigators suggested that the attentional abnormalities in autism 
reflect an inability to filter out irrelevant distractors (Burack, 1994). In Burack’s 
study, participants were required to identify a target shape (O or +) that appeared in 
the same central location on each trial. Experimental conditions were varied 
according to the presence/absence of a spatial window narrowing the visual field, the 
number of distractors in the periphery and distance between the target stimulus and 
distractors. The results showed that while individuals with ASD benefited from a 
narrowing of the spatial window when no distractors were present, they performed 
worse than controls when distractors were present. Burack concluded from these 
findings that individuals with ASD have an “inefficient attentional lens”, which 
impedes their ability to focus on a target stimulus and ignore other distracting 
stimuli. Similar evidence also comes from recent studies that found a selective deficit 
in filtering out, or inhibiting, distracting information in individuals with ASD 
compared to typically developing individuals. On variations of the flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), in which participants are required to detect a visual target 
surrounded by distractors, individuals with ASD consistently demonstrated larger 
degrees of interference in the presence of distractors than TD individuals (Adams & 
Jarrold, 2012; Christ, Holt, White, & Green, 2007; Christ, Kester, Bodner, & Miles, 
2011).  
These results have also received support from neurophysiological studies. 
Ciesielski, Courchesne, and Elmasian (1990) for instance recorded event-related 
potentials (ERP) from adults with ASD and controls as they performed a divided 
attention task (responding to a rare stimulus in either the auditory or visual modality 
whilst ignoring stimuli presented in the other modality). They demonstrated that 
individuals with ASD had some difficulty maintaining their focus of attention, and 
only attend to the relevant stimulus. ERP results confirmed the behavioural data and 
found that selective-attention related waves N270, Nc and P3b were attenuated 
within the ASD group but not in controls. Importantly, this was also the case for 
those individuals with ASD whose task performance (RT and accuracy) reached the 
level of controls. However, a later study from the same group did not find any 
differences between groups in behavioural performance, despite atypical activation 
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pattern of event-related potentials (ERPs) in adolescents with high-functioning ASD 
(Ciesielski, Knight, Prince, Harris, & Handmaker, 1995). In TD participants, the 
ERP associated with voluntary attention as measured by the slow negative wave 
(SNW) gradually modulated in response to attentional demands, with the largest 
amplitude observed during focused auditory- and visual attention conditions, 
intermediate in response to the divided attention condition, and smallest in response 
to unattended stimuli. Such task related modulation of the SNW however was not 
found in autistic subjects, which was thought to indicate a deficit in selective 
inhibition and attention (Ciesielski et al., 1995). Nonetheless, individuals with ASD 
were able to perform the task as well as TD controls. This dissociation suggests that 
individuals with ASD did not need to deploy attention to the same extent as TD 
controls to be able to perform the task. Other subsequent studies also did not find a 
filtering deficit in ASD (Burack, Iarocci, Mottron, Stauder, Robaey, & Brennan, 
1996; Iarocci & Burack, 2004). 
Visual search  
Visual search is one task domain in which selective attention has been studied 
extensively in both the typically developing population (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; 
Wolfe, 1998) and in ASD (O'Riordan, 2004; O'Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-
Cohen, 2001; Plaisted, O'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998), and typically involves 
participants locating a specific target among non-targets. There are two types of 
visual search tasks: feature (where the target has a unique visual feature, i.e. red F 
target among green X and red T distractors) and conjunctive search (where the target 
has a unique combination of two or more features shared with the distractors, i.e. red 
X among red T and green X distractors). Research has shown that items are 
processed differently in these two search tasks (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). In 
conjunctive search tasks, target detection times generally increase linearly with 
increases in the number of distractors, indicative of serial search (one item is 
processed at a time until the target is found). Detection times in feature search tasks 
on the other hand do not increase at larger display sizes and the search is carried out 
in a parallel fashion with all items being processed at once. Both search tasks have 
been applied to investigate attentional abnormalities in ASD. Plaisted et al. (1998) 
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for instance have shown that while performance of individuals with ASD and 
controls did not differ on a feature search task (i.e. both groups demonstrated search 
times unaffected by array size), the pattern of search times for individuals with ASD 
on a conjunctive search task was markedly different to controls. In particular, 
reaction times (RTs) of individuals with ASD were not affected by increases in array 
size, whereas controls showed the usual linear increase in RT when the number of 
non-targets increased. Plaisted et al. (1998) interpreted these findings as evidence 
that individuals with ASD are using parallel search mechanisms as might be 
expected in feature search tasks, and that this may underlie their superior 
performance on tasks that require processing of unique features such as the 
Embedded Figures Task and the block design task (Shah & Frith, 1983, 1993). Other 
studies have also since reported superior visual search performance in both children 
(Jarrold, Gilchrist, & Bender, 2005; O'Riordan et al., 2001) and adults with ASD 
(O'Riordan, 2004). 
O'Riordan et al. (2001) have put forward two processing mechanisms that 
could potentially explain superior visual search abilities in ASD: (1) enhanced 
memory for rejected distractor locations and (2) enhanced ability to discriminate 
between similar items. According to the first proposal, if individuals with ASD have 
an enhanced memory of already inspected distractor locations, search efficiency 
should improve and hence result in faster detection times. Joseph, Keehn, Connolly, 
Wolfe, and Horowitz (2009) tested this assumption by presenting a group of children 
with ASD and TD controls with a standard static search display or a dynamic search 
condition. In the latter condition, targets and distractors regularly changed positions, 
thus making memory of inspected locations of little value to the participant. Their 
results indicated that like TD children, children with ASD did not experience a 
deterioration of search performance in the dynamic display condition, suggesting that 
memory is not responsible for the superior search skills in ASD. The second 
possibility, enhanced discrimination, was tested by comparing the performance of 
children with ASD and IQ-matched controls on a visual search task where the 
similarity between targets and distractors was manipulated (O'Riordan & Plaisted, 
2001). The authors demonstrated that while all children were affected by increases in 
target-distractor similarity, the control group was more adversely affected than the 
ASD group, thus supporting the hypothesis of enhanced discrimination in ASD. 
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Hence, while some studies on selectivity and filtering point to impaired 
selective attention in ASD thought to underlie increased distractibility (e.g. Burack, 
1994), others have demonstrated enhanced performance of individuals with ASD on 
visual selective attention tasks. 
In the next section, I am going to detail how Remington et al. (2009) 
attempted to account for this discrepancy in findings on visual selective attention in 
ASD by applying Lavie’s Load theory of attention and cognitive control (e.g. Lavie, 
1995; Lavie, 2005). 
Perceptual load theory & selective attention in ASD 
Load theory asserts that the extent to which irrelevant distractors will be 
processed depends on the level of perceptual load of the task. Perceptual load of a 
given task can be manipulated by increasing the number of different task stimuli 
and/or perceptual processing requirements, such as increasing the number of 
additional visual stimuli in a search display or by presenting participants with 
perceptually more complex processing requirements. Crucial to this model is the 
assumption that while perception processes have a limited capacity, any incoming 
stimuli that fall within this capacity are automatically and involuntarily processed 
until it runs out of capacity. It follows then that under conditions of low perceptual 
load (e.g. only target letter and distractor are presented) any spare capacity of the 
processing of task-relevant stimuli automatically “spills-over” to process irrelevant 
distractors. In tasks of high perceptual load however (e.g. identifying a target letter 
among five or six similar letters) all processing capacity is engaged by searching 
through the search array for the target letter, leaving no additional capacity to process 
irrelevant distractors (Lavie, 1995). The key factor is that the level of perceptual load 
at which task-irrelevant stimuli are no longer processed relates to an individual’s 
perceptual capacity. In other words, an individual’s perceptual resources will 
determine what constitutes high perceptual load for that individual. 
Remington et al. (2009), using a hybrid between a visual search task 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980) and a flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), assessed 
the extent to which visual distractors were processed under different levels of visual 
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perceptual load in a group of adults with ASD and neurotypical adults (matched for 
chronological age and IQ). Participants were required to identify a relevant target 
letter (either X or N) briefly presented (100ms) among neutral letters in a central ring 
whilst attempting to ignore a distracting letter in the periphery, which could be either 
neutral (unrelated to the target letter; a T or an L) or incompatible (an X distractor 
when the target was N, or vice versa). When the perceptual load of the task was low 
(1 or 2 items in the search array), both groups were slower to search for a target in 
the presence of incompatible distractors compared to neutral distractors. This 
interference effect suggests that participants are processing distractors, (despite 
trying to ignore them). However, when perceptual load was higher (4 items in the 
search array) only the ASD group displayed an interference effect, suggesting that 
they continue to process distractors at a higher level of perceptual load than the 
comparison group. At even higher levels of perceptual load (6 search array items) 
there was no interference effect in either group. Remington et al. (2009) argued that 
this finding demonstrates a higher perceptual capacity in ASD as their capacity was 
not exhausted until there were 6 items in the search array, compared to 4 items in the 
search array for the neurotypical group. This study provided an indirect indication of 
the processing of task-irrelevant items by considering the reaction time costs within a 
focal task in the presence versus absence of the task-irrelevant items. 
The increased perceptual capacity account of ASD may also explain why on 
some visual selective attention tasks individuals with ASD appear to demonstrate 
superior performance in (e.g., visual search and embedded figures), while on others 
they show a reduced resistance to distractors.  Since according to load theory all 
stimuli in the visual field are processed automatically until perceptual capacity is 
reached, individuals with a higher perceptual capacity should process more 
information. This would lead to superior performance on tasks where all the 
information is task-relevant, as is seen for individuals with ASD in visual search 
tasks and embedded figures tasks (Hessels, Hooge, Snijders, & Kemner, 2014; 
O'Riordan, 2004; O'Riordan et al., 2001; Plaisted et al., 1998; Shah & Frith, 1983, 
1993), particularly when perceptual load is high (e.g. when array sizes are large in 
visual search). When the information is task-irrelevant, then this would result in 
increased processing of distractor stimuli, as has been demonstrated with individuals 
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with ASD using distractor tasks (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Burack, 1994; Christ et al., 
2007; Geurts, Luman, & Van Meel, 2008; Remington et al., 2009). 
In Remington et al. (2009), the extent to which distractors were processed 
was measured via response interference effects at various levels of visual perceptual 
load. However, interference effects are only an indirect measure of distractor 
perception, as the to-be-ignored flanker (X or N), although presented at a different 
spatial location, is an exact copy of the target stimuli (also X or N). Hence, increased 
interference effects in ASD under high perceptual load might also be related to their 
inability to only focus on the central array of letters and ignore the peripheral 
distractor. In this sense, longer reaction times on incongruent trials may not 
necessarily reflect perception of those distractors, but instead reflect interference 
effects on response selection (Remington, Swettenham, et al., 2012). A subsequent 
study accounted for this effect by directly measuring detection of an additional visual 
shape which was both unrelated to the primary search task and was not required to be 
ignored by participants at different levels of perceptual load. Remington, 
Swettenham, et al. (2012) presented adults with ASD and controls with a dual-task 
paradigm, in which participants had to identify a target letter (X or N) in a ring of 
letters and then indicate absence or presence of a small visual shape presented on 
50% of all trials in the periphery in one of six possible locations. 
 
Figure 2.7 Stimuli used by Remington, Swettenham, et al. (2012) 
 
Note: Left display (shape present, high perceptual load trial with target letter X) 
Right display (shape absent, low perceptual load trial with target letter X) 
 
Their results showed that detection sensitivity for the peripheral visual shape 
declined significantly as a function of visual perceptual load in controls, but 
remained unaffected in adults with ASD (Remington, Swettenham, et al., 2012). 
Importantly, detection remained high even under conditions of high visual perceptual 
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load in participants with ASD, despite no cost in accuracy or reaction time on the 
central search task. 
Recently, Swettenham et al. (2014) further tested the implications of the 
increased perceptual capacity account for perceptual awareness on an inattentional 
blindness task. Swettenham et al. (2014) presented children with ASD and age-and 
IQ-matched controls with either a subtle- (high perceptual load) or gross line 
discrimination task (low perceptual load). On a critical trial, an unexpected, 
additional visual stimulus (black square shape) was presented together with the 
central line discrimination cross in one of four possible locations in the periphery. 
Once participants had responded to the line discrimination they were asked whether 
they had noticed anything else. The results indicated that while high visual 
perceptual load reduced awareness of an unexpected visual stimulus in typically 
developing children, awareness rates remained high for children with ASD even 
when the perceptual of the central task was high. This finding suggests that in 
contrast to controls, ASD children had attentional resources left over indicating once 
again, an increased perceptual capacity. Importantly, the differential effect of high 
perceptual load between ASD and control groups was not due to differences in task 
performance, as both groups performed equally well on the low and high perceptual 
load line discrimination. 
Further evidence for the differential effect of perceptual load on visual 
selective attention in ASD comes from functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies. Ohta et al. (2012) used fMRI to measure brain responses evoked by 
irrelevant visual distractors at varying levels of perceptual load. In line with 
perceptual load theory and prior behavioural findings, increasing perceptual load 
reduced activation in visual cortices for both groups, yet this reduction at high 
perceptual load was significantly more pronounced for typically developing subjects 
than for subjects with a diagnosis of ASD. Examining these perceptual load effects at 
the neural level might also help to find a potential biomarker for an increased 
perceptual capacity in ASD. Schwarzkopf, Anderson, de Haas, White, and Rees 
(2014) have for example recently found larger extrastriate population receptive field 
maps (pRFs) in adults with ASD but not typically developing adults during 
performance of a visual task at varying levels of perceptual load. An enhanced 
capacity also seems to relate to the severity of autistic traits in the typically 
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developing population. Bayliss and Kritikos (2011) found that those individuals with 
higher AQ scores in a large sample of neurotypical individuals reported greater 
interference effects by distractors at high levels of perceptual load. This (very) 
preliminary evidence suggests that an increased perceptual capacity may be part of 
the broader autism phenotype. Additional work using other complementary 
techniques would be desirable to further investigate these effects. 
In the future, mapping of these specific brain-behaviour relationships may 
also contribute to broader initiatives in the field such as the Research Domain 
Criteria (RDoC) project from the US National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). 
This framework emphasises dimensions both across and within psychiatric disorders 
and provides a very promising approach to investigate neurodevelopmental disorders 
independent of current DSM-5 and ICD-10 classification systems.  
Perceptual load and cross-modal selective attention in ASD 
Until now, the effects of perceptual load on perceptual awareness in ASD 
have only been demonstrated within the visual domain and it is currently not known 
whether this extends to contexts of cross-modal selective attention. Within the 
literature, the only studies that have investigated cross-modal selective attention in 
ASD have produced conflicting results and did not manipulate the perceptual load of 
the task. 
Casey et al. (1993) for instance reported that autistic savants were less 
accurate than controls on a continuous performance test at detecting visual and 
auditory target stimuli presented simultaneously. However, methodological 
limitations of this study (small sample size, lower IQ scores in the ASD group 
among other) warrant caution in interpreting these results. Evidence from auditory-
visual divided attention tasks is also mixed. While an early study reported impaired 
performance of individuals with ASD (Ciesielski et al., 1990), a subsequent study by 
the same group found similar behavioural performance between groups (Ciesielski et 
al., 1995). Interestingly, in the latter study, although individuals with ASD were able 
to perform the task as well as TD controls, they still showed atypical neural 
activation. This dissociation suggests that individuals with ASD did not need to 
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deploy attention to the same extent as TD controls to be able to perform the task. It is 
difficult to tell whether these findings could be explained by an increased perceptual 
capacity in ASD. For example, in the divided attention condition, stimuli were 
presented in a serial order (2 flashes and 2 sounds presented in a random sequence), 
which suggests that performance on this task was dependent on rapid switching 
between target items rather than being able to process more perceptual information 
simultaneously. Perceptual load was also not directly manipulated in either of the 
above studies. 
It therefore remains unclear whether the effects of perceptual load in ASD in 
the visual domain also translate to cross-modal contexts of attention. In everyday 
situations, attention is required to operate in a multisensory environment where 
incoming sensory information is rarely confined to a single sensory modality. If 
individuals with ASD are able to process more perceptual information regardless of 
the sensory modality within which this additional information is presented, then their 
experience of their sensory environment would be distinctively different to their 
peers. Anecdotally, this is often observed by clinicians and parents, with individuals 
with ASD able to perform in a well-controlled environment, yet experience 
difficulties and even distress if the environment features too many sensory stimuli.  
In this respect, would individuals with ASD also demonstrate an increased 
perceptual capacity if a task features both visual and auditory stimuli? The research 
presented in this thesis will aim to answer this question by using different 
experimental paradigms that measure the effect of visual perceptual load on auditory 
awareness, and compare performance of children and adolescents with ASD with 
that of typically developing individuals. Before I am going to present the relevant 
research on ASD, I will present a study on the development of auditory awareness in 
the typically developing population.  
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Chapter 3 Development of awareness: Effects of age and 
perceptual load on inattentional deafness 
Attention and awareness have traditionally been considered to be closely 
linked (Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001). This is supported by a range of phenomena that 
illustrate how salient stimuli (e.g. someone saying your name at a party) can capture 
attention (Moray, 1959), yet other quite conspicuous events (e.g. a person wearing a 
gorilla suit appearing unexpectedly) fail to get noticed if attention is directed 
somewhere else (Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser, 1979). The precise nature with which 
attention and awareness interact however is the subject of a long-lasting and still on-
going debate (see Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Lavie et al., 2014, for a review). Even 
less is known whether attending to one sensory modality (e.g. visual) influences 
awareness of a stimulus in another modality (e.g. audition), or indeed how 
development affects the interaction between these two processes. 
The majority of developmental research on attention has typically used 
indirect reaction time (RT) measures to assess the magnitude of irrelevant distractor 
processing across different age groups. This body of research suggests that processes 
of selective attention and attentional control improve with age over childhood and 
into adulthood, and highlight how these changes in attention involve both significant 
improvements in the efficiency of attention with age (e.g. improved resistance to 
distractors), as well as the gradual development of attentional and information-
processing capacities (see Plude & Enns, 1994; Ridderinkhof & van der Stelt, 2000, 
for a review). However, the question of how development affects the interplay 
between attention and awareness, and particularly how awareness is influenced in 
cross-modal contexts of attention, remains poorly understood.  
One task that has been applied to investigate selective attention across 
development, and in particular the extent to which distracting information can 
interfere with a task response, is the garner interference task (Garner & Felfoldy, 
1970). In this task, participants are asked to sort cards according to a single stimulus 
attribute (e.g. colour: red or orange) while ignoring its other dimension (e.g. form: 
square or circle). A drop in performance, i.e. longer RTs in response to a target 
dimension, is generally observed in a filtering condition where the irrelevant 
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dimension varies randomly compared to a control condition where the irrelevant 
dimension remains constant (Garner & Felfoldy, 1970). In this condition, prolonged 
latencies are thought to reflect filtering costs associated with the processing of 
information in the irrelevant dimension. Shepp and Barrett (1991) for example asked 
5- and 8-year-olds as well as adults to sort items according to shape, with colour 
constituting the irrelevant dimension. The results indicated that 5-year-olds (but not 
8-year-olds and adults) were slower when colour varied independently of the shape 
of the object than when colour co-varied with the shape of the object. This was 
particularly pronounced for stimulus displays where the target and distractor 
dimension were conjoined in one stimulus and thus difficult to separate. The finding 
that younger children, but not older children or adults were processing the irrelevant 
aspects of the stimulus display therefore suggests that perceptual selection and gating 
of irrelevant information is less efficient in younger children (about 5 years of age), 
but improves gradually with age. Similar effects have been observed in an auditory 
version of the garner interference task, where children aged 3-6 years showed a 
greater degree of interference than adults when asked to selectively attend to a 
linguistic dimension (spoken word) while ignoring an auditory dimension of speech 
(speaker’s gender) (Jerger, Pirozzolo, et al., 1993). 
A number of studies have also shown that children are more susceptible to 
interference on Stroop tasks (Stroop, 1935) than adults (MacLeod, 1991). In the 
standard Stroop colour-word task (e.g. Stroop, 1935), participants are presented with 
a colour word printed in a conflicting hue (e.g. the word ‘Blue’ printed in red: Blue) 
and asked to name the colour of the ink whilst ignoring to read the word. Response 
latencies as measured by RTs in this condition (i.e. incongruent condition) are 
typically longer compared to control conditions in which, for example, the written 
text is congruent with the colour ink (e.g. the word ‘Blue’ printed in blue: Blue). In 
an early study that looked at inference effects across the life span (sample age range 
7 – 80 years), Comalli Jr, Wapner, and Werner (1962) reported that the degree of 
interference from incongruent words (e.g. ‘red’ written in blue ink) on colour naming 
was greater in young children than adults. Whilst these interference effects decreased 
from childhood into adulthood, they became more pronounced in older ages, 
suggesting that perceptual control processes follow a linear developmental trajectory 
until they reach maturity in adulthood, after which they regress back to infantile 
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levels in older ages. The finding of age-related improvements in attentional control 
on Stroop tasks has since been replicated with other visual stimuli such as non-target 
pictures (Day & Stone, 1980; Well, Lorch, & Anderson, 1980), printed words 
(Guttentag & Ornstein, 1990) and contextual shapes (Enns & Girgus, 1985). On 
auditory versions of the Stroop task, equivalent improvements in attentional control 
with age have been reported. Jerger, Martin, and Pirozzolo (1988) for example 
presented children aged 3- to 6-years with a speech Stroop-like task that required 
them to respond to a target speech dimension (e.g. talker gender) whilst ignoring the 
semantic content of the words being said by the talker. The semantic content could 
either be incongruent to the gender of the talker (e.g. hearing ‘daddy’ spoken in a 
female voice), congruent (e.g. hearing ‘daddy’ spoken in a male voice) or neutral 
(hearing ‘ice cream’ spoken in either voice). Children showed similar Stroop 
interference effects as adults, with slower response latencies on incongruent 
compared to congruent and neutral trials. The results also indicated that the 
magnitude of the interference effect (i.e. incongruent trials minus neutral trials) 
decreased significantly with age. Besides these reductions in interference on speech 
Stroop-like tasks (see Jerger, Stout, et al., 1993, for similar evidence), there is 
evidence that children become more efficient with age on cross-modal Stroop tasks. 
Hanauer and Brooks (2003) asked three age groups of children ranging from 4 to 11 
years and adults to name the colour of visual targets (i.e. colour patches) whilst 
ignoring auditory distractors presented over headphones that could either be 
incongruent to the visual target (e.g. female voice saying ‘red’ if colour was green) 
or neutral (e.g. female voice saying a non-colour word). It was found that cross-
modal interference effects on RTs were largest for the youngest children compared to 
older children and adults, and gradually diminished with age. 
Further evidence that children are less proficient than adults to filter out 
irrelevant distractors was provided by response competition tasks (e.g. the Eriksen 
flanker task). Enns and Akhtar (1989) asked participants aged 4, 5, 7, and 20 years to 
perform a speeded response to a central target (square or plus) that was flanked by 
distractors on either side. The distractors were either identical to the target 
(compatible: e.g. square if target was square), neutral (object similar in perceptual 
complexity, but not associated with either target response) or were associated with 
the opposite target response (incompatible: e.g. plus if square was target). The results 
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indicated that whilst all types of distracters led to significant RT costs, neutral 
distractors produced significantly greater RT costs in younger children than adults, 
suggesting again that perceptual interference of distractors was greatest in younger 
children and was reduced with age. 
Despite the observation of poorer selective attention in children as reflected 
by larger interference effects from flanker stimuli, children and adults can 
demonstrate equivalent flanker effects when attentional demands are high (Huang-
Pollock, Carr, & Nigg, 2002). The latter finding has been investigated within the 
framework of Lavie’s Load theory of attention and cognitive control (Lavie, 1995; 
Lavie & Tsal, 1994). The theory proposes that successful focused attention (selection 
of task-relevant information over task-irrelevant information) depends on two 
mechanisms of selective attention. The first is a perceptual selection mechanism that 
details how the processing of flanker items is related to a ‘spill-over’ of untapped 
attentional resources into the processing of distracting information. Central to this 
mechanism is the idea of a limited processing capacity. Once this capacity is 
reached, as in high perceptual load tasks, no resources are available for any 
additional distractor processing. Low perceptual load tasks on the other hand do not 
consume all processing capacity and resources automatically ‘spill over’ into 
processing task-irrelevant information. The second mechanism is a more active 
mechanism of cognitive control that is needed to minimise interference from 
distractor stimuli when these are perceived (as in low perceptual load conditions). 
Efficient cognitive control is dependent on higher cognitive functions such as 
working memory to ‘shield’ task performance from distractor interference by 
maintaining current task priorities and goal-directed behaviour. Importantly, these 
control functions only become relevant in task situations where the distractor is 
perceived and interferes with a target response, and not when the distractor is already 
filtered out at an early perceptual stage as in high perceptual load displays. Contrary 
to the predicted effect of perceptual load on focussed attention, loading these control 
functions (e.g. by increasing working memory load) disrupts the ability to prioritise 
processing of task-relevant information and instead leads to increased distractor 
processing (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). Thus, whereas high 
perceptual load should lead to less distraction, a high level of load on cognitive 
control functions should lead to more distraction (Lavie, 2000, 2005, 2010). 
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Huang-Pollock et al. (2002) examined interference effects across different 
age groups (children aged 7-8 years, 9-10 years and 11-12 years and adults) in a 
response competition task under varying levels of perceptual load. Participants made 
a speeded target letter response while a distractor letter (compatible, incompatible or 
neutral) appeared in the periphery. The perceptual load of the task was manipulated 
by increasing the search set size (adding one, three, or five non-target letters to the 
central letter display). Low perceptual load displays thus featured fewer attended 
objects, (i.e. fewer non-target letters in the central display) than did high perceptual 
load displays. It was found that at low levels of perceptual load, both children and 
adults showed large interference effects, which were eliminated for all age groups at 
the highest level of perceptual load.  This suggests that at high perceptual load, 
children were able to ignore the distracting flanker, ruling out alternative 
explanations of a more general age-related deficit in inhibiting distractors. 
Interestingly, children experienced this reduction in interference at a smaller set size 
than adults. That is, smaller increases in perceptual load were sufficient in children to 
reduce distractor interference, suggesting that children’s more limited capacity was 
already exhausted at lower levels of perceptual load compared to adults. Maylor and 
Lavie (1998) also demonstrated age-related differences in perceptual load effects in 
older compared to younger subjects, with the former showing an elimination of 
distractor effects at earlier levels of perceptual load, suggesting that processing 
capacity declines with age. Taken together, these findings indicate that development 
involves both the maturation in attentional control mechanisms, and an increase in 
processing capacity that develops throughout childhood and into adulthood 
(McAvinue et al., 2012; Plude & Enns, 1994). 
However, the aforementioned studies on distractor processing only provided 
an indirect measure of distractor perception (via RT performance). Consider for 
example the findings from response competition experiments reported earlier. There, 
longer target RTs in the presence of response-incongruent distractors (i.e. distractor 
identity was associated with the opposite target response) reflected the extent to 
which distractors were processed. This may imply that distractor stimuli were 
perceived, i.e. participants were aware of distractors. However, greater reaction time 
costs incurred on incompatible versus compatible trials could also reflect post-
perceptual processes such as response selection. Finally, it is important to consider 
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the nature of the irrelevant stimulus in studies of distractor processing compared to 
studies measuring awareness. In contrast to studies of distractor processing that 
measure the extent to which a distracting stimulus competes with a primary task 
response (via response interference effects), studies of awareness investigate the 
extent to which participants can report noticing an additional stimulus that is not 
interfering with a response and is expected to appear on only some of the trials (e.g. 
Macdonald & Lavie, 2008), or is not expected to appear (e.g. inattentional blindness) 
(Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Remington, Cartwright-Finch, & Lavie, 2014; 
Swettenham et al., 2014). 
In the visual domain, the inattentional blindness paradigm has been applied to 
investigate the effects of attention on awareness. Inattentional blindness refers to the 
phenomenon that participants often fail to notice an unexpected visual stimulus on a 
critical trial when their attention is engaged in the primary task (e.g. line 
discrimination), yet report awareness on a following control trial when they are told 
not to engage in the primary task (Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser, 1979). The term 
awareness in this context refers to the conscious and perceptual awareness of an 
additional visual stimulus that is accessible for report by an individual (Lavie et al., 
2014). Using an inattentional blindness paradigm, Remington et al. (2014) examined 
the role of perceptual load for awareness of a visual stimulus outside the focus of 
attention across different age groups. They presented children of varying age groups 
and adults with a line discrimination task (judging which line of a cross is longer) 
under varying levels of perceptual load (either a subtle (high load) or a gross (low 
load) line discrimination). On a critical trial, an unexpected visual stimulus (black 
shape) was presented in addition to the cross and participants were subsequently 
asked whether they had noticed anything else. The results indicated that younger 
children had reduced awareness for the additional stimulus (critical stimulus: CS) 
overall compared to older children and adults, and increasing the perceptual load of 
the task reduced awareness of the CS for children (7-14 years of age) but not adults. 
This suggested to the authors that awareness for stimuli outside of the focus of 
attention increases with age, and older children have an increased perceptual capacity 
compared to younger children.  
As yet however, it is not known whether these developmental effects on 
awareness are also relevant in cross-modal contexts of selective attention. Will an 
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increase in visual perceptual load also modulate auditory awareness across 
development, and will younger children’s awareness rates be more affected by 
increases in perceptual load? Opposing predictions of the results can be obtained 
from the findings of studies outlined in the literature review in chapter 2. In short, 
while some studies point towards perceptual load effects across modalities 
(Macdonald & Lavie, 2011; Parks et al., 2009; Raveh & Lavie, 2015), others have 
found that auditory processing is not dependent on the level of visual perceptual load 
(Matusz et al., 2015; Parks et al., 2011; Tellinghuisen & Nowak, 2003). For example, 
in the only study that also included children, Matusz et al. (2015) asked 6-year-olds, 
11-year-olds and adults to search for a coloured shape according to a conjunction of 
features (a red square or a green circle) amongst other non-target shapes (red and 
green triangles, circles, and squares). The perceptual load of the task was 
manipulated by either presenting the target shape alone (low perceptual load), or 
together with three non-target shapes (high perceptual load) in one of six possible 
locations. Distractors were either compatible or incompatible with the target 
response and participants performed in three distractor conditions: (1) visual (visual 
flanker presented in the periphery), (2) auditory (voice recordings of a person saying 
“red” or “green”), or (3) audio-visual (visual flanker + voice recording). The results 
indicated that for visual distractors, increasing perceptual load reduced interference 
for all age groups, in line with previous findings by Huang-Pollock et al. (2002). 
Auditory distractors on the other hand were processed by all age groups regardless of 
the level of perceptual load. This would suggest that across development, processing 
of auditory distractors is not dependent on the level of visual perceptual load. 
However, in the study by Matusz et al. (2015) the auditory distractor was presented 
for a longer duration (500ms) than the visual search display (200ms), leaving open 
alternative explanations in terms of temporal overlap. Whilst the authors showed that 
in adults, unequal presentation times of the auditory stimulus was unlikely to be 
responsible for the results reported in the main study, they did not provide any 
evidence whether the same is true for the younger children (6- and 11-year-olds). 
The latter study also only provided an indirect measure of distractor perception (via 
RT performance), and therefore cannot support any direct conclusions about the 
extent to which task-irrelevant stimuli were perceived. Clearly, the limited amount of 
developmental research in this area of research necessitates further consideration. 
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With this in mind, the following study investigated how development affects the 
interaction between attention and awareness in cross-modal contexts of attention 
using perceptual load theory. 
Experiment 1 
An inattentional deafness task similar to that used by Macdonald and Lavie 
(2011), but adapted to suit younger participants was used. Participants from different 
age groups (5-6 years, 9-10 years, 14-15 years and adults) judged which line of a 
briefly presented cross was longer (horizontal vs. vertical) during six non-critical 
trials that only featured the visual cross stimulus. On a critical trial, an unexpected 
auditory stimulus was played concurrently with the visual stimulus and participants 
were asked whether they had noticed anything else. The extent to which attentional 
resources were still available on the critical trial to also perceive the unexpected 
auditory stimulus was manipulated by increasing the perceptual load of the visual 
line judgment task. This was achieved by increasing the processing requirements (i.e. 
adjusting the visual angle of one of the arms of the target cross) involved in the line 
judgment task. The low perceptual load condition thus featured a more gross line-
length discrimination, whereas in the high perceptual load condition, a smaller line-
length difference was used and therefore required a subtle line discrimination. The 
critical trial was followed by a control trial, which assessed whether participants 
noticed the auditory stimulus when their attention was not engaged on the visual 
task.  
Prior to data collection, a pilot study comprising 20 adult participants and 10 
young children (9-10 years of age), none of whom participated in the following 
experiment, was carried out to validate whether the changes in task parameters were 
effective. In contrast to the task used by Macdonald and Lavie (2011), the line length 
discrimination required in the current task was more obvious. In the low perceptual 
load condition, the shorter arm subtended 0.9° (vs. 1.4°) and the longer arm 
subtended 3.9° (vs. 3.8°). In the high perceptual load condition, the shorter arm 
subtended 2.4° (vs. 3.6°) and the longer arm subtended 3.9° (vs. 3.8°). The 
presentation time of the cross stimulus was also increased from 150ms to 170ms. 
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These changes were necessary to guarantee that the youngest children were able to 
perform the task at an adequate level and meet the strict inclusion criteria (see 
method section below). Based on previous findings that the capacity for awareness 
develops with age (Remington et al., 2014), it was hypothesised that younger 
children will show reduced awareness overall of an auditory stimulus compared to 
older children and adults. It was also hypothesised that across age groups, increasing 
visual perceptual load will reduce awareness of an auditory tone and that awareness 
reports in the younger age groups will be affected more by an increase in perceptual 
load than in the older age children and adults. 
Method 
Participants  
After applying a range of exclusion criteria (see below), a total of 157 
participants, split into four age groups 5-6 years (n = 33, M = 6 y 1m, SD = 5m), 9-10 
years (n= 44, M = 10y 3m, SD = 5m), 14-15 years (n = 40, M = 14 y 8m, SD = 4m), 
and adults (n = 40, M = 22y 7m, SD = 2.9 y) took part in the study. Informed consent 
was received prior of the experiment and all participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The design of this study is a 4x2 between subjects 
factorial design, with participants across the four age groups being randomly 
distributed across the two perceptual load conditions (high vs. low). Participants 
were excluded if they obtained a score of less than five correct on the six non-critical 
trials, were incorrect on the critical trial or were unable to hear the sound on the 
control trial. These exclusion criteria were necessary to ensure that all participants 
engaged with the primary task, were focused on the visual task during the critical 
trial, and were able to hear the critical stimulus (CS) on the control trial when their 
attention was not directed at the visual task. A total of 12 children (5-6 years) failed 
these exclusion criteria (eight scored less than five correct non-critical trials, three 
failed the critical trial and two failed to report awareness of the critical stimulus on 
the control trial). All 5-6 year-old children who scored less than five correct non-
critical trials were in the high perceptual load condition. Three children (9-10 years) 
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failed the critical trial and one adolescent (14-15years) failed the control trial.  These 
participants were removed prior to analysis.  
Stimuli 
Microsoft Visual Basic (version 6) was used to create computer-based stimuli 
that were presented on an IBM Lenovo Thinkpad 14.1” personal laptop. Participants 
were seated directly in front of the computer screen such that viewing distance was 
60cm. Fixation was indicated by a black circle (0.15°). Target displays consisted of a 
black cross (RGB: 0, 0, 0), presented in the centre of the screen, against a white 
background (RGB: 255, 255, 255). On each trial, either the horizontal (H) or the 
vertical (V) line of the cross was longer than the other one (presentation was 
randomised across the first 6 trials, and counterbalanced across participants on trial 
7). Perceptual load of the primary visual task was manipulated by increasing the 
complexity of perceptual operations involved in the line discrimination task (Lavie, 
2005, 2010). Apart from increasing the number of relevant items in a search task 
(e.g. by increasing the search set size), perceptual load can be manipulated by 
increasing the processing requirements of items in the relevant task (Lavie, 1995). 
For example, a more subtle line discrimination task should demand considerably 
more attentional resources than a gross line discrimination task. There have been a 
number of published studies that have manipulated the perceptual load of a single-
element display (e.g. line discrimination) and demonstrated reduced distractor 
interference with increased perceptual load either behaviourally (Cartwright-Finch & 
Lavie, 2007; Macdonald & Lavie, 2011; Remington et al., 2014; Swettenham et al., 
2014) or by reduced neural responses evoked by task-irrelevant information in high 
perceptual load single element displays (Carmel et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2005). 
In the current study, the visual angle of one of the arms of the target cross was 
therefore adjusted, so that perceptual identification was more demanding on 
attention. In the high perceptual load condition, a cross with a shorter arm subtending 
2.4° and a longer arm subtending 3.9° appeared, whereas in the low load condition, a 
cross with a shorter arm subtending 0.9° and a longer arm subtending 3.9° appeared 
(see Figure 3.1). The auditory stimulus used was a 180-Hz pure tone of 69.4dB 
played through a pair of Sennheiser HD 25-1-II stereo headphones. The intensity 
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level was measured prior to the experiment by a Bruel & Kjaer 4153 artificial ear 
together with an Ono Sokki CF-350Z spectrum analyser.  
 
Figure 3.1 Illustration of stimuli used in (a) the low perceptual load condition and 
(b) high perceptual load condition 
 
Note: In each perceptual load condition, presentation of the two crosses was 
randomised across trials 
Procedure  
Prior to starting the computer task, the experimenter made sure that each 
child was able to correctly discriminate which line of a cross presented on an A4 
sheet of paper was the longer one. Participants were then told that the cross will only 
appear very briefly on the screen, and that they need to fixate on the middle of screen 
in order to tell the experimenter which line of the cross was longer. They were also 
told that they need to wear headphones as part of the experiment. Each trial began 
with the presentation of a fixation circle subtending 0.15° in the middle of the screen 
(1500ms); followed by a blank screen (96ms), a centrally located target cross 
(170ms), and a visual mask (496ms). A blank screen was then displayed and 
participants indicated which line of the cross was longer (see Figure 3.2 for 
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experimental procedure). Responses to the cross task were either obtained by 
children’s verbal responses referring to the lines as “the one going up and down” (V) 
vs. “the one going across” (H), pointing to visual aids placed next to the computer 
depicting each possible target cross scenario, or making appropriate hand gestures. 
The experimenter then entered their response on the computer. On the seventh and 
critical trial, the same procedure applied, but an auditory stimulus was played 
concurrently with presenting the cross. Responses to the cross task were recorded as 
in the previous trials, but participants were also asked whether they had noticed 
anything else. Participants responded verbally, giving details of the critical stimulus 
(i.e. describing having heard a ‘beep’ sound or imitating the beep sound) where 
possible. This is the standard way of assessing awareness on the critical trial in 
inattentional blindness/deafness paradigms (Memmert, 2006; Simons & Chabris, 
1999; Swettenham et al., 2014). The critical trial was subsequently repeated in a 
control trial, which measured awareness of the critical stimulus in absence of 
attention to the visual task. Participants were told prior to the control trial to ignore 
the cross stimulus and instead report anything else they notice. Only those 
participants who successfully identified the critical auditory stimulus on the control 
trial were included in further analyses. 
 
Figure 3.2 Procedure of experimental trials 
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Results 
Awareness of critical stimulus 
Participants were considered to be aware of the critical stimulus (CS) if they 
reported hearing something on the critical trial and were able to accurately describe 
the auditory stimulus verbally or by imitating the beep sound. Awareness rates as a 
function of perceptual load and age group are shown in Figure 3.3. All statistical 
analyses used maximum likelihood ratio tests (model comparisons based on 
differences in -2 log likelihood). 
 
Figure 3.3 Percentage of participants reporting awareness of the auditory stimulus 
(critical stimulus: CS) according to perceptual load and age group (error bars: 95% 
CI) 
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Effect of age and perceptual load on awareness rates 
Controlling for the effect of perceptual load, the analysis revealed a 
significant increase in the percentage of children reporting awareness of the CS, 2 
(1) = 48.608, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons (with Bonferroni-Holm corrected α-
levels for multiple comparisons) indicated that the youngest children (5-6 years) 
failed to notice the presence of the CS significantly more often (9 of 33) than 
children aged 9-10years (16 of 44), 2 (1) = 1.311, p = .252. In turn, children aged 
14-15 years (28 of 40) showed significantly higher proportions of awareness reports 
than children aged 9-10 years, 2 (1) = 9.707, p = .002. The difference in the 
proportion of awareness reports provided by 14-15 year old children compared to 
adults just missed significance, 2 (1) = 3.749, p = .053. 
Furthermore, the significant increases in awareness reports with age were 
observed in both the low perceptual load condition (2 (1) = 13.915, p < .001) and 
high perceptual load condition (2 (1) = 39.839, p < .001). These results therefore 
indicate that awareness for an auditory stimulus outside the focus of attention 
increased from 9-10 year-olds onwards into adulthood.  
Across all age groups, a significantly lower proportion of participants 
reported awareness of the CS in the high perceptual load condition (40 of 80 noticed 
the CS) compared to the low perceptual load condition (48 of 77 noticed the CS), 2 
(1) = 10.097, p = .001. An interaction between the level of perceptual load and age 
group was also significant, 2 (1) = 5.146, p = .023, suggesting that the effect of 
perceptual load is dependent on the age of participants. Individual comparisons 
indicated that increasing perceptual load from low to high significantly reduced 
awareness rates for 6-7 year old children (high load: 1/11, low load: 8/22, 2 (1) = 
7.713, p = .005) and 9-10 year old children (high load: 4/23, low load: 12/21, 2 (1) = 
7.747, p = .005). However, the level of perceptual load did not significantly modulate 
awareness in 14-15 year old children (high load: 16/24, low load: 12/16, 2 (1) = 
.322, p = .571) or adults (high load: 19/22, low load: 16/18, 2 (1) = .058, p = .809).  
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Cross task performance 
Overall, participants across age groups made significantly more errors on the 
line discrimination task in the high (M = 5.64, SD = .51) compared to the low 
perceptual load condition (M = 5.83, SD = .38), F(1, 149)  = 13.606, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
0.084. Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of age group, F(3, 149)  = 
5.975, p = .001, ηp
2 
= 0.107. Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected α-levels for 
multiple comparisons) revealed that 6-7 year old children made significantly more 
errors than all other groups (all p < .01). There were no significant differences in 
error rates between 10-11 year old children, 14-15 year old children and adults. The 
interaction of perceptual load and group was not significant, F(3, 149)  = 1.146, p = 
.333, ηp
2 
= 0.023. This suggests that the youngest children, as with the older children 
and adults, were performing similarly across perceptual load conditions. 
 
Figure 3.4 Task performance on line discrimination task according to perceptual 
load and age group (error bars: 95% CI) 
 
Discussion 
The findings indicated that with increasing age, participants failed less often 
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reduced awareness for children, but not adolescents and adults. Awareness rates were 
found to increase significantly from children (aged 9-10 years) to adolescents, and 
again to adults (albeit only approaching significance). This parallels findings in the 
visual domain, where similar age-related increases in awareness for a visual stimulus 
outside the focus of attention were found on an inattentional blindness task 
(Remington et al., 2014). The current findings therefore suggest that also awareness 
in cross-modal contexts of attention follows a developmental trajectory with linear 
increases in awareness observable throughout childhood and into adulthood. Note 
that this increase in awareness was observed both in low- and high perceptual load 
conditions. The finding that younger children (9-10 year olds) were less likely to 
notice the CS across these conditions supports the hypothesis that perceptual 
capacity is increased in older children compared to younger children, with these 
levels of perceptual load exhausting the smaller capacity of younger children to a 
greater extent. 
There was no further significant increase in awareness from adolescents (14-
15 year olds) to adults, potentially suggesting that the capacity for awareness 
develops with age until 14-15 years where it reaches a capacity level similar to 
adults. However, given that the task was adapted so that the youngest children were 
able to perform at an adequate level, it seems more likely that the current 
experimental set-up was not sensitive enough to detect any larger differences in 
awareness between these age groups. To further investigate these effects, a future 
study could present adolescents and adults with a more subtle line discrimination 
task (e.g. adopting the task parameters for the high perceptual load condition used by 
Macdonald & Lavie, 2011). 
The results also showed that the effect of visual perceptual load on auditory 
awareness was dependent on age. In particular, increasing the perceptual load of the 
task reduced awareness for children (aged 6–10 years), but not adolescents or adults. 
This demonstrates a smaller capacity in children compared to adolescents and adults 
that is disproportionally taxed by an increase in perceptual load, thereby restricting 
processing of the auditory tone to reach conscious awareness. Note that reduced 
awareness in the high perceptual load condition is unlikely to be explained by a 
trade-off in line discrimination accuracy. There were no differences in task 
performance between perceptual load conditions for all age groups, including the 
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youngest age groups. This is of course related to the strict exclusion criteria that were 
in place to ensure that participants engaged well with the visual task. Only those 
participants who performed correctly on at least 5 out of 6 line judgments, and were 
correct on the critical trial were included. It is worth noting that the youngest 
children (5-6-year olds) experienced the greatest difficulty performing the task at 
these levels, particularly in the high perceptual load condition (12 participants were 
excluded). However, we decided that it was necessary to impose these strict criteria 
in order to confidently include only those participants who engaged well with the 
task. This was necessary to ascertain that any differences in awareness between 
perceptual load conditions are not a result of difficulties performing the line 
discrimination task. 
A failure to notice the auditory stimulus can also not be attributed to the low 
intensity of the auditory stimulus. On both the critical and control trial, the auditory 
stimulus was played at hearing levels well above threshold and was therefore easily 
perceivable. Importantly, only those participants who noticed the auditory stimulus 
on the control trial were included in the final sample. The proportion of participants 
not meeting this requirement was very low (2 out of 157). While it is not clear why 
these participants did not hear the auditory tone, the low proportion of participants 
not noticing the tone suggests that the tone was played well above normal hearing 
threshold. Together, these results indicate that it is unlikely that a lack of engagement 
with the central task or low audibility of the auditory tone is responsible for the 
results. Instead, the current findings suggest that any differences in noticing the 
presence of an additional auditory stimulus was dependent on whether sufficient 
attentional resources were available after processing of the visual input finished. 
The current findings therefore support the idea that vision and hearing share 
an attentional capacity resource (Brand-D’Abrescia & Lavie, 2008; Broadbent, 1958; 
Macdonald & Lavie, 2011; Santangelo et al., 2007; Sinnett et al., 2006). Sinnett et al. 
(2006) for example showed that recognition memory for task-irrelevant words 
presented auditorily was reduced while monitoring either a rapid stream of pictures 
or sounds. Whilst this was the case for both within- (target and cue were presented in 
the same modality) and between modality conditions, participants performed 
significantly better when attending to the words in a control condition. These 
findings clearly show that word recognition depends on a capacity-limited resource 
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common to vision and hearing. However, due to the long delay between presentation 
of the stimuli words and the recognition test raises the possibility that recognition 
failure may reflect, in some cases, rapid forgetting. In the visual domain, such 
‘inattentional amnesia’ has been described by Wolfe (1999) and refers to the idea that 
a failure to detect a stimulus might be related to forgetting rather than not perceiving. 
In the current study, could slower responding to the awareness question by 
younger children facilitated rapid forgetting and therefore resulted in lower 
awareness rates in younger children? There is evidence that younger children 
generally respond slower on a target task (as indexed by RTs) than older children and 
adults (Kail, 1991; Wickens, 1974). Kail (1991) for instance, in a meta-analysis of 70 
studies, found that during childhood and adolescence, mean RTs increased linearly 
as a function of adult RTs in corresponding conditions. It is therefore possible that 
the younger children simply took longer to respond to the target task, thereby 
allowing a greater time window between presentation of the stimulus and the surprise 
question in which to forget the presence of the critical stimulus. Unfortunately, the 
absence of RT data in the current study does not allow us to evaluate this possibility. 
In the current study, I decided that it was important to keep the number of trials to a 
minimum in order to ensure that as many children as possible continued to engage 
with the task. To investigate the developmental effects of perceptual load on 
awareness in a cross-modal context of attention, it was essential to include the 
youngest age group (5-6 years old children) in the study and keep them engaged with 
the task in order to guarantee reliable performance on the critical trial. Given the 
small number of experimental trials (6 trials + 1 critical trial) and therefore larger 
variability in reaction times across trials, it is unlikely that in the current task design, 
reaction time would have been a reliable measure of task performance. Future 
research could attempt to increase the number of trials and also measure participants’ 
reaction times in order to help rule out the possibility that reduced awareness in the 
younger children was a result of rapid forgetting. 
Taken together, the findings suggest a smaller perceptual capacity in children 
compared to adolescents and adults, reflected by the observation that awareness for 
an auditory stimulus increased with age and an increase in perceptual load reduced 
awareness in children but not adolescents and adults. This therefore demonstrates 
how development involves the maturation of perceptual capacity and its relevance 
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for selective attention in cross-modal situations. In the following chapters, I am 
going to investigate the effects of visual perceptual load on auditory awareness in 
children and adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorders. 
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Chapter 4 The effect of visual perceptual load on auditory 
awareness in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
Perceptual and attentional atypicalities have often been reported in 
individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and are now also included in the 
new DSM-5 criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The most prominent 
theories attempting to account for perceptual anomalies in ASD, such as Weak 
Central Coherence (Frith, 1989b; Happé & Frith, 2006) and Enhanced Perceptual 
Functioning (Mottron et al., 2006), have focussed on explaining enhanced processing 
of local, low-level information or scene-detail in stimuli. For example, in the visual 
domain, a preference for local processing could be reflected by performance on the 
Navon task (Plaisted et al., 1999), the embedded figures task (Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983) and the block design task (Happé, 1996; Shah & 
Frith, 1993); and in the auditory domain by a higher incidence of perfect pitch (e.g. 
Heaton, 2003) and enhanced frequency discrimination skills, at least in a subgroup of 
those with ASD (Bonnel et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2009). 
Recent work on visual selective attention has proposed that individuals with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are characterised by an increased perceptual 
capacity (Remington, Swettenham, et al., 2012; Remington et al., 2009; Swettenham 
et al., 2014). This proposal attempts to account for enhanced processing of low-level 
information and scene-detail, as well discrepant findings in visual selective attention 
in ASD. For example, whilst a number of studies suggest a deficit in selective 
attention as evidenced by higher distractibility to task irrelevant stimuli (Adams & 
Jarrold, 2012; Burack, 1994), others indicate that individuals with ASD are 
characterised by superior selective attention (e.g. Joseph et al., 2009; Plaisted et al., 
1999; Shah & Frith, 1993).  
The proposal that individuals with ASD are characterised by an increased 
perceptual capacity has been based on the framework of Lavie’s Load theory of 
selective attention (Lavie, 1995). Load theory asserts that the extent to which 
irrelevant distractors will be processed depends on the level of perceptual load of the 
task. The perceptual load of a given task can be manipulated by increasing the 
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number of different task-relevant stimuli (e.g. increasing the number of additional 
visual stimuli in a search display) or by increasing the perceptual processing 
requirements (e.g. presenting a more subtle line discrimination task) (Lavie, 1995; 
Lavie & Tsal, 1994). It is not just the number of units in a task-relevant display 
which constitutes perceptual load, but even for single item displays “perceptual load 
correlates with the amount of information required to process each unit in order to 
produce the required perceptual response” (Lavie & Tsal, 1994, p. 185). Crucial to 
this model is the assumption that while perceptual processing is limited in capacity, it 
proceeds automatically and involuntarily until it runs out of capacity (Lavie, 2005, 
2010). It follows then that under conditions of low perceptual load (e.g. only a target 
letter and one non-target letter are presented) any spare capacity after the processing 
of task-relevant stimuli automatically “spills-over” to process irrelevant distractors. 
In tasks of high perceptual load however (e.g. identifying a target letter among six 
non-target letters), full processing capacity is engaged by searching through the 
search array for the target letter, leaving no additional capacity to process irrelevant 
distractors (Lavie, 1995). The key factor is that the level of perceptual load at which 
task-irrelevant stimuli are no longer processed relates to an individual’s perceptual 
capacity. In other words, an individual’s perceptual resources will determine what 
constitutes high perceptual load for that individual. 
It is also important to note that the effects of perceptual load on attention can 
be distinguished from the effects of task difficulty. Perceptual load can be 
manipulated by increasing the number of task-relevant items or by increasing 
perceptual processing requirements, thereby placing higher attentional demands on 
available resources (i.e. increasing data “resource limits” (Lavie, 2005; Lavie, 2010). 
Task difficulty on the other hand can be increased by manipulations of extreme 
sensory degradation, altering sensory “data limits” (e.g. by manipulating contrast or 
size of a target) (Lavie and de Fockert, 2003). Lavie and de Fockert (2003) 
demonstrated that whereas an increase in perceptual load resulted in reduced 
distractor processing, task difficulty (as defined above) disrupts task performance 
while having no effect on distractor processing. 
As outlined earlier, increasing the perceptual load in a task has been shown to 
reduce both distractor interference effects as well as awareness of task-irrelevant 
visual stimuli in neurotypical individuals (see Lavie, 2010 for a review). However, 
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this reduction has been shown to only occur for individuals with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD) at higher levels of perceptual load, potentially reflecting a higher 
perceptual capacity in ASD (Remington, Swettenham, et al., 2012; Remington et al., 
2009; Swettenham et al., 2014). 
Experiment 2 
Until now the effects of perceptual load on perceptual awareness in ASD 
have only been demonstrated within the visual domain and it is currently not known 
whether this extends to contexts of cross-modal selective attention. Within the 
literature, the only studies that have investigated cross-modal attention in ASD have 
produced conflicting results and did not manipulate the perceptual load of the task 
(Casey et al., 1993; Ciesielski et al., 1995). Would individuals with ASD also 
demonstrate an increased perceptual capacity if a task features both visual and 
auditory stimuli? The following experiment examined whether increasing perceptual 
load in the visual modality also influences awareness for an auditory stimulus in a 
group of children with ASD and a neurotypical comparison group. To measure these 
effects, children diagnosed with ASD and a matched control group on chronological 
age and non-verbal ability were presented with the same inattentional deafness 
paradigm used in the previous chapter. Based on the findings in the previous chapter 
that perceptual load modulates the incidence of inattentional deafness in typically 
developing children and the findings suggesting that perceptual capacity is increased 
in ASD, I reasoned that children with ASD would also show reduced inattentional 
deafness under high visual perceptual load compared to typically developing 
children. 
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Method 
Participants 
44 typically developing (TD) children, attending a local mainstream school, 
and 29 children with a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), attending a 
school specifically for children with a diagnosis of ASD, took part in the study. The 
sample of TD children used in this experiment was selected from the previous 
experiment and was carefully matched with the ASD sample for chronological age 
and non-verbal ability using the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 1998) (for descriptives see Table 4.1). Informed consent for all 
participants was received prior to the experiment. All participants with ASD had 
received a clinical diagnosis of ASD from a trained, independent clinician using the 
ADOS and following criteria listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). ASD 
diagnosis was also confirmed at the time of testing using the Social Communication 
Questionnaire (current version of the SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003); with all 
participants in the ASD group scoring above the recommended cut-off score of 15. 
None of the participants had any other neurological disorder. Note that the SCQ was 
not administered to typically developing participants. Given the time constraints in 
collecting data, as well as the limited value to further understand the primary 
research questions, it was decided that it was more important to collect SCQ data on 
the ASD group alone. This applies to all experiments presented in this thesis. 
The experimental design of this study is a factorial design with two 
independent predictors (‘Perceptual load’: high vs. low and ‘Group’: ASD vs. TD), 
with all participants being randomly distributed across the two ‘perceptual load’ 
conditions. Participants were excluded if they obtained a score of less than five 
correct on the six non-critical trials, were incorrect on the critical trial or were unable 
to hear the tone on the control trial. These exclusion criteria were necessary to make 
sure that all participants were engaging with the primary task on the critical trial that 
featured the additional auditory stimulus. Three children with ASD scored less than 
five correct non-critical trials (all in the high perceptual load condition) and therefore 
were removed from the sample. The final sample was composed of 26 children with 
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ASD (14 in the low load condition and 12 in the high load condition) and 44 
typically developing children (21 in the low load condition and 23 in the high load 
condition). An independent samples t-test indicated that there were no significant 
differences in non-verbal ability scores and chronological age between groups, 
between perceptual load conditions and between group/perceptual load conditions 
(maximum t-value = 1.84, minimum p-value = 0.07). 
  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for each group 
Group Statistic 
CA 
(years : 
months) 
Raven’s  
Score 
Cross-
judgment 
task 
SCQ 
score 
ASD (n= 26)      
Low load (n= 14) M 10:4 34.5 6.64 19.71 
 SD 0:6 6.9 0.63 3.79 
 Range 9:3 – 11:5 24  – 45  15  – 24 
      
High load (n= 12) M 10:6 36.7 6.58 18.92 
 SD 0:6 5.1 0.52 2.84 
 Range 9:6 – 11:9 24  – 46  15  – 26 
TD (n= 44) 
     
Low load (n= 21) M 10:3 38.5 6.86  
 SD 0:5 6.2 0.36  
 Range 9:4 – 11:2 27  – 46   
      
High load (n=23) M 10:2 38.2 6.65  
 SD 0:3 6.4 0.57  
 Range 9:5 – 10:8 27  – 49   
Note: 
CA = Chronological Age 
SCQ = Social Communication Questionnaire 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The same line discrimination task used in the previous chapter was given to 
participants, with either the horizontal (H) or the vertical (V) line of the cross being 
longer than the other one (presentation was randomised across the first 6 trials, and 
counterbalanced across participants on trial 7). Perceptual load of the primary visual 
task was manipulated by increasing the complexity of perceptual operations involved 
in the line discrimination task (Lavie, 2005). This was achieved by adjusting the 
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visual angle of one of the arms of the target cross, so that perceptual identification 
was more demanding on attention. In the high perceptual load condition, a cross with 
a shorter arm subtending 2.4° and a longer arm subtending 3.9° appeared, whereas in 
the low load condition, a cross with a shorter arm subtending 0.9° and a longer arm 
subtending 3.9° appeared (see Figure 3.1). Responses to the cross task were either 
obtained by children’s verbal responses referring to the lines as “the one going up 
and down” (V) vs. “the one going across” (H), pointing to visual aids placed next to 
the computer depicting each possible target cross scenario, or making appropriate 
hand gestures. The experimenter then entered their response on the computer. 
On a critical trial, the same procedure applied, but an auditory stimulus was 
played concurrently with presenting the cross (for procedure see Figure 3.2). 
Responses to the cross task were recorded as in the previous trials, yet participants 
were also asked whether they had noticed anything else. This is the standard way of 
assessing awareness on the critical trial in inattentional blindness/deafness paradigms 
(Memmert, 2006; Simons & Chabris, 1999). Participants responded verbally, giving 
details of the critical stimulus (i.e. imitating the beep sound) where possible. The 
critical trial was subsequently repeated in a control trial, which measured awareness 
of the critical stimulus in absence of attention to the visual task. Participants were 
told prior to the control trial to ignore the cross stimulus and instead attend to any 
other stimulus they might notice. Only those participants who successfully identified 
the critical stimulus on the control trial were included in further analyses. Data from 
four children (2 TD and 2 ASD children) was excluded prior to analysis due to an 
inability to notice the critical stimulus on the control trial (no change in final sample 
size reported earlier). 
Results 
Cross task performance 
Task performance was analysed by comparing the number of correct 
responses on the line discrimination task according to diagnostic group (ASD vs. 
TD) and perceptual load (high vs. low). A 2x2 between-participants ANOVA 
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indicated that there was no significant difference in correct responses according to 
perceptual load (high load: M = 6.63; low load: M = 6.77), F(1,66) = 1.048, p = .310, 
ηp
2
 = .02, suggesting that participants from both groups performed similarly across 
perceptual load conditions. To some extent, this result is not surprising, given the 
rather strict exclusion criteria that were in place to ensure all participants were 
engaged to a high degree with the primary task. Indeed, there was also no main effect 
of group (ASD: M = 6.62; TD: M = 6.75), F(1,66) = 1.201, p = .277, ηp
2
 = .02 and no 
significant interaction between diagnostic group and perceptual load, F(1,62) = 
0.317, p = .575, ηp
2
 = .005, suggesting that both groups engaged well with the task. 
Awareness of critical stimulus 
Participants were considered to be aware of the critical stimulus (CS) if they 
reported hearing something on the critical trial, and were able to accurately describe 
the auditory stimulus verbally or by imitating the beep sound. Awareness rates as a 
function of perceptual load and group are shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 Percentage of participants reporting awareness of the auditory stimulus 
(critical stimulus: CS) according to perceptual load and diagnostic group (error bars: 
standard error) 
 
Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, a hierarchical logistic 
regression analysis was carried out to predict awareness of the auditory stimulus (0 
=“No”, 1 =”Yes”) according to perceptual load, diagnostic group, and their 
interaction. In a first step, an intercept-only model was compared against a model 
with perceptual load and diagnostic group as predictors. The latter model was 
subsequently compared to a full model including the interaction between perceptual 
load and diagnostic group. All statistical analyses used maximum likelihood ratio 
tests (model comparisons based on differences in -2 log likelihood) and the statistical 
cut-off criterion for all predictors was set at .05. 
The first regression model predicting awareness of the critical stimulus (CS: 
unexpected auditory stimulus) from perceptual load and diagnostic group performed 
significantly better overall than the intercept-only model, 2 (2) = 10.054, p = .007. 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test also indicated a good fit of the model to the data, 2 
(2) = 3.322, p = .190. When controlling for the effect of group, there was a 
significant effect of perceptual load on awareness, 2 (1) = 4.467, p = .035, with 
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participants in the high perceptual load condition being 0.342 times less likely to 
notice the stimulus than participants in the low perceptual load condition. 
  
Table 4.2 Logistic regression analysis predicting awareness of the critical stimulus 
from perceptual load condition and diagnostic group 
Variable B SE B df 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
Estimation 
(MLE) 
p 
Odds 
ratio 
(OR) 
95% CI of 
OR 
Perceptual load -1.074 .518 1 4.467 .035* .342 .124 - .943 
Group 1.212 .537 1 5.357 .021* 3.361 
1.173-
9.632 
Load X Group 2.251 .823 1 7.479 .006** 9.5 
1.892- 
47.689 
Note: 
* p < .05 
** p < .01  
 
Diagnostic group also significantly predicted awareness of the CS, 2 (1) = 
5.357, p = .021 with participants in the ASD group being 3.4 times more likely to 
notice the critical stimulus (for maximum likelihood ratio tests, odds ratio and CI of 
odds ratio see Table 4.2). The interaction between perceptual load and diagnostic 
group was tested by comparing a full model that included all predictors (perceptual 
load, group, and their interaction), against a reduced model with only load and group 
as predictors.  The likelihood ratio test revealed a significant interaction between 
perceptual load and group, 2 (1) = 7.479, p = .006, suggesting a different effect of 
perceptual load on detection between groups. In particular, whereas in the low 
perceptual load condition detection rates did not differ between groups (TD: 57% vs. 
ASD: 64%), 2 (1) = .179, p = .672, detection rates were significantly reduced for the 
TD group compared to the ASD group in the high perceptual load condition (TD: 
17% vs. ASD: 66%), 2 (1) = 8.498, p = .004. An additional logistic regression 
analysis also confirmed that neither non-verbal ability scores (raw score on the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices) nor scores on the SCQ was a significant predictor 
(both p > .05) of awareness rates of the CS in the ASD group. 
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Discussion 
The findings demonstrate greater awareness for an unexpected auditory 
stimulus (critical stimulus: CS) overall and a reduced effect of visual perceptual load 
on CS awareness in children with ASD compared to typically developing (TD) 
children. Importantly, the increased rates of CS awareness in children with ASD, 
when visual perceptual load was high, are not likely to be explained by deterioration 
in task performance on the line discrimination task. These findings suggest an 
increased perceptual capacity in children with ASD that operates across sensory 
modalities. 
According to Load theory, whether or not a stimulus reaches awareness 
depends on whether sufficient capacity is available to process additional information. 
Whereas high perceptual load conditions should result in lower awareness rates as all 
processing capacity is already exhausted by performing a primary task, low 
perceptual load leads to greater awareness as there is enough capacity available to 
also attend to any other additional stimulus (Lavie, 2005). It follows then that if the 
relevant task fails to exhaust capacity, then any excess capacity will automatically 
and involuntarily be allocated to the processing of any other stimulus regardless of 
whether that stimulus is task-unrelated. As awareness rates remained unaffected by 
the increase in perceptual load of the visual task in children with ASD, yet dropped 
significantly in TD children, the findings suggest that children with ASD had 
processing resources left-over to attend to the auditory stimulus after processing of 
the visual task finished. The findings from this experiment therefore provide further 
support for the hypothesis that individuals with ASD have an increased perceptual 
capacity. 
Both groups showed equally high performance rates in the high as well as the 
low perceptual load conditions of the line discrimination task. Of course this was not 
surprising given that any participant who did not meet the criteria of 5 out of 6 
correct discriminations on non-critical trials and a correct discrimination on the 
critical trial (when the CS was presented) was excluded.  It is worth noting though 
that only three participants failed to reach these inclusion criteria. All three were 
children with ASD in the high perceptual load condition.  It is not possible to tell 
exactly why these three participants did not perform well on the line discrimination 
task, this may have been due to a lack of motivation, a misunderstanding of 
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instructions or a genuine difficulty in making discriminations. However, for the 
purpose of this study it was important only to include participants who were 
successfully performing the central task when the CS appeared. Any differences in 
CS awareness are therefore unlikely to be due to a lack of engagement with the 
central task. The participants’ performance on the central task was only measured in 
terms of accuracy on the line discrimination task and not in terms of reaction time. In 
the current study we decided that it was important to keep the number of trials to a 
minimum in order to ensure that as many children as possible continued to engage 
with the task.  Given the small number of trials and therefore larger variability in 
reaction times across trials, it is unlikely that in the current task design, reaction time 
would have been a reliable measure of task performance. Future research could 
attempt to increase the number of trials and also measure participants’ reaction times 
in order to obtain a more nuanced measure of task performance. Such reaction time 
data could help rule out the possibility that increased detection rates occurred 
because the ASD participants had more time to divert attentional resources from the 
primary task to the unexpected auditory stimulus. Whilst this explanation cannot be 
completely dismissed with the current data, it seems unlikely given the experimental 
set-up. The auditory stimulus was a single, unexpected event and as a result, 
participants were neither expecting the additional auditory stimulus nor the surprise 
question following the critical trial. As the auditory stimulus was unexpected, it 
seems unlikely that task strategies influenced detection rates such that participants 
prepared to divert attention to the unattended modality prior to the critical trial. 
The results also indicated that overall cognitive abilities (non-verbal ability 
scores) and ASD symptomatology (SCQ scores) were not able to account for the 
increased awareness rates of the CS in the ASD group, suggesting that the results 
were not simply driven by a subgroup of more able children with ASD (i.e. those 
with higher non-verbal ability scores and lower SCQ scores). However, the sample in 
this study, as well as those from previous studies (Remington, Swettenham, et al., 
2012; Remington et al., 2009; Swettenham et al., 2014) only included participants 
with ASD with IQs within the typical range. To date there have been no studies 
examining perceptual capacity in children with ASD who also have learning 
difficulties. Could the difference in awareness rates between the ASD and TD group 
be due to under reporting by the TD group?  For example, there is evidence that 
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individuals with autism are less concerned about social pressures and more ready to 
report veridical experience (e.g. Bowler & Worley, 1994).  This seems unlikely as a 
main explanation for the findings given that the difference between the groups in 
reporting rates occurs in one load condition (high load) but not in another (low load) 
despite the auditory stimulus being the same in both. 
Reduced awareness rates in TD children on the other hand cannot be 
attributed to the low intensity of the auditory stimulus. On both the critical and 
control trial, the auditory stimulus was played at hearing levels well above threshold 
and was therefore easily perceivable, and all participants noticed the auditory 
stimulus and were able to describe it on the control trial when their attention was not 
focused on the primary visual task. The observed group effect is also unlikely to be 
caused by any differences in cognitive abilities as all participants were carefully 
matched for performance on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices. 
The finding of reduced inattentional deafness under load in children with 
ASD extends existing work on the effect of perceptual load on selective attention in 
ASD. In particular, whereas previous demonstrations of an increased perceptual 
capacity in ASD have only been within the visual domain (Remington, Swettenham, 
et al., 2012; Remington et al., 2009; Swettenham et al., 2014), the current findings 
suggest that this increased capacity operates across sensory modalities. However, the 
one-trial nature of the inattentional deafness paradigm means that one should be 
cautious to not overstate the conclusions of this single study.  
In the following chapter, I am going to examine whether a stimulus that 
conveys biological and socially relevant information (e.g. a person greeting another 
person) would produce similar results. In the visual domain, there is evidence that 
social stimuli (e.g. faces) do not capture attention to the same extent in ASD 
compared to TD children. Remington, Campbell, and Swettenham (2012) for 
instance demonstrated that unlike TD adults who processed distracting faces 
regardless of the perceptual load of a task, adults with ASD only processed 
distracting faces at low levels of perceptual load, but not at high levels of perceptual 
load. These findings suggest that in the typical population, social stimuli have a 
“special status” and are processed in an automatic and mandatory fashion regardless 
of the perceptual load of a relevant task. Whether similar differences in attention to 
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social auditory information can be observed will be investigated in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5 The effect of visual perceptual load on auditory 
awareness of a social vs. non-social stimulus in ASD 
Whereas the research presented so far has dealt with the cross-modal effects 
of attention on awareness of a neutral, socially-meaningless auditory stimulus (e.g. a 
simple sinewave tone), the purpose of the current chapter was to examine these 
cross-modal effects for social attention, in particular, the effects of visual perceptual 
load on awareness of a speech sound. 
There is some evidence that in typically developing individuals, processing of 
distracting visual social stimuli (i.e. faces) is unaffected by the perceptual load of a 
relevant task. Lavie, Ro, and Russell (2003) found that interference from famous 
distractor faces was observed at all levels of perceptual load, including high 
perceptual load, suggesting that face stimuli cannot be ignored and are processed 
automatically. By contrast, increasing perceptual load in a task that featured 
irrelevant neutral, non-face stimuli (categorising the names of fruits and musical 
instruments while ignoring their photographs) eliminated interference effects from 
distractors. Continued interference in typical individuals under high perceptual load 
levels for irrelevant face stimuli, but not non-face distractors indicated that 
processing of face stimuli does not depend on general capacity limits. Instead, Lavie 
and colleagues proposed that face processing may have a separate, face-specific 
capacity (Lavie et al., 2003). 
Applying perceptual load theory to investigate these effects in individuals 
with ASD, Remington, Campbell, et al. (2012) found that adults with ASD do not 
show the same prioritisation of attention towards faces. Participants performed a 
speeded classification task indicating whether a central target name, presented  
among other non-words, was female or male (e.g. Katie or John) whilst ignoring 
either congruent (same gender as target name) or incongruent (opposite gender as 
target name) distractor faces shown simultaneously in the periphery. The perceptual 
load of the task was manipulated by increasing the number of non-words adjacent to 
the target name. In individuals with ASD, processing of distractor faces was only 
evident at low-, but not at high levels of perceptual load, whereas TD individuals 
demonstrated a high level of distraction irrespective of the perceptual load of the 
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task. This indicated to the authors that faces do not capture attention of adults with 
ASD to the same extent as in typical adults, where faces seem to have a “special 
status” for attention and are processed regardless of task relevance or perceptual load 
of the task. 
With this in mind, the aims of the current study were two-fold: First, would 
an unexpected, socially salient auditory signal (e.g. a person greeting another person) 
also capture attention in TD individuals regardless of the visual perceptual load of an 
ongoing task? In other words, as with faces, do speech sounds have a “special status” 
for attention in the typically developing population? And second, how does visual 
perceptual load affect attentional capture of a speech sound in individuals with ASD? 
Speech sounds are ostensibly the most important social signal in our auditory 
environment. Speech is not only fundamental for everyday social interactions, but 
also forms the basis for human communication by allowing us to share ideas, 
thoughts and emotions with the people around us. Whilst the exchange of social 
information can proceed directly via the content of speech, listeners are also able to 
gather important social cues through certain properties of the human voice (Ellis, 
1989). For example, emotional prosody, a set of acoustic parameters of speech (e.g. 
mean amplitude, mean segment and pause duration) that is directly influenced by 
affect, allows the listener to infer the speaker’s affective state (Scherer, 1995). The 
voice also contains important information on an individual’s identity. By listening to 
a speaker’s voice, listeners are able to accurately determine the gender of a speaker 
(Lass, Hughes, Bowyer, Waters, & Bourne, 1976; Mullennix, Johnson, Topcu‐
Durgun, & Farnsworth, 1995) and her/his approximate age (Hartman & Danhauer, 
1976; Linville, 1996). The ability to attend to, process, and extract this multitude of 
information transmitted via speech or the voice is therefore fundamental for social 
interactions. 
However, in individuals with ASD, impairments in processing social and 
emotional information, as well as atypical orienting and attention to social stimuli, 
including speech stimuli have been well documented (Baron-Cohen, Lombardo, 
Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2013; Dawson, Bernier, & Ring, 2012). For example, one 
of the striking characteristic of children with ASD is their poor orienting to the 
human voice (Klin, 1991). Whereas typically developing children show an 
attentional bias towards speech sounds from a very early age (Alegria & Noirot, 
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1978; Jusczyk & Bertoncini, 1988), children with ASD often do not exhibit such a 
preference (Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998; Dawson et al., 
2004; Kuhl, Coffey-Corina, Padden, & Dawson, 2005). It remains unclear why 
individuals with ASD demonstrate this atypical orientation to socially relevant 
auditory information, and in particular to speech. A deficit in orienting could be a 
result of a more fundamental perceptual impairment in acoustic encoding of complex 
stimuli, as advocated by Mottron et al. (2006). Alternatively, reduced attention to 
social stimuli might underlie this deficit in orienting, such that individuals with ASD 
assign fewer attentional resources to social stimuli than TD individuals (Klin, Jones, 
Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Swettenham et al., 1998). 
This chapter examines the predictions of perceptual load theory for attention 
to social stimuli within a cross-modal context of selective attention in ASD. Before I 
introduce the experiment, I will first outline the relevant literature on speech 
processing and the implications for social attention in ASD. 
Processing of speech sounds in typically developing individuals 
The development of speech sound processing abilities 
Long before speech perception abilities develop, infants already seem to be 
drawn to the social properties of the human voice (Vouloumanos & Werker, 2007a). 
Indeed, one of the earliest observations in infants is their preferential orienting and 
processing of the human voice (Grossmann, Oberecker, Koch, & Friederici, 2010). 
Experiments measuring sucking preference or heart rates in newborn infants during 
presentation of different voices have demonstrated a preference of infants, and even 
fetuses,  of their mother's voice to the voice of another newborn's mother (DeCasper 
& Fifer, 1980; Kisilevsky et al., 2003) and their father’s compared to another person 
(Ockleford, Vince, Layton, & Reader, 1988). By the age of three months, infants also 
seem to prefer human voices to similar non-social auditory stimuli (Vouloumanos, 
Hauser, Werker, & Martin, 2010). A range of studies also suggest that infants have 
an attentional and perceptual bias for speech sounds relative to non-speech sounds. 
For example, Glenn, Cunningham, and Joyce (1981) found that 9-month-olds chose 
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more frequently to listen to a female person singing compared to instrumental music 
matched in melody. Other studies have shown that neonates have a preference for 
speech over filtered speech (Spence & DeCasper, 1987) and prefer speech spoken in 
their own language to a language from a different rhythmic class (Mehler, Jusczyk, 
Lambertz, Halsted, Bertoncini, & Amiel-Tison, 1988; Moon, Cooper, & Fifer, 1993).  
However, whether this reflects an innate bias to listen to speech or a 
preference for speech patterns in rhythm and intonation (as a result of prenatal 
experiences) remains an issue of debate. In a set of studies that compared speech to 
carefully matched sine-wave analogues of speech in terms of duration, timing and 
fundamental frequency, Vouloumanos and Werker found that 2- to 7- month-olds 
listened longer to spoken words than to the complex non-speech analogues 
(Vouloumanos & Werker, 2004) and adjusted their high amplitude sucking in 
response to speech sounds (Vouloumanos & Werker, 2007a), indicating a preference 
for speech stimuli. In a response to Vouloumanos and Werker (2007a), Rosen and 
Iverson (2007) however pointed out that in their study, the non-speech analogues 
stimuli differed from the speech stimuli in voice pitch and therefore any bias towards 
speech stimuli could simply reflect a preference of infants for a strong voice melody 
that underlies prenatal learning experiences (for counter-arguments see 
Vouloumanos & Werker, 2007b). This account of the findings also fits with the 
general auditory theory, which suggests that preferential treatment of speech sounds 
is the result of perceptual learning (see Dumoulin & Wandell, 2008 for a review). 
Perceptual learning relates to the idea that increased exposure to certain 
environmental stimuli improves the ability of perceptual systems to respond to these 
signals and possibly involves increased attentional weighting to these stimuli  
(Goldstone, 1998). While this debate suggests that newborns may not possess an 
innate bias to listen to speech, there is certainly something special about the way 
infants attend to speech to guide their social interactions.  
Neural selectivity for speech sounds 
Studies from neuropsychology, neuroimaging and neurophysiology have also 
addressed the issue of whether speech is processed differently and/or activates 
specific brain regions compared to non-speech stimuli. In this respect, much of the 
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research has investigated whether processing of speech sounds is domain-specific or 
domain-general, that is, whether specific modules for speech processing are in place 
(Liberman & Mattingly, 1985) or whether these modules also process non-speech 
stimuli (Tallal, 2003). Preliminary evidence for a speech-specific processing system 
was put forward by studies on patients with cerebral lesions. Lesions in the region of 
the left posterior superior temporal gyrus can produce a syndrome referred to as 
‘Wernicke’s aphasia’, characterised by severe deficits in speech comprehension yet 
intact fluent speech (Wernicke, 1874). Another syndrome known as ‘pure word 
deafness’, reported to occur after lesions to the auditory cortex bilaterally (Coslett, 
Brashear, & Heilman, 1984; Shoumaker, Ajax, & Schenkenberg, 1977), is 
characterised by a double dissociation of a selective deficit to comprehend speech 
with concurrent intact hearing, speech production and reading ability. In these two 
syndromes, perception of non-speech sounds is generally preserved, suggesting that 
the observed deficits are restricted to human speech. This indicates the existence of 
domain-specific perceptual brain mechanisms that are finely tuned to processing 
speech. 
Domain-specific accounts of speech processing also received support from 
neuroimaging studies. Regions in the left superior temporal gyrus/sulcus (STG/STS) 
have been shown to exhibit significantly greater activation in response to speech 
sounds compared to other auditory stimuli such as tones (Binder et al., 2000), 
environmental sounds (Humphries, Willard, Buchsbaum, & Hickok, 2001), 
amplitude-modulated noise (Zatorre, Evans, Meyer, & Gjedde, 1992) and spectrally 
rotated speech (Scott, Blank, Rosen, & Wise, 2000). When comparing auditory 
speech to tones and complex non-speech sounds, Vouloumanos, Kiehl, Werker, and 
Liddle (2001) only found increased activation for speech stimuli in the middle 
temporal gyri, left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and right inferior frontal gyrus and 
not for any other sound (Vouloumanos et al., 2001). There is mounting evidence that 
also other specific brain areas are involved in the analysis of speech, particularly the 
anterior parts of the superior temporal cortex (Binder et al., 2000; Liebenthal, Binder, 
Spitzer, Possing, & Medler, 2005; Narain et al., 2003; Scott et al., 2000). 
These specific activations also seem to extent to human voice stimuli apart 
from speech (e.g. laughs, coughs). A number of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies suggest that voice-selective brain regions are found 
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bilaterally along the upper bank of the STS, (Fecteau, Armony, Joanette, & Belin, 
2004, 2005). Referred to as ‘temporal voice areas’ (TVA), these regions showed 
greater activation when participants’ listened passively to human voice-specific 
sounds (e.g. speech, laughs, coughs) compared to non-human (e.g. animal cries) and 
mechanical sounds (Belin, Zatorre, Lafaille, Ahad, & Pike, 2000; Zatorre, Belin, & 
Penhune, 2002). The STS also seems to be involved in processing affective 
information (anger, sadness, fear, happiness) conveyed in a speaker’s voice (Ethofer, 
Van De Ville, Scherer, & Vuilleumier, 2009; Grandjean et al., 2005) and identity 
information during speaker recognition (Kriegstein & Giraud, 2004). 
However, a fundamental problem of comparing speech and non-speech 
sounds is that any differences in brain activations could be the result of acoustic 
features of the stimuli. For example, the left posterior STG/STS may not be involved 
in speech perception per se, but gets activated in response to complex acoustic 
features that are also characteristic of speech sounds. Are these activations to speech 
sounds based on properties specific to speech sounds, or simply reflect activation in 
response to more complex stimuli? In line with this account, some studies have 
found a significant overlap in the brain regions, particularly the left STG/STS, in 
processing the rapid temporal characteristics of both speech and non-speech signals 
(Joanisse & Gati, 2003; Zatorre et al., 2002). Similar overlaps of activation for 
speech and non-speech signals were also observed for melody and pitch processing 
(Price, Thierry, & Griffiths, 2005) and complex auditory stimuli (e.g., a dog barking) 
(Dick et al., 2007; Lewis, Wightman, Brefczynski, Phinney, Binder, & DeYoe, 
2004). 
Whilst this debate suggests that these areas are not necessarily speech-
specific (e.g. areas activate only in response to speech input), stronger activation of 
speech or voice-selective areas in response to human sounds as opposed to other 
complex sounds indicates preferential activation to this input. There is evidence that 
preferential processing of human sounds has been present for a long evolutionary 
period. Macaque monkeys activate a similar voice-selective region in the superior 
temporal plane in response to conspecific vocalizations (Petkov, Kayser, Steudel, 
Whittingstall, Augath, & Logothetis, 2008), and possess voice-selective neurons in 
that region (Perrodin, Kayser, Logothetis, & Petkov, 2011). This suggests that voice-
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specific mechanisms in humans did not recently emerge and that preferential 
processing of species-specific vocalization is a long evolutionary process. 
Is speech processing an automatic and mandatory process? 
Linked to the idea of specialised brain mechanisms for speech processing is 
the concept that speech processing is a mandatory and automatic process. Fodor 
(1983) proposed that information from the environment is processed by specialised, 
independently functioning modules or input systems. These modules are thought to 
be domain specific in the sense that they can only process certain types of 
information (e.g. speech) and ignore other, potentially competing input. Important in 
this respect is the notion that for each module, processing of relevant information 
proceeds automatically, i.e. a module cannot refrain from processing relevant target 
material. Liberman and Mattingly (1985), by adopting Fodor’s (1983) idea of 
modularity, proposed that speech perception underlies such a specialised module that 
processes speech input in an automatic fashion. When listening to sine wave speech 
(synthesized stimulus based on frequency-amplitude modulations of the original 
speech recording), most people initially only hear ‘funny noise’ and not speech 
(Remez, Rubin, Pisoni, & Carrell, 1981). Yet, when primed to hear some form of 
speech, most people will be able to identify what was said on repeated presentation. 
This suggests the existence of a special ‘speech mode’ of processing that operates in 
an automatic and mandatory fashion, that is, when exposed to speech-like stimuli, we 
cannot choose but to process them.  
Speech sound processing in ASD 
Impaired or atypical attention to social stimuli has been highlighted as a 
possible explanation for the core impairments in social communication seen in 
individuals with ASD (Dawson et al., 2012). Indeed, Kanner already noted in his 
initial report on autism a relative indifference to the human voice: 
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“He did not register any change of expression when spoken to […] he did not 
respond to being called or to any other words addressed to him” (Kanner, 1943) 
 
The following literature review will outline the behavioural and 
neurophysiological evidence on how individuals with ASD attend to speech sounds 
in their environment. 
Orienting to speech in ASD  
As mentioned earlier, one of the striking characteristic of children with ASD 
is their poor orienting to the human voice (Klin, 1991), and particularly to spoken 
language. An important contribution in understanding atypical attention to speech in 
infants with autism was made by analysing retrospectively home videotapes and 
parental descriptions of children’s behaviour within the first two years of life prior to 
diagnosis (Werner & Dawson, 2005; Wimpory, Hobson, Williams, & Nash, 2000). 
These studies have shown atypical orientation in infants with ASD to their own name 
at –10 months (Werner, Dawson, Osterling, & Dinno, 2000), 9–12 months (Baranek, 
1999) and 1 year of age (Osterling, Dawson, & Munson, 2002; Osterling & Dawson, 
1994) relative to both age-matched typically developing (TD) controls and infants 
with mental retardation (Osterling et al., 2002). Similar findings were also reported 
in older children. Dawson et al. (1998) compared the ability of 5-year-old children 
with ASD, children with Down syndrome, and mental-age (MA) matched TD 
children to orient to a range of social (e.g. name called, hands clapping) and non-
social stimuli (e.g. rattle, musical jack-in-the-box). In relation to both other groups, 
children with ASD more frequently failed to orient to both social and non-social 
stimuli, and showed a particularly severe deficit in orienting to social stimuli. In 
addition, those children with ASD who did orient to social stimuli took longer to do 
so than individuals in both comparison groups. In a follow-up study, Dawson et al. 
(2004) replicated these findings in a larger sample of 4-year-old children with ASD, 
developmentally delayed children and MA matched TD toddlers. 
Consistent with these findings, research by (Klin, 1991, 1992) has 
demonstrated that when given the choice to elicit either motherese (i.e. child-directed 
speech) or a mixture of environmental noises (i.e. multi-talker-babble) during 
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spontaneous play with an audio toy, children with ASD either demonstrated no 
preference for either sound or were more interested in environmental noise. Similar 
evidence has been reported by Kuhl et al. (2005), who examined the preference of 
preschool children with ASD and chronologically- and mentally-matched TD 
children for either motherese speech or non-speech analogues that were matched 
acoustically to the motherese speech samples. Their findings indicated that most 
children with ASD preferred a non-speech analogue to child-directed speech. 
However, when the ASD group could be divided into two groups (a group that 
preferred non-speech analogues and a group that preferred speech stimuli), those 
children with ASD that did orient to speech sounds had a more typical ERP pattern. 
Kuhl et al. (2005) also demonstrated that a listening preference for non-speech 
stimuli was strongly associated with autism severity as reflected by higher scores on 
the social-communicative sub-test of the ADOS. A similar pattern of findings was 
reported in toddlers with ASD by Paul, Chawarska, Fowler, Cicchetti, and Volkmar 
(2007), who found that those toddlers with ASD who oriented longer to motherese 
speech displayed better receptive language skills even one year post-study. Together, 
these studies suggest that an early basic impairment in the preferential processing of 
speech sounds could contribute to the deficits in social communication and language 
abilities that are characteristic of individuals with ASD.  
Neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies 
Functional imaging research also points to atypical neural activation in 
response to vocal sounds in individuals with ASD compared to typically developing 
(TD) individuals. Gervais et al. (2004), for example, found decreased activation in 
speech- and voice-selective areas such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS) in 
response to vocal stimuli (speech and vocal stimuli) in individuals with ASD relative 
to TD controls. No group differences were observed for non-vocal environmental 
stimuli. In a recent study, Abrams et al. (2013) examined functional connectivity of 
voice-selective regions in ASD using resting-state functional MRI. The results 
indicated that children with ASD had reduced intrinsic connectivity between voice-
selective brain regions (i.e. posterior STS) and cortical structures involved in 
emotion and speech processing such as the ventral tegmental area (VTA), nucleus 
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accumbens (NAc), amygdala, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The authors also 
demonstrated that reduced brain connectivity was a significant predictor for 
communication subtest scores on the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS). These findings indicated that weak connectivity may be linked to reward 
circuits in experiencing speech, thereby impacting the development of language and 
social communication in individuals with ASD. Other areas that have been found to 
be less activated in high functioning adults with ASD compared to controls are the 
left middle temporal gyrus, left medial prefrontal cortex and left precuneus, 
particularly during presentation of long connected speech stimuli that featured 
complex prosodic components (e.g. intonation, rhythm and affect) (Hesling, 
Dilharreguy, Peppé, Amirault, Bouvard, & Allard, 2010). Studies using positron 
emission tomography (PET) have supported these findings and have shown reduced 
activity of left frontal-temporal language regions for complex speech-like sounds in 
children with ASD relative to mental-age matched controls (Boddaert et al., 2014).  
In addition, electrophysiological studies have investigated how individuals 
with ASD attend to speech stimuli. ERP markers for attentional effects can be found 
at the P300 latency, with the earlier subcomponent P3a, largest at frontocentral sites, 
being elicited by rare stimuli in passive oddball paradigms. In an active oddball task, 
a small percentage of infrequent stimuli (deviant) are presented amongst frequent 
stimuli (standards) and subjects are asked to respond to the deviant stimulus. In the 
passive version of this task, participants do not respond to the deviant stimuli and 
ERPs are recorded in response to involuntary orienting to the deviant stimulus. The 
P3a measured in passive oddball tasks is therefore thought to reflect a response to 
novelty and attention switching to perceptually salient stimuli (O’Connor, 2012).  
When asked to listen passively to either speech or non-speech stimuli, a  
number of studies have observed smaller or absent P3a amplitudes in children with 
ASD compared to TD children, indicative of a deficit in switching attention to 
speech stimuli. Ceponiene et al. (2003), for example, demonstrated that whilst 
auditory sensory processing of vowels as measured by the mismatch negativity 
(MMN) was intact in children with ASD, attentional orienting to vocal-speech 
sounds (i.e. vowel changes) as indexed by P3a was absent in the ASD group 
compared to the TD group. Importantly, simple and complex tones elicited a more 
normal P3a response in the ASD group. This suggested to the authors that atypical 
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orienting to speech in ASD cannot be accounted for by a low-level deficit in sensory 
processing. Impaired attention-switching in ASD therefore seems to be speech-
specific. Similar findings of reduced P3a amplitude in response to speech sounds 
have since been reported in children with autism (Lepistö, Kujala, Vanhala, Alku, 
Huotilainen, & Näätänen, 2005), in children with Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) 
(Lepistö, Silokallio, Nieminen-von Wendt, Alku, Näätänen, & Kujala, 2006) and 
adults with AS (Lepistö, Nieminen-von Wendt, von Wendt, Näätänen, & Kujala, 
2007). 
Whitehouse and Bishop (2008) however questioned whether individuals with 
ASD are impaired in switching attention to speech stimuli. They recorded ERPs of 
high functioning children with ASD and TD children during either a passive (no 
task) or active (respond to deviants stimuli) oddball task. The findings indicated that 
when not attending to sounds, children with ASD had smaller P3a amplitudes for 
novel tones (presented amongst standard speech sounds), but not to novel speech 
sounds (presented amongst standard tones). In the active condition, children with 
ASD did not differ from controls on any ERP measures. This suggests that in 
contrast to previous research (e.g. Ceponiene et al., 2003) children with ASD were 
orienting to speech sounds. Whitehouse and Bishop proposed that the difference in 
findings can be explained by the choice of oddball standards. In previous studies, the 
infrequent speech sounds were embedded within other speech-standards (Ceponiene 
et al., 2003), yet in their study, the deviant stimuli were presented amongst non-
speech standards. The nature of the repetitive standard stimuli thus seems to 
modulate responsiveness to speech sounds in ASD. These findings indicate that “top-
down” factors influence basic sensory processing in the sense that individuals with 
ASD might be actively inhibiting processing of speech sounds. However, it has to be 
noted that in their study, only those participants with an accuracy of at least 80% on 
the attentive task were included. It is therefore likely that these findings relate to a 
subgroup of more able children with ASD. 
Other variations of the oddball task require participants to detect a target 
stimulus (deviant) among frequent (standards) and infrequent non-target (novel) 
stimuli. In these conditions, a later sub-component of the P300, the P3b is elicited 
when subjects attend to infrequent target stimuli (i.e. deviant targets). The P3b is 
thought to correlate with memory updating and allocation of attention during 
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stimulus categorisation (Kok, 2001; Landry & Bryson, 2004). Courchesne et al. 
(1984, 1985) found that in response to infrequent speech-targets presented amongst 
other speech standards, individuals with ASD recorded reduced P3b amplitudes 
compared to age-matched controls. Smaller P3b amplitudes were also observed in 
children with ASD for rare phoneme stimuli (‘da’) embedded within click stimuli 
(Dawson, Finley, Phillips, Galpert, & Lewy, 1988). Kemner, Verbaten, Cuperus, 
Camfferman, and van Engeland (1995) also demonstrated that during an active 
oddball task that required participants to detect a deviant stimulus (i.e. phoneme ‘ay’) 
amongst standards (i.e. phoneme ‘oy’) and a novel stimulus (complex sound 
‘bbrrzzz’), children with ASD had smaller P3b amplitude relative to children with 
dyslexia, children with ADHD and TD children. The ASD group however was as 
accurate as all other groups on detecting the deviant stimulus. This suggests that 
although behavioural performance was similar across groups, i.e. individuals with 
ASD were attending as well as other groups to the deviant stimulus, marked 
differences in neural activity can still occur. 
Attention to speech – is speech special in ASD? 
In contrast to typically developing children who are engaged by (Alegria & 
Noirot, 1978) and highly sensitive (Eimas, Siqueland, Jusczyk, & Vigorito, 1971) to 
the human voice, children with ASD are often observed to not automatically orient to 
the human voice (Dawson et al., 2004) and are relatively indifferent to vocal stimuli 
(Kuhl et al., 2005). As suggested above, this lack of interest in social stimuli might 
stem from individuals with ASD assigning less of their attention to social stimuli 
than TD individuals (Klin et al., 2002; Swettenham et al., 1998). 
Electrophysiological studies also suggest that whilst basic sensory processing of 
speech stimuli is relatively intact in ASD (Ceponiene et al., 2003), a lack of attention 
to speech sounds is reflected in reduced P3a and P3b amplitudes. Reduced activity 
(Gervais et al., 2004) and connectivity (Abrams et al., 2013) in speech-specific 
regions such as the STS also indicates distinct differences in cortical speech 
processing in individuals with ASD. In this chapter, I will further investigate these 
altered patterns in attention to speech sounds within the framework of perceptual 
load theory. 
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Experiment 3: Effect of visual perceptual load on awareness of a socially 
meaningful stimulus in ASD 
The evidence presented above indicates that individuals with ASD show a 
distinct behavioural and neurophysiological profile in response to speech sounds. 
Important for this thesis is the observation that in individuals with ASD, speech 
sounds do not seem to be prioritised over processing of other auditory stimuli, i.e. 
they do not capture attention to the same extent as in TD individuals. 
This may suggest that typically developing individuals possess a dedicated 
capacity for social stimuli, which however is absent in individuals with ASD. In 
other words, in TD individuals, there are extra processing resources for social stimuli 
regardless of the level of perceptual load, which may not be the case however in 
individuals with ASD. The current experiment set out to investigate the extent of 
reported awareness for an unexpected auditory social stimulus in TD individuals and 
individuals with ASD within the capacity-based framework of perceptual load 
theory. It was hypothesised that increasing the perceptual load of a visual task would 
not affect awareness of an unexpected speech sound in TD individuals, i.e. 
awareness rates will remain high across perceptual load conditions, yet increasing 
perceptual load would reduce awareness rates of a speech sound in individuals with 
ASD. 
Participants performed either a subtle (high perceptual load), or more gross 
(low perceptual load) line discrimination task. Following a set of trials that did not 
feature the unexpected stimulus (referred to as non-critical trials), participants 
performed the critical trial. On this trial, participants indicated as before which line 
of the cross was longer, yet at the same time, a speech sound (a male person saying 
‘hi’) was played via headphones. Immediately following this trial, participants were 
asked whether they noticed anything else. 
Following on from the findings in experiment 2, the current experimental 
design was adapted to control for some of the methodological limitations outlined 
earlier. For example, the retrospective measure of awareness with a surprise question 
about an unexpected stimulus raises the possibility that the failure to report presence 
of the auditory stimulus may reflect, in some cases, rapid forgetting. In the visual 
domain, such ‘inattentional amnesia’ has been described by Wolfe (1999) and refers 
to the idea that a failure to detect the presence of the unexpected stimulus might be 
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related to a weak memory trace of the unexpected stimulus rather than inattention. 
Another possibility is that the findings in the previous experiment reflect a change in 
the response criterion such that participants may be more reluctant to admit noticing 
an unexpected stimulus for which there is only a weak memory trace in conditions of 
high perceptual load. In order to control for these effects in the current experiment, 
the surprise question was presented after a short and fixed amount of time following 
the critical trial.  
In the previous experiment, participant’s performance on the central task was 
only measured in terms of accuracy on the line discrimination task. The number of 
trials was now increased to allow measurement of each participant’s reaction time in 
order to obtain a more nuanced measure of task performance. In addition, measuring 
RT data for both groups on critical trials will allow us to evaluate whether increased 
awareness rates in the ASD group in the previous experiment might have been a 
consequence of them diverting attentional resources from the visual to the auditory 
modality. A shift in attention of participants away from the visual task to the auditory 
modality would be reflected in a significant difference between RT on the critical 
trial compared to average RTs on non-critical trials. To measure this effect, an RT 
difference score was created (RToverall – RTcritical), where a positive score reflects 
a slowing of response on the critical trial, whereas a negative score reflects a faster 
response on the critical trial relative to average response times on non-critical trials. 
Lastly, to control for the possibility that increased detection rates of the CS 
on the critical trial were due to lower perception thresholds in some individuals, 
participants also performed an auditory threshold task (2-up, 1-down procedure). 
This also allowed us to test whether the two groups (ASD vs. TD) differed in 
perceptual thresholds and to confirm that the intensity level of the auditory stimulus 
was well above the threshold for each participant (and similarly so for both groups). 
In order to not prime participants of the occurrence of the auditory stimulus in the 
inattentional deafness task, the threshold task was always administered after 
participants performed the inattentional deafness task. 
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Method 
Participants 
A new sample of 30 typically developing (TD) adolescents and 31 
adolescents with a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), naïve to the aim 
of the experiment, took part in this study. All participants were diagnosed and 
recruited in the same manner as in the previous experiment. Participants were 
randomly allocated across the two ‘perceptual load’ conditions (high vs. low). 
Similar task-specific exclusion criteria as in the previous experiment were in place. 
Participants were excluded if they obtained a score of less than 9 correct on the 11 
non-critical trials, were incorrect on the critical trial or were unable to hear the tone 
on the control trial. These exclusion criteria were necessary to make sure that all 
participants were engaging with the primary task on the critical trial that featured the 
additional auditory stimulus. This resulted in six participants (four ASD, two TD) 
being excluded from further analysis. Two participants made an incorrect judgment 
on the critical trial (one ASD and one TD participant in the low perceptual load 
condition). Three ASD and one TD participants did not hear the critical stimulus 
(CS) on the control trial. No participant scored less than 9 out of 11 correct on the 
line discrimination task. The remaining 28 TD and 27 ASD participants were 
matched for non-verbal ability (using the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices, 
Raven et al., 1998) and chronological age (see Table 5.1 for descriptives). 
Independent samples t-tests indicated that there were no significant differences 
between groups on any of these measures (maximum t-value = 1.946, minimum p-
value = 0.06).  
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for each group 
Note: 
CA = Chronological Age 
SCQ = Social Communication Questionnaire 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Microsoft Visual Basic (version 6) was used to create computer-based stimuli 
that were presented on an IBM Lenovo Thinkpad 14.1” personal laptop. The task 
involved a black circle (0.15°), presented at fixation, followed by a black cross 
(RGB: 0, 0, 0) against a white background (RGB: 255, 255, 255). Viewing distance 
was 60cm. On each trial, participants indicated via appropriate button presses on the 
keyboard which line of a centrally presented cross was longer than the other one 
(horizontal or vertical, presentation was randomised across all experimental trials 
and counterbalanced on the critical trial). Perceptual load of the visual task was 
manipulated by increasing the visual angle of one of the arms of the target cross. In 
the low perceptual load condition, the short arm extended 1.25° and the long arm 
3.9°, whereas in the high perceptual load condition the short arm extended 3.35° and 
the long arm 3.9°.  
 
 
Group Statistic 
CA 
(years : months) 
Raven’s  Score SCQ score 
ASD (n= 27)     
Low load (n= 13) M 14:4 41.9 27.1 
 SD 0:9 6.8 6.6 
 Range 12:8 – 15:6 31 – 52 17 – 35 
     
High load (n= 14) M 13:6 42.5 25.3 
 SD 1:3 5.2 4.7 
 Range 11:1 – 15:2 34 – 52 18 – 33 
TD (n= 28)     
Low load (n= 14) M 14:9 44.9  
 SD 0:6 5.2  
 Range 14:1 – 15:5 36 – 52  
     
High load (n=14) M 14:3 43.7  
 SD 1:3 4.9  
 Range 11:6 – 15:5 35 – 52  
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of stimuli used in the current and previous two chapters 
according to (a) low perceptual load condition and (b) high perceptual load condition 
 
 
  
 
It is important to point out that the cross task stimuli in this experiment were 
slightly adjusted compared to the stimuli used in the previous chapters (see Figure 
5.1 for an illustration). In particular, whilst the visual angle of the longer arm of the 
cross was kept the same (3.9°), the shorter arm of the cross in both the low- and high 
perceptual load condition was increased. These changes were made based on a pilot 
study with TD adolescents that indicated that adolescent participants performed at 
ceiling on a cross task using the same task parameters as in the previous experiments.  
Participants were told that they should be as fast, but also as accurate as they 
can on the line discrimination task. Participants performed a total of 19 trials, of 
which 6 were practice trials that were not included in any further analysis. Reaction 
time (RT) and accuracy data were recorded on 13 trials, of which the 13
th
 trial was 
the critical trial. On the critical trial, an auditory stimulus was played concurrently 
with presenting the cross. Responses to the cross task were recorded as in the 
previous trial, yet immediately after participants made the cross task response, a 
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question mark appeared on the screen that prompted participants to indicate whether 
they noticed anything else. The critical trial was subsequently repeated in a control 
trial, which measured awareness of the critical stimulus in absence of attention to the 
visual task. Participants were told prior to the control trial to ignore the cross 
stimulus and instead attend to any other stimulus they might notice. Only those 
participants who successfully identified the critical stimulus on the control trial were 
included in further analyses.  
  
Figure 5.2 Procedure of experimental trials 
 
The auditory stimulus used in this experiment was a recording of a male 
person saying “Hi” (85-150Hz). The duration of the stimulus was set at 176ms to 
match the presentation time of the visual cross stimulus and played at an intensity 
level of 33db through a pair of Sennheiser HD 25-1-II stereo headphones. The 
intensity level of the stimulus was determined by piloting with adult volunteers and 
measured prior to the experiment by a Bruel & Kjaer 4153 artificial ear together with 
an Ono Sokki CF-350Z spectrum analyser. 
After completing the line discrimination task, the absolute perceptual 
threshold for the auditory stimulus was established for each participant using a two 
alternative forced-choice (2AFC) adaptive threshold procedure. Each trial consisted 
of two pictures appearing on the screen (one left and one right) after each other, with 
the target sound (speech sound) being randomly presented together with either the 
first or the second picture. Participants indicated when they heard the target sound 
(first or second) and the experimenter entered their response via the keyboard. If 
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participants produced two consecutive correct answers, the intensity of the auditory 
stimulus was reduced by 1db. As soon as they provided an incorrect answer, the 
intensity of the auditory stimulus was increased by 1db. Individual absolute 
thresholds were based on an average of five reversals (point at which direction is 
changed, i.e. either when producing a correct answer followed by an incorrect 
answer or when producing 2 correct after an incorrect answer). 
Results 
Line discrimination performance 
Reaction times (RT) on the line discrimination task above 2500ms were 
discarded and average correct RT and accuracy rates were calculated (see Table 5.2 
for summary statistics). Before presenting the statistical results, it is noteworthy that 
the ASD group in the high perceptual load condition reported much greater 
variability in mean RT scores compared to the TD group (SD=225ms vs. SD=123ms 
respectively), yet both groups showed similar RT variability in the low load 
condition (SD=109ms vs. SD=123ms respectively). A consequence is that equal 
error variance between groups cannot be assumed, which necessitated log-
transforming the dependent variable (RT). All analyses on RT data (i.e. total RT data 
and RT on critical trial) will be based on the log transformed values to satisfy the 
assumption of equality. 
 
  
111 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of task performance and threshold measures according to 
diagnostic group and perceptual load condition  
Group Statistic 
RT 
(in ms) 
RT 
(on crit. 
trial; in 
ms) 
RT 
difference 
score 
(in ms)  
Acc. 
(out 
of 12) 
Threshold 
(db SPL) 
ASD (n= 27)       
Low load (n= 13) M 573.8 522.2 29.8 11.4 23.6 
 SD 109.2 124.9 97.5 .8 6.1 
       
High load (n= 14) M 933.4 868.6 46.4 10.8 21.36 
 SD 225.7 281.4 123.6 1.1 8.0 
TD (n= 28)       
Low load (n= 14) M 514.4 559.1 -15.6 11 25.5 
 SD 173.7 223.8 154.1 .9 4.6 
       
High load (n=14) M 815.6 802.9 21.2 10.6 21.9 
 SD 123.2 148.8 124.6 .9 6.3 
Note: 
RT = Reaction Time 
RT difference score = RToverall – RTcrit 
Acc. = Accuracy on line discrimination task 
Threshold = Threshold level for CS 
 
A 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA was used to analyse RTs according to 
diagnostic group (ASD vs. TD), perceptual load (high vs. low), and an interaction 
term of group and load. The results indicated that participants across groups 
responded significantly slower in the high- compared to the low perceptual load 
condition, F(1,51) = 61.787, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .548. There was no significant effect of 
group on RT, F(1,51) = 2.805, p = .100, ηp
2
 = .052, and the interaction between 
group and load was also not significant, F(1,51) = .047, p = .829, ηp
2
 = .001. This 
suggests that the manipulation of perceptual load was effective as significantly 
slower RT scores (index of higher processing demands) were observed in the high 
perceptual load compared to the low perceptual load condition. In addition, the 
absence of any group or interaction effects indicates that both groups performed 
similarly on the task and across perceptual load conditions. 
Reaction time on the critical trial was subsequently compared to the overall 
RT performance on non-critical trials by creating a RT difference score (RToverall – 
RTcritical; see Table 5.2). A positive score reflects a faster response on the critical 
trial, whereas a negative score reflects a slowing of response on the critical trial 
relative to average response times on non-critical trials. Prior to analysis, one outlier 
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was removed (RT difference score of two standard deviations away from the mean). 
This participant was in the TD group and performed in the low perceptual load 
condition. Using ANOVA, the results indicated that there was no significant main 
effect of group or condition, nor a significant interaction effect of group and 
condition (maximum F-value = 2.465, smallest p-value = .123).  
Analysis of accuracy data (number of correct responses on the line 
discrimination task) was also carried out using ANOVA. Participants made 
significantly more errors in the high perceptual load condition than the low 
perceptual load condition, F(1,51) = 4.525, p = .038, ηp
2
 = .081. There was no main 
effect of group, F(1,51) = 1.537, p = .221, ηp
2
 = .029, and no interaction effect, 
F(1,51) = .124, p = .726, ηp
2
 = .002. Again, this suggests that whilst task 
performance was affected by increasing perceptual load, task performance and 
therefore task engagement was similar between groups.  
Threshold analysis 
Overall, the perceptual threshold for the auditory stimulus (critical stimulus: 
CS) across all participants (M = 23.1db, SD = 6.39db) was well below the intensity 
level of the CS on the critical trial (CS was played at an intensity level of 33db). This 
provides some preliminary evidence that a failure to notice the CS on the critical trial 
does not relate to an inability to hear the CS. Statistical analyses confirmed this 
observation, as the absolute threshold for the CS was significantly lower than the 
intensity of the CS used in the inattentional deafness task, t(54) = 11.496, p < .001, 
[95% CI: 8.2 – 11.64]. Importantly though, there were no significant group 
differences in perceptual threshold, F(1,51) = .513, p = .477, ηp
2
 = .01, no differences 
between thresholds for each perceptual load condition, F(1,51) = 2.888, p = .095, ηp
2
 
= .054, and no interaction effect, F(1,51) = .147, p = .703, ηp
2
 = .003. Perceptual 
sensitivity of the CS was thus similar across groups.   
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Awareness of CS 
Participants were considered to be aware of the critical stimulus (CS) if they 
reported hearing something on the critical trial, and were able to accurately describe 
the auditory stimulus verbally or by imitating the speech sound. Awareness rates as a 
function of perceptual load and group are shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 Percentage of participants reporting awareness of the auditory stimulus 
(critical stimulus: CS) according to perceptual load and diagnostic group (error bars: 
standard error) 
 
As in the previous chapter, a hierarchical logistic regression analysis was 
carried out to predict awareness of the auditory stimulus (0 =“No”, 1 =”Yes”) 
according to perceptual load, diagnostic group, and their interaction. In a first step, 
an intercept-only model was compared against a model with perceptual load and 
diagnostic group as predictors. The latter model was subsequently compared to a full 
model including the interaction between perceptual load and diagnostic group. All 
statistical analyses used maximum likelihood ratio tests (model comparisons based 
on differences in -2 log likelihood) and the statistical cut-off criterion for all 
predictors was set at .05 (see Table 5.3 for a summary). The results indicated that 
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diagnostic group, 2 (1) = .596, p = .440, and perceptual load did not significantly 
modulated awareness, 2 (1) = .596, p = .440. This suggests that awareness was not 
modulated by either increasing perceptual load or by group membership. The 
interaction between perceptual load and group was also not significant, 2 (1) = .074, 
p = .785. 
 
Table 5.3 Logistic regression analysis predicting awareness of the CS from 
perceptual load, diagnostic group, and their interaction 
Variable B SE B df  MLE p OR 95% CI of OR 
Perceptual load -.221 .29 1 .596 .440 .801 .456 – 1.409 
Group 221 .29 1 .596 .440 1.248 .710 – 2.194 
Load X Group -0.79 .29 1 .074 .785 .924 .523 – 1.632 
Note: 
MLE = Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
OR = Odds Ratio 
 
An additional logistic regression analysis also confirmed that neither non-
verbal ability scores (raw score on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices) nor scores on 
the SCQ was a significant predictor (both p > .05) of awareness rates of the CS in the 
ASD group. 
Discussion 
The results showed that for both groups, awareness of an unexpected, socially 
meaningful auditory stimulus was not affected by the level of perceptual load in a 
visual task. That is, both the ASD and TD group continued to report presence of an 
unexpected speech sound despite an increase in the level of perceptual load in the 
visual task. Note that for TD individuals, the pattern of awareness for a social 
stimulus observed here is markedly different from the results observed in experiment 
2, where an increase in visual perceptual load significantly reduced awareness of a 
neutral sound in TD individuals. The findings here thus provide preliminary evidence 
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that in the typical population, unexpected socially meaningful auditory information is 
processed regardless of the level of visual perceptual load. Interestingly, individuals 
with ASD demonstrated similar levels of awareness of a speech sound across 
perceptual load conditions. The implications of these results will be discussed in the 
overall chapter discussion.  
Experiment 4: Effect of visual perceptual load on awareness of a neutral 
stimulus in ASD 
In order to confidently determine whether speech sounds capture attention 
differently than neutral sounds at different levels of perceptual load, the results from 
the previous experiment must be compared to data on a task that carefully matches 
the speech sound to a neutral sound. The data in experiment 2 (inattentional deafness 
in children with ASD and TD children) is not sufficient for this purpose, given the 
subtle differences in methodology, the acoustic properties of the critical auditory 
stimulus compared to the speech stimulus (experiment 3), and differences in 
participant characteristics (i.e. large differences in chronological age between the two 
samples). Instead, a control task identical in task design to the previous experiment 
was employed to measure awareness of a socially meaningless auditory stimulus 
(beep tone) that was matched with the social stimulus used in the previous 
experiment on a number of acoustic properties including pitch, frequency range and 
intensity (see method section below). Participants performed the same line 
discrimination task as before, which this time however featured a neutral sound 
rather than a speech sound on the critical trial. 
Method 
Participants 
32 typically developing (TD) adolescents and 32 adolescents with a diagnosis 
of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), who were naïve to the aim of the experiment, 
took part. All participants were diagnosed and recruited in the same manner as in the 
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previous experiment. Participants were randomly allocated across the two 
‘perceptual load’ conditions (high vs. low). The same task-specific exclusion criteria 
as in the previous experiment were in place, which resulted in four participants (two 
ASD, two TD) being excluded from further analysis. One participant made an 
incorrect judgment on the critical trial (one ASD in the high perceptual load 
condition). One ASD and two TD participants did not hear the critical stimulus (CS) 
on the control trial. No participant scored less than 9 out of 12 correct on the line 
discrimination task. The remaining 30 TD and 28 ASD participants were matched for 
non-verbal ability (using the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices, Raven et al., 
1998) and chronological age (see Table 5.4 for descriptives). Independent samples t-
tests indicated that there were no significant differences between groups on any of 
these measures (maximum t-value = 1.351, minimum p-value = 0.182). 
 
 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics for each group 
Group Statistic 
CA 
(years : months) 
Raven’s  Score SCQ score 
ASD (n= 28)     
Low load (n= 14) M 15:0 44.6 26.8 
 SD 1:3 5.3 6.5 
 Range 12:4 – 17:5 37 – 54 17 – 35 
     
High load (n= 14) M 14:11 45.6 24.1 
 SD 0:5 5.8 4.3 
 Range 14:4 – 15:7 34 – 52 18 – 33 
TD (n= 30)     
Low load (n= 15) M 15:1 45.7  
 SD 0:6 6.4  
 Range 14:3 – 15:10 35 – 57  
     
High load (n=15) M 15:1 45.1  
 SD 0:5 6.3  
 Range 14:3 – 15:7 36 – 56  
Note: 
CA = Chronological Age 
SCQ = Social Communication Questionnaire 
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Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants were presented with the same line discrimination task used in the 
previous experiment. On each trial, participants indicated via appropriate button 
presses on the keyboard which line of a centrally presented cross was longer than the 
other one (horizontal or vertical). Perceptual load of the visual task was manipulated 
by increasing the visual angle of one of the arms of the target cross. 
However, instead of presenting a speech sound on the critical trial, the 
auditory stimulus was a socially meaningless/neutral tone (beep). Specifically, the 
sound employed here was a saw-tooth wave that was matched with the social 
stimulus in the previous experiment on pitch (85-150Hz), duration (176ms) and 
intensity (33db) and presented with the same Sennheiser HD 25-1-II stereo 
headphones. As in the previous experiment, after completing the line discrimination 
task, the perceptual threshold for the auditory stimulus was established for each 
participant using a two alternative forced-choice (2AFC) adaptive threshold 
procedure. 
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Results 
Task performance 
Reaction times (RT) on the line discrimination task above 2500ms were 
discarded and average correct RT and accuracy rates were calculated (see Table 5.5 
for summary statistics).  
 
Table 5.5 Summary of task performance and threshold measures according to 
diagnostic group and perceptual load condition 
Group Statistic 
RT 
(in ms) 
RT 
(on crit. 
trial; in 
ms) 
RT diff. 
score 
(in ms) 
Acc. 
(out of 
12) 
Threshold 
(db SPL) 
ASD (n= 28)       
Low load (n= 14) M 586.9 577.4 9.6 11.3 26.8 
 SD 214.9 202.4 84.3 .9 2.1 
       
High load (n= 14) M 818.4 790.2 28.1 10.9 26.6 
 SD 208.5 167.7 99.4 .9 2.5 
TD (n= 30)       
Low load (n= 15) M 534.3 522.8 11.5 11.3 25.3 
 SD 127.5 121.4 47.8 .6 2.6 
       
High load (n=15) M 750.1 721.1 29 10.7 26.3 
 SD 203.8 200 158.1 .9 2.8 
Note: 
RT = Reaction Time 
RT difference score = RToverall – RTcrit 
Acc. = Accuracy on line discrimination task 
Threshold = Threshold level for CS 
 
A 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA was used to analyse RTs according to 
diagnostic group (ASD vs. TD), perceptual load (high vs. low), and an interaction 
term of group and load. The results indicated that participants across groups 
responded significantly more slowly in the high- compared to the low perceptual 
load condition, F(1,54) = 19.799, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .263. There was no significant 
effect of group on RT, F(1,54) = 1.448, p = .234, ηp
2
 = .026, and the interaction 
between group and load was also not significant, F(1,54) = .024, p = .877, ηp
2
 = .001. 
This suggests that as in the previous experiment, the manipulation of perceptual load 
was effective as significantly slower RT scores (index of higher processing demands) 
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were observed in the high perceptual load compared to the low perceptual load 
condition. The absence of any group or interaction effects indicates that both groups 
performed similarly on the task and across perceptual load conditions. 
Reaction time on the critical trial was subsequently compared to the overall 
RT performance on non-critical trials by creating a RT difference score (RToverall – 
RTcrit). A positive score reflects a faster response on the critical trial, whereas a 
negative score reflects a slowing of response on the critical trial relative to average 
response times on non-critical trials. Prior to analysis, one outlier was removed (RT 
difference score of two standard deviations away from the mean). This participant 
was in the TD group and performed in the low perceptual load condition. The results 
indicated that there was no significant main effect of group or condition, nor a 
significant interaction effect of group and condition (maximum F-value = .424, 
smallest p-value = .518). Analysis of accuracy data (number of correct responses on 
the line discrimination task) was also carried out. Participants made significantly 
more errors in the high perceptual load condition than the low perceptual load 
condition, F(1,54) = 4.733, p = .034, ηp
2
 = .081. There was no main effect of group, 
F(1,54) = 1.480, p = .229, ηp
2
 = .027, and no interaction effect, F(1,54) = .596, p = 
.444, ηp
2
 = .011. Again, this suggests that whilst task performance was affected by 
increasing perceptual load, task performance and therefore task engagement was 
similar between groups. 
Threshold analysis 
Overall, the perceptual threshold for the auditory stimulus (critical stimulus: 
CS) across all participants (M = 26.2db, SD = 2.49db) was significantly lower than 
the intensity level of the CS on the critical trial (CS was played at an intensity level 
of 15db), t(57) = 20.704, p < .001, [95% CI of the difference: 6.12 – 7.43]. This 
again suggests that a failure to notice the CS on the critical trial does not relate to an 
inability to hear the CS. Importantly though, there were no significant group 
differences in perceptual threshold, F(1,54) = 1.796, p = .186, ηp
2
 = .032, no 
differences between perceptual load conditions, F(1,54) = .301, p = .586, ηp
2
 = .006, 
and no interaction effect, F(1,54) = .766, p = .385, ηp
2
 = .014. Perceptual sensitivity 
of the CS was thus similar across groups.   
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Awareness of CS 
Participants were considered to be aware of the critical stimulus (CS) if they 
reported hearing something on the critical trial, and were able to accurately describe 
the auditory stimulus verbally (e.g. “it was a beep sound”). Awareness rates as a 
function of perceptual load and group are shown in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4 Percentage of participants reporting awareness of the auditory stimulus 
(critical stimulus: CS) according to perceptual load and diagnostic group (error bars: 
standard error) 
 
A hierarchical logistic regression analysis was carried out to predict 
awareness of the auditory stimulus (0 =“No”, 1 =”Yes”) according to perceptual 
load, diagnostic group, and their interaction. In a first step, an intercept-only model 
was compared against a model with perceptual load and diagnostic group as 
predictors. The latter model was subsequently compared to a full model including the 
interaction between perceptual load and diagnostic group. All statistical analyses 
used maximum likelihood ratio tests (model comparisons based on differences in -2 
log likelihood) and the statistical cut-off criterion for all predictors was set at .05. 
The first regression model predicting awareness of the CS from perceptual load and 
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diagnostic group performed significantly better overall than the intercept-only model, 
2 (2) = 8.667, p = .013. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test also indicated a good fit of 
the model to the data, 2 (2) = 4.157, p = .125. When controlling for the effect of 
group, there was a significant effect of perceptual load on awareness, 2 (1) = 4.954, 
p = .026, with participants in the high perceptual load condition being 0.5 times less 
likely to notice the stimulus than participants in the low perceptual load condition. 
 
 
Table 5.6 Logistic regression analysis predicting awareness of the CS from 
perceptual load, diagnostic group, and their interaction 
Variable B SE B df MLE p OR 95% CI of OR 
Perceptual load -.632 .29 1 4.954 .026* .549 .304 – .992 
Group .575 .29 1 4.049 .044* 1.736 .961 – 3.137 
Load X Group .428 .29 1 4.092 .043* 1.821 1.008 – 3.291 
Note: 
MLE = Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
OR = Odds Ratio 
* p < .05 
 
Diagnostic group also significantly predicted awareness of the CS, 2 (1) = 
4.049, p = .044 with participants in the ASD group being 1.7 times more likely to 
notice the critical stimulus (for maximum likelihood ratio tests, odds ratio and CI of 
odds ratio see Table 5.6). The interaction between perceptual load and diagnostic 
group was tested by comparing a full model that included all predictors (perceptual 
load, group, and their interaction), against a reduced model with only load and group 
as predictors.  The likelihood ratio test revealed a significant interaction between 
perceptual load and group, 2 (1) = 4.092, p = .043, suggesting a different effect of 
perceptual load on detection between groups. In particular, whereas in the low 
perceptual load condition detection rates did not differ between groups (TD: 73% vs. 
ASD: 71%), 2 (1) = .013, p = .909, detection rates were significantly reduced for the 
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TD group compared to the ASD group in the high perceptual load condition (TD: 
20% vs. ASD: 71%), 2 (1) = 8.128, p = .004. 
An additional logistic regression analysis also confirmed that neither non-
verbal ability scores (raw score on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices) nor scores on 
the SCQ was a significant predictor (both p > .05) of awareness rates of the CS in the 
ASD group. 
Comparing awareness of social auditory stimulus and neutral auditory stimulus 
The findings from the last experiment (4) can be displayed alongside the 
results from experiment 3 to illustrate the effect of visual perceptual load on 
awareness of a social stimulus versus socially neutral stimulus for each group (ASD 
and control) separately. 
ASD group 
A 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA was used to analyse RTs according to 
experimental task (social vs. non-social), perceptual load (high vs. low), and an 
interaction term of task and load. The results indicated that ASD participants 
performed significantly slower in the high- compared to the low perceptual load 
condition, F(1,51) = 27.934, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .345. There was no significant effect of 
task on RT, F(1,51) = .830, p = .367, ηp
2
 = .016, and the interaction between group 
and load was also not significant, F(1,51) = 1.314, p = .257, ηp
2
 = .025. This suggests 
that individuals with ASD performed similarly across tasks. There was also no 
significant main effect of task or perceptual load condition on RT difference scores 
(RToverall – RTcritical), nor a significant interaction effect of group and condition 
(maximum F-value = 1.697, smallest p-value = .199). Analysis of accuracy data 
partially confirmed previous results, as the effect of perceptual load approached 
significance, F(1,51) = 3.647, p = .062, ηp
2
 = .067. There was no main effect of task, 
F(1,51) = .344, p = .580, ηp
2
 = .006, and no interaction effect, F(1,51) = .457, p = 
.502, ηp
2
 = .009 on accuracy. 
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As can be seen from Figure 5.5, awareness rates did not differ greatly as a 
function of task (social and neutral) and perceptual load or an interaction between the 
two. Statistical analyses confirmed this observation, with no significant effect of 
perceptual load (low vs. high) or task (social vs. neutral) on awareness, and no 
interaction effect of load and task on awareness (smallest p-value = .608).   
 
Figure 5.5 Percentage of individuals with ASD reporting awareness of the CS 
according to perceptual load and task (error bars: standard error) 
 
TD group 
A separate 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA was carried out for the TD group 
predicting RT performance from task (social vs. neutral) and perceptual load (low vs. 
high). As for the ASD group, the results showed that participants performed 
significantly slower in the high- compared to the low perceptual load condition, 
F(1,54) = 44.999, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .455. There was also no significant effect of task on 
RT, F(1,54) = .352, p = .555, ηp
2
 = .006, and the interaction between group and load 
was also not significant, F(1,54) = 1.227, p = .273, ηp
2
 = .022. There was also no 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Social Neutral
%
 o
f 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g
 a
w
ar
en
es
s 
o
f 
C
S
 
Low Load High Load
124 
 
significant main effect of task or condition on RT difference scores (RToverall – 
RTcritical), nor a significant interaction effect of group and condition (maximum F-
value = 1.025, smallest p-value = .333). Analysis of accuracy data confirmed 
previous results, with participants making significantly more errors in the high- 
compared to the low perceptual load condition, F(1,54) = 5.795, p = .02, ηp
2
 = .097. 
There was no main effect of task, F(1,54) = .717, p = .401, ηp
2
 = .013, and no 
interaction effect, F(1,514) = .161, p = .690, ηp
2
 = .003 on accuracy. 
 
Figure 5.6 Percentage of TD individuals reporting awareness of the CS according to 
perceptual load and task (error bars: standard error) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5.6, increasing the level of visual perceptual load 
had little effect on awareness of a social stimulus in TD individuals, yet performing a 
high perceptual load task reduced awareness of a neutral stimulus. This observation 
was confirmed statistically, with a significant interaction effect between perceptual 
load and task, 2 (1) = 7.848, p = .005. 
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Discussion 
The findings indicated that on a task that featured a socially meaningless 
stimulus, increasing perceptual load resulted in significantly reduced awareness rates 
in TD adolescents, but not in adolescents with ASD who continued to report 
awareness of the CS. This therefore replicated the results from experiment 2. 
More importantly, the findings from experiment 4, where the critical stimulus 
was a neutral auditory sound, provide crucial information that can be used to contrast 
the effect of perceptual load on awareness in tasks involving social stimuli. A distinct 
difference is seen between the pattern of awareness in TD participants for the speech 
sound (experiment 3) compared to the neutral sound (experiment 4) under high 
perceptual load. Whereas in experiment 4, a reduction in awareness of the CS in the 
TD group was observed in the high perceptual load condition, awareness of an 
unexpected speech sound was unaffected by an increase in the level of perceptual 
load. This disparity was shown to be statistically significant. 
The same pattern of awareness of the CS is not seen for individuals with 
ASD. Awareness rates for both the social and neutral CS remained unaffected by the 
level of perceptual load. These findings will be fully discussed in the next section.  
Overall discussion  
For typically developing individuals, the current findings demonstrated that 
the level of visual perceptual load determined the incidence of inattentional deafness 
for an unexpected socially meaningless sound, but not for a speech sound. This 
parallels findings in the visual domain, where processing of distracting face stimuli 
has been shown to be unaffected by the visual perceptual load of the relevant task 
(Lavie et al., 2003; Remington, Campbell, et al., 2012). Crucially however, the 
current results show, for the first time, that an unexpected yet ecologically salient 
speech sound captures attention regardless of the level of visual perceptual load, 
whereas a neutral sound does not in the TD group. This provides preliminary 
evidence that in TD individuals, processing of unexpected auditory social stimuli in a 
cross-modal context of attention may also be automatic and mandatory, whereas 
processing of neutral auditory information relies on general capacity limits.  
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Considering the special biological and social significance of speech sounds 
could explain these findings. It may be adaptive that socially meaningful auditory 
information, unlike other neutral information, is processed irrespective of the level of 
visual perceptual load. Even if unexpected auditory information is not relevant for 
current task behaviours, as was the case in the current experiment, it can potentially 
carry important information including social cues (e.g. information on an 
individual’s affect), which may be detrimental not to attend to. 
Note at this point that the non-social critical stimulus was matched as closely 
as possible to the social stimulus on a number of acoustic properties including pitch, 
duration and intensity. Thus, whilst both stimuli had similar complex acoustic 
properties, the social stimulus retained its ‘speechness’ quality relative to the non-
social stimulus. Any differences in awareness are therefore unlikely to be related to 
differences between the two sound stimuli in basic acoustic qualities.  
Similar to the results of typically developing individuals, increasing 
perceptual load did not modulate awareness of the social CS in individuals with 
ASD. However, in the absence of any differences under high perceptual load in 
awareness of the neutral CS compared to the social CS, these findings do not 
necessarily imply that individuals with ASD also process unexpected speech sounds 
in any special way. An alternative explanation could be that in individuals with ASD, 
social auditory information captures attention similarly as socially neutral 
information, i.e. individuals with ASD treat social and non-social information in a 
similar manner. To further explore these issues, it would be interesting to measure 
the effect of visual perceptual load on awareness of a social vs. non-social stimulus 
in ASD at very high levels of perceptual load to see if there is a point at which a non-
social stimulus CS does not reach awareness while a social stimulus does, or whether 
both types of stimuli suffer the same fate of not being noticed at higher levels of 
load. 
Whereas both groups continued to report awareness of the social CS under 
high perceptual load, awareness of the neutral CS was significantly reduced for TD 
individuals but not for individuals with ASD in the high perceptual load condition. 
This replicates the findings reported earlier in experiment 2 and provides further 
support for an increased perceptual capacity in ASD that operates across sensory 
modalities. Importantly, increased rates of CS awareness in children with ASD, when 
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visual perceptual load was high are not likely to be explained by deterioration in task 
performance on the line discrimination task. This is reflected by the absence of any 
group or interaction effects for both reaction time (RT) and accuracy measures 
suggests that both groups performed similarly on the task and across perceptual load 
conditions. 
The RT and accuracy data also showed that the manipulation of perceptual 
load was effective across all participants, reflected by slower RT scores and higher 
error rates (index of higher processing demands) in the high perceptual load 
compared to the low perceptual load condition. Due to the constraints of the 
experimental paradigm, the previous experiment was not able to ascertain whether 
increased awareness of the CS in individuals with ASD was a result of the ASD 
group diverting attentional resources from the primary task to the unexpected 
auditory stimulus. A shift in attention of participants away from the visual task to the 
auditory modality would be reflected in a significant difference between RT on the 
critical trial and RT’s on non-critical trials (i.e. experimental trials). Results from the 
current study suggest that this was unlikely to be the case. There were no group 
differences on RT-difference score that reflected the extent to which participant’s RT 
slowed on the critical trial in relation to average RTs. Reduced awareness rates in TD 
children on the other hand cannot be attributed to the low intensity of the auditory 
stimulus. On both the critical and control trial, the auditory stimulus was played at 
hearing levels well above threshold and was therefore easily perceivable, and all 
participants noticed the auditory stimulus and were able to describe it on the control 
trial when their attention was not focused on the primary visual task. Perceptual 
thresholds of the CS did also not differ across groups, suggesting that any differences 
in awareness cannot simply be due to increased sensitivity to auditory signals. The 
observed group effect is also unlikely to be caused by any differences in cognitive 
abilities as all participants were carefully matched for performance on the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices. 
Taken together, these findings provide evidence that in typically developing 
individuals, the capacity for socially meaningless stimuli is distinguishable from the 
capacity for social stimuli. In particular, the TD group demonstrated automatic and 
mandatory processing of the social stimuli at all levels of perceptual load, but not for 
an acoustically-matched neutral stimulus. Individuals with ASD did not show any 
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differences in awareness for both stimuli, suggesting that both unexpected social and 
non-social auditory information captures attention regardless of level of perceptual 
load. In a task that featured a non-social critical stimulus, earlier findings in chapter 4 
of an increased perceptual capacity in ASD were replicated. This was done using an 
improved experimental design, which further strengthens these findings.
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Chapter 6 The effect of perceptual load on detection sensitivity in 
ASD 
In the previous experiments, evidence of an increased perceptual capacity in 
individuals with ASD that operates across sensory modalities was presented. These 
conclusions were based on analyses of awareness reports for an unexpected, neutral 
auditory stimulus during an inattentional deafness task under varying levels of visual 
perceptual load. Whereas individuals with ASD continued to report awareness for an 
unexpected sound at high perceptual load, i.e. awareness rates remained high, 
awareness rates declined significantly in TD individuals under high visual perceptual 
load. 
Because of the single-trial nature of the inattentional deafness paradigm, i.e. 
the auditory detection stimulus was only presented once per participant, measures of 
detection sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c) could not be assessed in these 
experiments. However, it is possible that reduced awareness in conditions of high 
perceptual load in TD individuals may reflect the influence of a more stringent 
response criterion rather than a true reduction in perceptual detection. Detection 
sensitivity measures the detectability of a stimulus, whereas response criterion relates 
to a participant’s internal bias towards responding either with ‘stimulus present’ or 
‘stimulus absent’. In addition, although the surprise question followed the critical 
trial immediately after recording the visual response, thereby minimising any 
confounding effects, alternative explanations in terms of rapid forgetting (Wolfe, 
1999) or a weak memory trace (Barber & Folkard, 1972) cannot be completely ruled 
out. 
Raveh and Lavie (2015) recently addressed these concerns in a study with TD 
adults by directly measuring the effect of visual perceptual load on perceptual 
sensitivity of an auditory tone using a dual-task paradigm. Measuring perceptual 
sensitivity (e.g. d’) has the advantage that its value does not depend upon the 
response criterion the subject is adopting, thereby providing a true measure of a 
subject’s sensitivity. Participants were required to perform a letter identification task 
at either low or high perceptual load and also report the presence of a critical 
stimulus (an auditory tone) presented on 50% of all trials, thus avoiding the delay 
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involved in processing a surprise question as in a typical inattentional 
blindness/deafness task. Moreover, in one experiment, participants also had to make 
the detection response prior to the letter search task response, therefore ruling out the 
possibility of rapid forgetting or poorer encoding into memory during prolonged 
response times in the high perceptual load condition. The results demonstrated that 
despite participants anticipating and actively trying to detect the critical auditory 
stimulus, high perceptual load resulted in a reduction in sensitivity, while having no 
effect on response bias. The authors also showed that this pattern remained when 
participants had to make the detection response prior to the letter search task 
response. Together, these results suggest that in typically developing adults, a 
reduction in auditory awareness in conditions of high perceptual load neither reflects 
a change in response criterion, nor rapid forgetting.  
In ASD, Remington, Swettenham, et al. (2012) examined the implications of 
an increased perceptual capacity for perceptual sensitivity of an expected visual 
stimulus at varying levels of perceptual load. The authors presented age-and IQ-
matched adults with ASD and controls with a central letter search task (identify 
target letter ‘X’ or ‘N’). Perceptual load was manipulated by increasing the number 
of neutral letters in the task display, such that participants performed four different 
set sizes (1, 2, 4 and 6). In addition to the search task, participants also had to 
indicate the presence or absence of a peripheral shape presented simultaneously on 
50% of all trials with the search task. The results showed that detection sensitivity 
declined as a function of perceptual load in TD individuals, yet remained unaffected 
in adults with ASD. This effect was observed despite no concurrent deterioration in 
accuracy or reaction time on the central letter search task. It was also found that the 
response criterion was not influenced by perceptual load, suggesting that the higher 
detection rate in individuals with ASD was not a result of a change in response 
criterion. 
Experiment 5 
Given these findings, the aim of the current experiment was to establish 
whether an increased perceptual capacity in ASD also has implications for auditory 
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detection sensitivity in a cross-modal context of attention. To do so, a dual-task 
paradigm was adopted from Remington, Swettenham, et al. (2012) to examine how 
the perceptual load of a visual task can influence perceptual sensitivity of a critical 
auditory stimulus. Participants performed a visual search task while simultaneously 
attending to a target sound in noise. Perceptual load was manipulated by increasing 
the number of additional visual stimuli in the search display to create four different 
perceptual load conditions. 
Because the additional stimulus was presented multiple times, the design 
allowed for a signal detection analysis of the data so that the effects of perceptual 
load on perceptual sensitivity could be assessed independently from any effects of 
response bias. In addition, the critical auditory stimulus in noise was adjusted to 
participant’s individual threshold. This was necessary to account for any individual 
differences in perceptual sensitivity that could bias the results. Sensory disturbances, 
especially in the auditory modality, are frequently reported in individuals with ASD. 
These can range from complete ignoring of sounds (Dawson et al., 1998) to 
oversensitivity to loud noises or particular sounds (Grandin, 1997; Jones et al., 2009; 
Rosenhall, Nordin, Sandström, Ahlsen, & Gillberg, 1999). By presenting participants 
with an auditory tone embedded in noise adjusted to their individual threshold, yet 
keeping the absolute difference between signal (target sound) and noise the same 
across all participants, the effect of perceptual load on auditory detection could be 
examined without any confounding effects of individual differences in perceptual 
sensitivity. It was predicted that both the ASD and TD group would show a reduction 
in sensitivity to the auditory stimulus as the perceptual load of the visual task 
increased. TD individuals however would experience this reduction in sensitivity at 
an earlier set size (i.e. at a lower level of perceptual load) than individuals with ASD, 
who would demonstrate greater sensitivity than controls at higher levels of 
perceptual load. At the highest level of perceptual load, both groups would show 
similar reduced sensitivity. 
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Method 
Participants 
20 typically developing (TD) adolescents and 19 adolescents with ASD were 
recruited. These participants were sampled equally across the two previous 
experiments based on their ability to perform the task at an adequate level (please 
refer to the Appendix on page 191 for a summary of how participants were 
distributed across experiments). 
The same diagnostic and recruitment criteria applied as in the previous 
experiments. Parent report of ASD symptoms using the Lifetime version of the SCQ 
(Social Communication Questionnaire, Rutter et al. 2003) was obtained for all 
participants with ASD and all participants met the recommended cut-off score of 15. 
Participants were excluded if their accuracy on the letter search task was lower than 
50% or if their detection accuracy of the auditory stimulus was lower than 30% in 
either or both perceptual load conditions. On the basis of these exclusion criteria, 
three participants with ASD and three TD participants were removed prior to the 
analysis. The remaining 17 TD and 16 participants with ASD were matched for non-
verbal ability (using the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices, Raven et al., 1998) 
and chronological age (see   
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Table 6.1 for descriptive statistics). Independent samples t-tests indicated that 
there were no significant differences between groups on any of these measures 
(maximum t-value = .519, minimum p-value = .607). 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for each group 
Group Statistic 
CA 
(years : months) 
Raven’s  Score SCQ score 
ASD (n= 16) 
M 14:8 44.9 26 
SD 1:0 6.2 4.5 
Range 12:5 – 17:5 33 - 56 21 - 35 
     
TD (n= 17) 
M 14:5 45.8  
SD 1:1 4.6  
Range 11:7 – 15:5 36 - 54  
Note: 
CA = Chronological Age 
SCQ = Social Communication Questionnaire 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
Microsoft Visual Basic (version 6) was used to create computer-based stimuli 
that were presented on an IBM Lenovo Thinkpad 14.1” personal laptop. Viewing 
distance was 60cm. The task involved a dual-task paradigm that required participants 
to identify a visual target letter (‘X’ or ‘N’) presented in the middle of the screen and 
then indicate the presence or absence of an auditory tone embedded in noise. 
On each trial, six equally spaced letters were placed around the circumference 
of a circle, centered at fixation, with a radius of 1.7° visual angles (see Figure 6.1 for 
a visual presentation of the letter search display). The background of the display was 
black (RGB: 0, 0, 0) and the letters were white (RGB: 255, 255, 255). On each trial, 
one of the letters presented in the ring was the target letter (a capital letter ‘X’ or ‘N’, 
equally likely to appear). The target letter measured 0.6° x 0.6° visual angles and was 
presented randomly, but with equal probabilities, in one out of six possible locations. 
Depending on the condition, the other ring positions were occupied by perceptually 
similar non-target letters (H, K, V, Y or Z; 0.6° x 0.6° visual angles) or an easy to 
distinguish small letter O (0.2° x 0.2° visual angles). The perceptual load of the 
search task was manipulated by adding non-target letters to the display to create four 
different set sizes: one (target letter and five O’s), two (target letter, one non-target 
letter, and four O’s), four (target letter, three non-target letter, and two O’s), and six 
(target letter and five non-target letter).  
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Figure 6.1 Example of letter search display: (a) target is ‘X’ at set size four, (b) 
target is ‘N’ at set size one 
 
 
 
On each trial, participants also had to indicate the presence or absence of an 
auditory target sound embedded in noise. Starting at the onset of each trial, a speech-
shaped noise masker (48db SPL), which is noise with amplitudes at different 
frequencies to match those of natural speech (Nelson et al., 2003), was played 
continuously through a pair of Sennheiser HD 25-1-II stereo headphones for 2 
seconds (see Figure 6.2). On half of the trials, simultaneously with the presentation 
of the letter-search task, an auditory target sound (i.e. a beep tone) was played 
together with the speech-shaped noise. On the other half of the trials, the noise 
continued to play until completion. The target sound was a saw-tooth wave 
(frequency range of 85-150Hz) and was matched for duration with the visual 
presentation time of the central letter search task (i.e. 176ms). 
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Figure 6.2 Example trial with an auditory tone present in noise (1) at set size four 
 
 
Presentation of (a) the target sound + noise or (b) noise-only stimulus was 
randomised across trials. All sound files were prepared with Audition and SFSWin 
and calibrated prior to the experiment by a Bruel & Kjaer 4153 artificial ear together 
with an Ono Sokki CF-350Z spectrum analyser. To combine the saw-tooth wave and 
speech-shaped noise, a total of 25 Sine-to-noise-ratio (SNR) stimuli were created that 
ranged from -2db to -14db in 0.5db steps. The larger the SNR, the more difficult it 
was to detect the target sound in noise. Note that in this study, the masking noise is a 
speech-shaped noise instead of white noise (as in Raveh & Lavie, 2015). The reasons 
for this decision were two-fold. First, white noise is characterised by an equal energy 
distribution that is not representative of noise typically found in the environment, and 
is therefore not a very realistic masker for test signals, whereas speech-shaped noise 
simulates more closely real life situations (Taylor & Mueller, 2011). Second, speech-
shaped noise is a better masker for low frequency sounds such as the saw-tooth wave 
used in this study (Nelson, Jin, Carney, & Nelson, 2003). 
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Participants performed a total of 196 trials, administered in four blocks 
according to each set size (1, 2, 4, and 6). Participants always completed one set size 
first, before moving on to the next set size. For each set size, a total of 48 trials were 
presented and presentation of both the visual target letter (‘X’ or ‘N’) and auditory 
stimulus (auditory tone + noise or noise-only) was randomised (visual and auditory 
stimuli were equally often presented). Presentation of blocks was randomised and 
counterbalanced across participants and participants were able to take breaks after 
each block. 
Prior to performing the dual task paradigm, the perceptual threshold for the 
auditory stimulus in noise was established for each participant using a two alternative 
forced-choice (2AFC) adaptive threshold procedure. Each trial consisted of two 
pictures appearing on the screen (one left and one right) after each other which were 
accompanied by a noise masker. The target sound (beep tone + noise) appeared 
randomly with either the first or second picture. Participants indicated after each trial 
when they heard the target sound (first or second) and the experimenter entered their 
response via the keyboard. If participants produced two consecutive correct answers, 
the SNR was reduced by -0.5db. As soon as they provided an incorrect answer, the 
SNR was increased by 0.5db. A reduction in SNR thus made it more difficult to 
make out the target sound in noise, whereas an increase in SNR made it easier. 
Individual thresholds were based on an average of five reversals (point at which 
direction is changed, i.e. either when producing a correct answer followed by an 
incorrect answer or when producing 2 correct after an incorrect answer). 
The threshold level for each participant subsequently informed the choice of 
the SNR mix used in the letter search task. This was achieved by increasing the SNR 
by 5 units (i.e. +2.5db) such that the individual SNR mix used in the main 
experiment was well above each individual’s threshold. So for example, someone 
who recorded a SNR threshold of -9.5db, this person would be presented with a SNR 
mix of -7.0db in the main experiment. Each participant was therefore presented with 
an auditory tone embedded in noise adjusted to their individual threshold, yet across 
participants, the absolute difference between signal (target sound) and noise was 
always the same. 
138 
 
Procedure 
On each trial, together with a fixation cross that was displayed centrally for 
1000ms, the speech-shaped noise started to play (see Figure 6.2). This was followed 
by the visual search array for 176ms, which could be accompanied either by the 
presence or absence of the target sound. A blank screen was then displayed until a 
response to the visual input was made. Immediately following this response, a white 
question mark was presented centrally at a size of 0.6º x 0.6º until a response is made 
regarding the presence or absence of the auditory stimulus. A blank screen was then 
displayed for 2000ms, after which the next trial began.   
Participants were told that they would see a central ring made up of letters 
and that one letter would be either an X or an N. They were instructed to indicate as 
quickly but also as accurately as they can whether an ‘X’ or an ‘N’ is present 
(keypress of ‘X’ or ‘N’ for X and N respectively). They were then told that on some 
of the trials (50%), they would also hear a short beep tone hidden in noise whilst the 
ring of letters appeared on the screen. Participants always needed to first make the 
visual judgment (‘X’ or ‘N’) and then indicate via a separate keypress whether the 
sound in noise was present (press ‘S’) or absent (only noise; press ‘A’). 
Following a set of practice trials, participants completed all four blocks one 
after the other and were able to take breaks in between blocks. For the letter search 
task, reaction time (RT) and discrimination accuracy was recorded, whereas for the 
auditory detection task only accuracy was recorded. 
Results 
Letter search task 
All incorrect trials (i.e. wrong target letter response) and trials with reaction 
times (RT) on the ring of letter task above 2500ms were discarded prior to analysis 
and average correct RTs were calculated (see Table 6.2 for descriptive summary of 
task performance).  
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Table 6.2 Means and standard deviations for reaction time (RT) and error rate 
according to diagnostic group and set size 
  
Reaction Time 
(in ms) 
 
Error Rate 
(in %) 
Set size Statistic ASD TD 
 
ASD TD 
1 
M 1207 977  6 6 
SD (260) (366)  (10) (8) 
       
2 
M 1325 1150  4 6 
SD (253) (344)  (4) (5) 
       
4 
M 1472 1316  14 15 
SD (255) (353)  (6) (8) 
       
6 
M 1570 1346  27 26 
SD (288) (322)  (9) (8) 
 
 
A mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with group (ASD vs. TD) as a 
between-subjects factor and set size (one, two, four, and six) as a within-subjects 
factor was subsequently performed on RT data. There was a significant main effect 
of set size, F(3, 90) = 52.332, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .636, indicating that participants were 
slower to respond to trials with higher set sizes. This suggests that the manipulation 
of perceptual load was effective as significantly slower RT scores (index of higher 
processing demands) were observed as a function of increases in the perceptual load 
of the task. There was no significant effect of group, F(1, 30) = 1.951, p = .173, ηp
2
 = 
.06, which means that overall, there was no difference in reaction times between 
groups. Any differences between groups are therefore unlikely to be due to a 
generalised reduction in processing speed within individuals with ASD. The 
interaction between set size and group was also not significant, F(3, 90) = .442, p = 
.723, ηp
2
 = .054. 
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Figure 6.3 Mean Reaction Time (RT) as a function of set size and group (error bars: 
95% CI) 
 
A similar observation was made for accuracy data (see Figure 6.4), where 
task performance as indexed by accurate responses on the letter task declined 
significantly as a function of set size, F(2.5, 90) = 66.767, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .69 (Huyn-
Feldt adjusted degrees of freedom). The main effect of group on accuracy was not 
significant, F(1, 30) = .016, p = .899, ηp
2
 = .001, as was the interaction between set 
size and group, F(2.5, 90) = .945, p = .410, ηp
2
 = .031 (Huyn-Feldt adjusted degrees 
of freedom). 
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Figure 6.4 Mean accuracy rate (in %) as a function of set size and group (error bars: 
95% CI) 
 
Analysis of RT and accuracy data therefore suggests that the manipulation of 
perceptual load was successful and that participants were engaging with the task in 
the way that was intended. 
Detection of the critical auditory stimulus 
As before, all incorrect trials on the letter search task, as well as those trials 
with longer RTs than 2500ms were excluded prior to analysis. The percentage 
detection rate of the auditory stimulus (Figure 6.5), false alarm rate (Figure 6.6) and 
sensitivity (d’) (Figure 6.7) for each group at each set size was calculated (for a 
descriptive summary of all measures see Table 6.3). The d’ measure assesses 
detectability of a stimulus independent of a participant’s response bias and is 
estimated using both the observed percentage detection rate and false alarm rate. It is 
calculated by taking into account the probability of a correct target response (a ‘Hit’) 
and the probability of incorrectly responding (i.e. respond present) when the target is 
absent (a ‘False alarm’): 
 
𝑑′ = 𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡) − 𝑍(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚)   where function 𝑍(𝑝), 𝑝 ∈ [0,1]
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Table 6.3 Detection rate, false alarm rate, detection sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c) according to diagnostic group and set size 
  
Detection rate 
(in %) 
 
False alarm rate 
(in %) 
 Detection sensitivity (d’)  Response criterion (c) 
Set size Statistic ASD TD 
 
ASD TD 
 
ASD TD 
 
ASD TD 
1 
M 91.7 89.6  10.3 12.3  2.93 2.75  -.03 0.03 
SD (6.4) (6.2)  (11.1) (14.6)  (0.62) (0.93)  (.37) (.29) 
             
2 
M 87.1 86.2  11.0 12.5  2.76 2.49  0.07 0.03 
SD (10.8) (9.4)  (13.5) (8.7)  (0.97) (0.8)  (.37) (.29) 
             
4 
M 90.4 77.9  14.3 18.5  2.65 1.81  -0.13 0.06 
SD (7.4) (11.8)  (11.8) (11.3)  (0.76) (0.63)  (.34) (.3) 
             
6 
M 79.9 71.3  22.8 17.4  1.79 1.75  -0.09 0.25 
SD (13.0) (19.1)  (12.0) (14.7)  (0.76) (0.98)  (.36) (.38) 
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A repeated measures ANOVA on the percentage detection rate indicated that 
there was a significant main effect of set size, F(3, 90) = 14.705, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .329, 
suggesting that the auditory stimulus was detected less often as the perceptual load of 
the task increased. Post-hoc within-subjects contrasts revealed that a linear trend 
captured best this effect of set size, F(1, 30) = 29.736, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .490. There 
was a significant main effect of group, F(1, 30) = 4.906, p = .035, ηp
2
 = .141. Visual 
inspection of detection rates (see Figure 6.5) indicated that the ASD group reported 
higher detection rates than the TD group.  
 
Figure 6.5 Detection rate of the auditory stimulus (in %) as a function of set size and 
group (error bars: 95% CI) 
 
There was also a significant interaction between set size and group (F(3, 90) 
= 2.753, p = .047, ηp
2
 = .084, suggesting that the difference in detection rates 
between the ASD and TD group was dependent on set size. Post-hoc ANOVA for 
each set size demonstrated that whilst there were no significant differences between 
groups in detection rates at set size 1(ASD = 91.7%, TD = 89.6%), t(30) = .967, p = 
.341 and set size 2 (ASD = 87.1%, TD = 86.2%), t(30) = .254, p = .802, the ASD 
group had significantly higher detection rates than the TD group at set size 4 (ASD = 
90.4%, TD = 77.9%), t(27) = .37, p = .001. There was no significant difference in 
detection rates between groups at set size 6 (ASD = 79.9%, TD = 71.3%), t(30) = 
1.518, p = .140. 
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1 2 4 6
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 r
at
e 
(i
n
 %
) 
Set size 
TD ASD
144 
 
False alarm rate 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of set size, 
F(3, 90) = 5.250, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .149, with the false alarm rates increasing linearly 
with set size (see Figure 6.6). This was to be expected, as an increase in task 
difficulty inevitably leads to a greater amount of guessing. There was no significant 
main effect of group, F(1, 30) = .040, p = .843, ηp
2
 = .001, indicating that false alarm 
rates did not differ between groups. The interaction between set size and group was 
also not significant, F(3, 90) = 1.281, p = .286, ηp
2
 = .041. 
 
Figure 6.6 False alarm rate (in %) as a function of set size and group (error bars: 
95% CI) 
 
 
Detection sensitivity 
The d’ measure, an index of sensitivity or discrimination, provides a more 
accurate reflection of task performance by taking into account both participant’s 
detection and false alarm rate. A repeated measures ANOVA on the d’ values for 
each participant at each set size revealed a significant main effect of set size, F(3, 90) 
= 17.317, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .366, with detection sensitivity being lower at higher set 
sizes. There was no effect of group, F(1, 30) = .950, p = .337, ηp
2
 = .03, which means 
that there was no overall difference in sensitivity levels between the two groups. 
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Figure 6.7 Detection sensitivity (d’) as a function of set size and group (error bars: 
95% CI) 
 
However, the interaction between set size and group was close to 
significance, F(3, 90) = 2.394, p = .074, ηp
2
 = .074, indicating that the pattern of 
sensitivity is changing differently for the two groups as the perceptual load increased 
(see Figure 6.7). A priori specified t-tests showed that there was a significant 
difference in sensitivity between the two groups at set size 4 (d’; ASD = 2.65, TD = 
1.81), t(30) = 3.411, p = .002, yet this difference disappeared at set size 6 (d’; ASD = 
1.79, TD = 1.75), t(30) = .126, p = .9. There was also no significant difference 
between groups at set size 1 (d’; ASD = 2.93, TD = 2.75), t(30) = .621, p = .539 and 
set size 2 (d’; ASD = 2.76, TD = 4.88), t(30) = .871, p = .391.   
Response criterion 
As for detection sensitivity, the response criterion (c) was calculated for each 
participant at each set size: 
 
𝑐 = −
Z(Hit)−𝑍(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚)
2
  where function 𝑍(𝑝), 𝑝 ∈ [0,1]
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A response criterion with a value greater than 0 indicates a bias towards the 
no response, a value of less than 0 indicates a bias towards the yes response and the 
value of 0 indicates no bias towards yes or no (see Figure 6.8). 
Using ANOVA, the results showed that the response criterion did not differ 
significantly across set sizes, F(2.7, 90) = .933, p = .422, ηp
2
 = .03 (Huyn-Feldt 
adjusted degrees of freedom) or groups, F(1, 30) = 3.048, p = .091, ηp
2
 = .092. The 
interaction between set size and group was close to significance, F(2.7, 90) = 2.507, 
p = .07, ηp
2
 = .077 (Huyn-Feldt adjusted degrees of freedom). From Figure 6.8, it can 
be seen that this trend is likely to be driven by differences in response bias between 
groups at set size 6, with participants in the TD group adopting a more stringent 
response criterion (i.e. bias towards responding ‘no’) than the ASD group. 
 
Figure 6.8 Response criterion for each group at each set size 
  
Discussion 
The results presented here demonstrate that individuals with ASD are 
characterised by an increased perceptual capacity on a cross-modal auditory 
detection task. When the perceptual load of the visual task was low (1 or 2 items in 
the central search array), detection rates for the auditory stimulus did not differ 
between groups. However, when the perceptual load was higher (4 items in the 
search array) auditory detection rates were significantly reduced in TD individuals 
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compared to individuals with ASD, who maintained a high level of detection. At 
even higher levels of perceptual load (6 search array items), there was no difference 
in detection rates between groups. The fact that auditory detection rates in the ASD 
group were not affected by the perceptual load of the visual task until there were 6 
items in the search array (compared to 4 items in the search array for the 
neurotypical group) suggests an increased perceptual capacity in ASD. 
The signal detection analysis confirmed that the observed advantage in 
detection in individuals with ASD reflects a superior perceptual sensitivity rather 
than a shift towards a more lenient response criterion. This was shown by a 
significant difference between groups in detection sensitivity at higher perceptual 
load levels (set size 4). An alternative account of increased detection in the ASD 
group as a result of a tendency to respond with ‘stimulus present’ can therefore be 
ruled out. 
There was also no difference between groups in central search task 
performance as indexed by target letter RTs. The absence of any difference therefore 
suggests that superior detection in ASD did not come at the expense of a general 
reduction in processing speed. Also recall that only correct trials were included for 
further analyses to ensure that participants were paying attention to the visual task 
whilst they also attended to the target sound. Could differences between groups in 
goal neglect (i.e. deprioritisation of detecting the target sound) account for the 
findings observed here? There are two reasons why this is unlikely. First, the 
auditory target sound was presented on 50% of all trials and was therefore highly 
expected. Indeed, on each trial, participants always had to indicate the presence or 
absence of the CS, before being able to move onto the next trial. Second, any form of 
goal neglect (i.e. participants forgot to attend to the target sound) would most likely 
occur at the highest level of perceptual load (set size 6), ostensibly requiring most 
attentional resources and hence putting a higher priority on the visual task. The fact 
that there were no differences in detection rates or sensitivity between groups in 
detection at this level of perceptual load clearly provides evidence that goal neglect 
is an unlikely explanation for the results. 
The current findings converge with the findings of experiment two and four, 
where increasing the visual perceptual load of the task resulted in a reduction in 
awareness of an unexpected neutral auditory stimulus in TD individuals, but not in 
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individuals with ASD. The present study thus provides further evidence of an 
increased perceptual capacity in ASD by showing how also detection of expected 
auditory information is only modulated at higher levels of perceptual load in ASD. 
One potentially problematic issue that may have arisen in the current 
experiment concerns the use of a blocked design: where each block only contained 
trials of the same set size.  A number of studies with typical adults using different 
converging operations (Handy & Mangun, 2000; Murray & Jones, 2002; Theeuwes 
et al., 2004) have shown that distractor interference depends on participants’ 
anticipation of high-load or low-load displays irrespective of the actual display 
presented. Thus, based on these findings rather than bottom-up it is the top-down 
factors such as load anticipation that are most critical to performance. These 
differences in strategy rather than the level of perceptual load could have influenced 
the effects seen on detection rates and sensitivity. Other studies however have found 
the opposite (Brand-D'Abrescia & Lavie, 2007; Lavie, Lin, Zokaei, & Thoma, 2009; 
Macdonald & Lavie, 2008, 2011), namely that randomly intermixing low-and high 
load trials produces the same perceptual load effect as presenting participants with a 
blocked design. It would be important in a future study to explore the possibility of 
strategy effects within the dual-task paradigm used here in individuals with ASD. 
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Chapter 7 The effect of perceptual load versus target degradation 
on detection sensitivity in ASD 
The findings presented in this thesis demonstrate that increasing the 
perceptual load of a visual task has a differential effect on auditory awareness rates 
in individuals with ASD compared to typically developing controls. This pattern of 
results has been found to be consistent across different measures of awareness, both 
when the additional stimulus was expected to appear on only some of the trials 
(Experiment 5), or was not expected to appear at all (e.g. Experiment 2, 4). These 
experiments also used different manipulations of perceptual load, either by 
increasing the number of stimuli among which a target letter had to be identified (i.e. 
the relevant search set size) or by increasing the processing requirements for the 
same stimuli in a single-element display (i.e. present a more subtle line 
discrimination task) (Lavie, 1995, 2005). A problematic issue that arises however is 
that an increase in perceptual load also typically involves an increase in task 
difficulty and associated slowing of overall RTs and increase in error rates. This was 
for example shown in the previous experiment, where higher set sizes produced 
prolonged RTs and higher error rates. One could therefore argue that the differential 
effect of higher perceptual load on awareness in individuals with ASD may be 
attributed to an increase in general task difficulty rather than reflecting load-specific 
effects on perceptual resources. 
In an important experiment for load theory, Lavie and de Fockert (2003) 
attempted to separate the effects of perceptual load from the general effects of task 
difficulty on attention. Specifically, they contrasted the effects of perceptual load (by 
varying the search set size in the relevant task) with the effects of sensory degration 
(e.g. by reducing the contrast or size of a target) on distractor processing. Lavie and 
de Fockert proposed that whilst both manipulations will result in increased task 
difficulty, degrading the sensory quality of a target item should make discrimination 
more difficult (i.e. making identification of target items subject to sensory ‘data 
limits’) without putting any further demand on attentional ‘resource limits’ (Norman 
& Bobrow, 1975). They hypothesised that the extent to which distractors will be 
processed will critically depend on the type of manipulation of task difficulty: 
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increasing task difficulty by increasing perceptual load will lead to reduced distractor 
processing, whereas increasing task difficulty by degrading the target stimulus will 
not reduce distractor processing. 
Participants performed a hybrid between a visual search task (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980) and a flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), that required them to 
identify a relevant target letter (either X or N) while attempting to ignore a 
distracting letter in the periphery. This distractor could be either compatible (an X if 
target was X) or incompatible (an X distractor when the target was N, or vice versa) 
with the target response. Perceptual load of the task was varied by increasing the 
number of non-target letters in the central search array to create a low perceptual 
load condition (only target letter present) or high perceptual load condition (target 
letter + 7 neutral non-target letters). Participants also performed a condition of low 
perceptual load with a degraded target letter. In this condition, only the target letter 
was presented in the central search array (i.e. constituting a low perceptual load 
display), yet size and contrast of the target letter were reduced relative to the other 
conditions, thereby degrading the sensory input. The results indicated that both 
increasing perceptual load and target letter sensory degradation resulted in an 
increase in task difficulty as indexed by longer RTs and higher error rates compared 
to a low perceptual load condition that featured an intact target letter. However, 
whereas an increase in perceptual load resulted in reduced distractor processing, an 
increase in task difficulty had no effect on distractor processing. This was also 
observed when the presentation time of the target was decreased, when the target was 
followed by a mask, or when the eccentricity of the target was increased to reduce 
retinal acuity. These results therefore indicate that increasing task difficulty (via 
stimulus degradation) without increasing the perceptual load of the task is not 
sufficient to reduce distractor interference. Instead,  it was shown that the extent to 
which distractors are processed critically depends on the level of perceptual load in 
the relevant task and available attentional resources. 
A recent study by Benoni and Tsal (2012) however challenged these 
conclusions, proposing instead that dilution theory can account for the observed 
findings. According to dilution theory (Benoni & Tsal, 2012; Tsal & Benoni, 2010a, 
2010b; Wilson et al., 2011), the reduction in distractor interference observed under 
high perceptual load (in tasks manipulating search set size) occurs as a result of the 
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diluting effect of the distractor by neutral items, rather than exhaustion of attentional 
capacity. To demonstrate this, Tsal and Benoni (2010a) presented participants with a 
low perceptual load/high dilution search task, where the number of non-target items 
matched a typical high perceptual load display, but with these non-target items being 
clearly distinguishable from the target item (i.e. red target among white non-targets). 
In this condition, ostensibly a low load condition as the target “pops-out”, the mere 
presence of non-target items (neutral letters) was sufficient to eliminate distractor 
processing. According to Tsal and Benoni (2010a, 2010b), the features of the non-
target search items (e.g. neutral letters) competed with those of the distractor, thus 
degrading the quality of its visual representation and leading to reduced distractor 
processing. 
Benoni and Tsal (2012) investigated the predictions of dilution theory for 
manipulations of perceptual load and sensory degradation. They proposed that the 
differential effect of perceptual load compared to sensory degradation on distractor 
processing  reported by Lavie and de Fockert (2003) could in fact be accounted for 
by dilution theory. That is, distractor interference is reduced in conditions of high 
task difficulty because neutral letters are added to the display that can dilute 
distractor processing (perceptual load), and not when task difficulty is increased but 
the target is presented alone without any other potentially diluting items (sensory 
degradation). Benoni and Tsal (2012) reasoned that if potentially diluting items are 
presented together with the degraded target, distractor processing should again be 
reduced. To measure this effect experimentally,  Benoni and Tsal (2012) presented 
participants with a degraded low perceptual load/high display set size condition. This 
condition featured a degraded target stimulus that was surrounded by five non-target 
items (as in the high perceptual load condition). In line with their predictions, 
distractor interference effects were substantially reduced in this condition, and 
indeed identical to interence effects obsered at high perceptual load. This observation 
suggested to the authors that if dilution is controlled for, the effects of perceptual 
load and sensory degradation are identical on distractor processing.  
Lavie and Torralbo (2010), in an earlier response to Tsal and Benoni (2010a), 
however have provided evidence against the dilution account, which in extension, 
also applies to the findings of Benoni and Tsal (2012). Crucial to this proposal is the 
idea that the processing of flanker items is related to a ‘spill-over’ of untapped 
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attentional resources into the processing of distracting information (Lavie, 2005, 
2010). In high set size conditions however, there are also other items in the display 
that can receive involuntary capacity spill-over of attention. For example, apart from 
the response competing distractor in the periphery, this could be the non-target letters 
in the search array. In cases where distractor interference is reduced or even 
eliminated, perceptual load theory would predict that non-target search items 
received the capacity spill-over rather than the peripheral distractor. This led Lavie 
and Torralbo (2010) to suggest that if the non-target letters received the spillover of 
attention in low perceptual load but high set size displays (as used in Benoni & Tsal, 
2012), then replacing these non-target letters with distractors should reestablish the 
distractor interference effect. 
In their study, a typical flanker task display was adapted such that two non-
target letters in the search array were replaced by response competing letters. Each 
display consisted of six letters of which one was the target letter (X or N) presented 
in green. The other letters were either distractors or neutral letters presented in black. 
The results demonstrated that in this low perceptual load/high set size display, 
distractor interference effects are restored if the search array features response 
competing letters. This suggested to the authors that capacity in fact spilled over into 
processing of the non-target items in the search array, therefore ruling out an 
alternative explanation in terms of dilution (Lavie & Torralbo, 2010). 
Lavie and Torralbo (2010) also point out that Tsal and Benoni’s (2010a) 
interpretation of perceptual load effects in terms of dilution only pertain to one 
specific measure of selective attention, that is, distractor response competition effects 
at different search set sizes. Dilution theory clearly cannot account for perceptual 
load effects observed in studies manipulating the processing requirements of the task 
(e.g. by presenting a more subtle line discrimination task), or when the irrelevant 
stimulus does not share any visual features that could be ‘diluted’ by adding neutral 
items to the search array (e.g. in the cross-modal auditory detectiont task employed 
here). The findings in this thesis can therefore be seen as providing ‘dilution-proof’ 
evidence for the effects of perceptual load on attention. 
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Experiment 6 
Based on these considerations, it is now important to further investigate the 
effects of perceptual load and stimulus degradation within a cross-modal dual-task 
paradigm in individuals with ASD and a typically developing control group. 
Participants were required to perform the same dual-task as in the previous 
experiment, consisting of a central letter search task and an auditory detection task. 
Perceptual load was manipulated by adding neutral letters to the visual search array. 
That is, the target was either presented alone (low perceptual load condition), or 
together with five additional neutral letters (high perceptual load). The new condition 
of interest was that of low perceptual load with a degraded target letter. In this 
condition, the target was presented alone (as in the low perceptual load condition), 
yet the size and contrast were reduced relative to the ones used in the other 
conditions. 
It was hypothesised that increasing both perceptual load and sensory 
degradation would result in increased RTs and error rates. However, only an increase 
in perceptual load would reduce detection sensitivity, whereas manipulating sensory 
degradation would have no effect on detection sensitivity. It was hypothesised that 
these effects are similar for both groups, based on the findings in the previous 
experiment that indicated equivalent detection sensitivity across groups at the highest 
level of perceptual load (set size 6). 
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Method 
Participants 
19 typically developing (TD) adolescents and 18 adolescents with ASD were 
recruited for this study. The majority of TD participants (14 out of 19) were newly 
recruited for this experiment, while most ASD participants (16 out of 18) were 
recruited from the previous study (please refer to the Appendix on page 189 for a 
summary of how participants were distributed across experiments). 
 The participants were diagnosed and recruited in the same manner as in the 
previous experiments. Parent report of ASD symptoms using the Lifetime version of 
the SCQ (Social Communication Questionnaire, Rutter et al. 2003) was obtained for 
all participants with ASD and all participants met the recommended cut-off score of 
15. Participants were excluded if their accuracy on the letter search task was lower 
than 50% or if their detection accuracy of the auditory stimulus was lower than 30% 
in either or both perceptual load conditions. On the basis of these exclusion criteria, 
four participants with ASD and three TD participants were removed prior to the 
analysis. The remaining 16 TD and 14 ASD participants were matched for non-
verbal ability (using the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices, Raven et al., 1998) 
and chronological age (see Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics). Independent samples 
t-tests indicated that there were no significant differences between groups on any of 
these measures (maximum t-value = 1.534, minimum p-value = .136). 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics for each group 
Group Statistic 
CA range 
(years : months) 
Raven’s  
Score 
SCQ 
score 
ASD (n= 14) 
M 14:8 45.4 25.3 
SD 1:7 6.1 5.4 
Range 12:6 – 17:5 37 – 56 18 - 35 
     
TD (n= 16) 
M 14:8 48.6  
SD 0:6 5.6  
Range 13:8 – 15:4 33 – 56  
Note: 
CA = Chronological Age 
SCQ = Social Communication Questionnaire 
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Stimuli and Procedure 
Microsoft Visual Basic (version 6) was used to create computer-based stimuli 
that were presented on an IBM Lenovo Thinkpad 14.1” personal laptop. Viewing 
distance was 60cm. Participants were presented with the same dual-task paradigm as 
in the previous experiment. The stimuli for set size 1 and set size 6 remained the 
same, with the target letter measuring 0.6° x 0.6° visual angles. Depending on the set 
size, the other ring positions were occupied by perceptually similar non-target letters 
(set size 6: H, K, V, Y or Z; 0.6° x 0.6° visual angles) or a small letter O (set size 1: 
0.2° x 0.2° visual angles). As in the previous experiment, participants had to identify 
a visual target letter (‘X’ or ‘N’) presented in the central search array and then 
indicate the presence or absence of an auditory tone embedded in noise. The same 
target sound and speech-shaped noise stimuli were used.   
However, new stimuli were created for the degraded low perceptual load 
condition. First, the size of the target letter was decreased to 0.2° x 0.2° visual angles 
and the lightness was reduced by 75% to make visual discrimination more difficult 
(see Figure 7.1 for an illustration). This manipulation has previously been shown to 
induce ‘data limits’, without inducing ‘resource limits’ (Lavie and de Fockert, 2003). 
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Figure 7.1 Example of a (A) high perceptual load, (B) low perceptual load, and (C) 
degraded low perceptual load trial 
 
 
Participants performed a total of 145 trials, which were administered in three 
blocks according to each condition (low perceptual load, high perceptual load, 
degraded low load). Presentation of blocks was randomised and counterbalanced 
across participants and participants were able to take breaks after each block. For 
each set size, a total of 48 trials were presented and presentation of both the visual 
target letter (‘X’ or ‘N’) and auditory stimulus (auditory tone + noise or noise-only) 
was randomised. Participants always completed one condition first, before moving 
on to the next condition. The same procedure as in the previous experiment was 
used. 
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Prior to performing the dual-task paradigm, the perceptual threshold for the 
auditory stimulus in noise was also established for each participant using a two 
alternative forced-choice (2AFC) adaptive threshold procedure. The threshold level 
for each participant subsequently informed the choice of the SNR mix used in the 
letter search task. This was achieved by increasing the SNR by 5 units (i.e. +2.5db) 
such that the individual SNR mix used in the main experiment was well above each 
individual’s threshold. So for example, someone who recorded a SNR threshold of -
9.5db, this person would be presented with a SNR mix of -7.0db in the main 
experiment. Each participant was therefore presented with an auditory tone 
embedded in noise adjusted to their individual threshold, yet across participants, the 
absolute difference between signal (target sound) and noise was always the same. 
Results 
Effect of perceptual load and letter degradation on task difficulty 
All incorrect trials (i.e. wrong target letter response) and trials with reaction 
times (RT) on the ring of letter task above 2500ms were discarded prior to analysis 
and average correct RTs were calculated (see Table 7.2 for a descriptive summary of 
task performance). 
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Table 7.2 Means and standard deviations for reaction time (RT) and error rate 
according to diagnostic group and condition 
  
Reaction Time 
(in ms) 
 
Error Rate 
(in %) 
Condition Statistic ASD TD 
Total 
(overall) 
 
ASD TD 
Total 
(overall) 
Low Load 
M 1048.1 885.3 961.3  5 9 7 
SD (240.9) (302.1) (282.9)  (6) (9) (8) 
         
High Load 
M 1471.6 1316.6 1388.9  28 29 28 
SD (256.7) (336.5) (307.1)  (10) (17) (14) 
         
Degraded 
Low Load 
M 1282.2 1073 1170.6  14 15 14 
SD (351.5) (301.3) (337.1)  (15) (11) (13) 
 
A mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with group (ASD vs. TD) as a 
between-subjects factor and condition (Low perceptual load, high perceptual load, 
and degraded low perceptual load) as a within-subjects factor was subsequently 
performed on RT data and error rates. These analyses revealed a significant main 
effect of condition on RTs, F(2, 56) = 48.794, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .635, indicating that 
participants performed differently across conditions. Planned contrasts showed that 
RTs were significantly longer for high perceptual load displays (M = 1388, SD = 
307.1) than for degraded low load displays (M = 1170.6, SD = 337.1), t(29) = 4.614, 
p < .001, which in turn produced longer RTs than low perceptual load displays (M = 
961.3, SD = 282.9), t(29) = 4.931, p < .001. Significantly longer RTs were also 
observed in the high perceptual load condition compared to the low perceptual load 
condition, t(29) = 11.423, p < .001.There was no significant effect of group on RTs 
(F(1, 28) = 3.182, p = .085, ηp
2
 = .102) and no significant interaction between group 
and condition (F(2, 56) = .229, p = .796, ηp
2
 = .008). 
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Figure 7.2 Mean Reaction Time (RT) as a function of condition and group (error 
bars: 95% CI) 
 
 
Similar effects were also observed for error rates. Participants differed 
significantly in error rates across conditions (F(2, 56) = 25.644, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .478). 
Individual contrasts revealed that error rates were significantly higher in the high 
perceptual load condition (M = 28%, SD = 14%) than in the degraded low load 
condition (M = 14%, SD = 13%), t(29) = 3.952, p < .001, and low perceptual load 
condition (M = 7% , SD = 8%), t(29) = 7.148, p < .001. Error rates in the low 
perceptual load condition were also significantly lower than in the degraded low load 
condition, t(29) = 3.138, p = .004. There was no main effect of group on error rates 
(F(1, 28) = .362, p = .552, ηp
2
 = .013) or interaction effect (F(2, 56) = .240, p = .788, 
ηp
2
 = .008). 
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Figure 7.3 Mean accuracy rate (in %) according to condition and group (error bars: 
95% CI) 
 
  
The findings therefore suggest that both the manipulation of the perceptual 
load of the task and target letter degradation resulted in an increase in general task 
difficulty as indexed by longer RTs and reduced accuracy on the central letter task 
compared to a condition of low perceptual load with intact letter targets.  
Detection of the critical auditory stimulus 
As before, all incorrect trials on the letter search task, as well as those trials 
with longer RTs than 2500ms were excluded prior to analysis. The percentage 
detection rate of the auditory stimulus (Figure 7.4), false alarm rate (Figure 7.5) and 
sensitivity (d’) (Figure 7.6) for each group at each set size was calculated (for a 
descriptive summary of all measures see Table 7.3). The d’ measure assesses 
detectability of a stimulus independent of a participant’s response bias and is 
estimated using both the observed percentage detection rate and false alarm rate. It is 
calculated by taking into account the probability of a correct target response (a ‘Hit’) 
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Low load High load Degraded low load
A
cc
u
ra
cy
 (
in
 %
) 
TD ASD
161 
 
and the probability of incorrectly responding (i.e. respond present) when the target is 
absent (a ‘False alarm’): 
 
𝑑′ = 𝑍(𝐻𝑖𝑡) − 𝑍(𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚)   where function 𝑍(𝑝), 𝑝 ∈ [0,1 
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Table 7.3 Detection rate, false alarm rate, detection sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c) according to condition and diagnostic group 
  
Detection rate 
(in %) 
 
False alarm rate 
(in %) 
 
Detection sensitivity (d’) 
 
Criterion (c) 
Condition Statistic ASD TD Total 
 
ASD TD Total 
 
ASD TD Total 
 
ASD TD Total 
Low Load 
M 89.4 87.8 88.6  10.6 11.4 11.1  2.79 2.67 2.73  0.01 0.01 0.01 
SD (10) (10.3) (10)  (11.3) (10.5) (10.7)  (0.68) (0.85) (.76)  (.39) (.32) (.34) 
                 
High Load 
M 80.2 72.8 76.3  23.9 16.2 19.8  1.9 1.89 1.89  0.14 0.12 0.13 
SD (13.7) (24.1) (20)  (18) (14.4) (16.3)  (1.24) (1.1) (1.14)  (.46) (.43) (.44) 
                 
Degraded 
Low Load 
M 82.6 84.4 83.6  13.6 12.1 12.8  2.61 2.53 2.57  -.06 0.21 0.08 
SD (20.7) (11.9) (16.3)  (18.4) (12.3) (15.2)  (1.31) (0.79) (1.05)  (.34) (.44) (.41) 
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A repeated measures ANOVA on the percentage detection rate with group (ASD vs. 
TD) and condition (low load, high load and degraded low load) indicated that there was a 
significant main effect of condition (F(2, 56) = 7.385, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .209). Planned contrasts 
showed that detection rates were significantly reduced in the high perceptual load condition 
(M = 76.3%, SD = 20%) relative to the degraded low load condition (M = 83.6%, SD = 
16.3%), t(29) = 2.258, p = .032, and low perceptual load condition (M = 88.6%, SD = 10%), 
t(29) = 3.353, p = .002. The difference in detection rates between the degraded low load and 
low perceptual load condition was close to significance, t(29) = 2.032, p = .051, with a trend 
towards lower detection rates in the degraded low load condition (difference of 
approximately 5% in detection rates). Neither the main effect of group (F(1, 28) = .272, p = 
.606, ηp
2
 = .01), nor the interaction between group and condition was significant (F(2, 56) = 
1.080, p = .347, ηp
2
 = .037). 
 
Figure 7.4 Detection rate of the auditory stimulus (in %) according to condition and group 
(error bars: 95% CI) 
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False alarm rate 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition, 
F(2, 56) = 4.027, p = .023, ηp
2
 = .126, with individual contrasts showing that this was 
due to a significantly larger false alarm rates in the high load (M = 19.8%, SD= 
16.3%) compared to the low load  condition (M = 11.1%, SD =10.7%), t(29) = 2.776, 
p = .01. There were no significant differences between low load and degraded low 
load displays (M = 12.8%, SD = 15.2%), t(29) = .567, p = .575. The difference in 
false alarm rates between high load and degraded low load was close to significance, 
t(29) = 1.867, p = .072. There was no main effect of group or interaction effect 
(maximum F-value = .864, minimum p-value = .427). 
 
Figure 7.5 False alarm rate (in %) as a function of condition and group (error bars: 
95% CI) 
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Detection sensitivity 
A repeated measures ANOVA on the d’ values for each participant in each 
condition was carried out. There was a significant main effect of condition (F(2, 56) 
= 10.554, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .274), but no significant effect of group (F(1, 28) = .061, p 
= .807, ηp
2
 = .002) or interaction between group and condition (F(2, 56) = .037, p = 
.964, ηp
2
 = .001). In order to follow-up on the main effect of condition, planned 
contrasts showed that detection sensitivity was significantly reduced in the high 
perceptual load condition (d’: M = 1.89, SD = 1.14) relative to the degraded low load 
condition (d’: M = 2.57, SD = 1.05), t(29) = 3.677, p = .001, and low perceptual load 
condition (d’: M = 2.73, SD = .76), t(29) = 3.923, p < .001. Importantly, there was no 
significant difference in detection sensitivity between low perceptual load and 
degraded low load conditions, t(29) = .949, p = .350. This suggests that while an 
increase in perceptual load reduced perceptual sensitivity of an additional stimulus, 
increasing sensory degradation (i.e. increasing general task difficulty) had no effect 
on detection sensitivity.  
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Figure 7.6 Detection sensitivity (d’) as a function of condition and group (error bars: 
95% CI) 
 
Response criterion 
As for detection sensitivity, the response criterion (c) was calculated for each 
participant (see  
Figure 7.7). Using ANOVA, the results showed that the response criterion did 
not differ significantly between conditions (F(2, 56) = .834, p = .440, ηp
2
 = .029), or 
between groups (F(1, 28) = .626, p = .435, ηp
2
 = .022). There was also no significant 
interaction effect (F(2, 56) = 1.508, p = .230, ηp
2
 = .051). 
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Figure 7.7 Response criterion (c) according to condition and group (error bars: 95% 
CI) 
 
Analysis of relative speed between conditions 
It is important to acknowledge that the high perceptual load condition showed 
a greater task difficulty effect compared to the degraded low load condition as 
reflected by significantly longer RTs and higher error rates. This might suggest that it 
is still higher task difficulty (as indexed by slower processing speed) that is driving 
the difference in detection sensitivity between these conditions. In order to further 
examine whether the relative speed difference between these conditions can account 
for the results on detection sensitivity, I re-analysed the results for detection 
sensitivity by factoring in the relative overall speed in these conditions. 
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Figure 7.8 Mean RTs as a function of condition and relative speed in the high load 
compared to the degraded low load condition 
 
All participants were divided into two groups using a median split procedure 
(high speed difference group, low speed difference group) of the RT difference score 
between the high perceptual load and degraded low load condition. Group A was 
characterised by slower RTs in the degraded low load compared to the high load 
condition (23ms difference), whereas group B was composed of individuals who 
were slower in the high load relative to the degraded low load condition (414ms 
difference) (see Figure 7.8). If the difference in processing speed (i.e. effect of task 
difficulty) between the high perceptual load and degraded low load condition can 
account for the results on detection sensitivity, then we would expect a significant 
interaction between group (Group A, Group B) and condition (low load, high load, 
degraded low load). In other words, Group B (high speed difference) should show a 
difference in detection sensitivity between the degraded low load and high perceptual 
load condition, whereas Group A (no speed difference) should demonstrate no 
difference in detection sensitivity between these conditions. 
Inspection of d’ values however suggest the opposite (see Figure 7.9). Group 
A (no difference in speed between conditions) actually demonstrated a stronger 
effect on detection sensitivity than Group B (high speed difference).  An ANOVA 
confirmed this by showing no significant interaction effect of condition (low load, 
high load, degraded low load) and group (group A vs. group B) on detection 
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sensitivity, F(2, 56) = 1.219, p = .303, ηp
2
 = .042. Recall that the above analysis 
showed that while detection sensitivity was significantly reduced in the high 
perceptual load condition compared to low perceptual load and degraded low load 
condition, degraded low load did not result in a significant reduction in detection 
sensitivity compared to the low perceptual load condition. This analysis therefore 
rules out an alternative explanation of the differential effect of perceptual load 
compared to sensory degradation on detection sensitivity in terms of relative 
processing speed between these conditions. 
 
Figure 7.9 Mean detection sensitivity as a function of condition and relative speed in 
the high load compared to the degraded low load condition 
 
 
Discussion 
The findings demonstrated that detection sensitivity for an additional auditory 
stimulus depended upon the type of processing demand imposed on participants in a 
visual task. Increasing the visual perceptual load by varying the relevant search set 
size resulted in a reduction in detection sensitivity. In contrast, increasing general 
task difficulty by altering the sensory quality of the target stimulus (by reducing its 
size and contrast) did not reduce sensitivity. Although both manipulations resulted in 
longer RTs and higher error rates compared to a low perceptual load condition with 
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
Low load High load Degraded low load
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 s
en
si
ti
vi
ty
 (
d
')
 
Group A Group B
170 
 
an intact target stimulus, only an increase in perceptual load significantly reduced 
detection sensitivity. Support for this conclusion was also derived from an additional 
analysis that split the sample according to relative processing speed. One group 
(group A) was characterised by longer RTs in the degraded low load compared to the 
high load condition, whereas group B was composed of individuals who had longer 
RTs in the high load relative to the degraded low load condition. An additional 
analysis showed that these groups produced similar effects of condition on detection 
sensitivity, suggesting that relative difference in processing speed between these 
conditions cannot account for the findings. In summary, these findings therefore 
indicate that the reduction in sensitivity at high levels of perceptual load cannot 
simply be attributed to a general increase in task difficulty.  
The differential effects of perceptual load and sensory degradation on 
attention were also shown to be equivalent across groups. This clearly suggests that 
the ability of both groups to also attend to an additional stimulus critically depended 
upon the level of perceptual load in the relevant task and available attentional 
resources rather than being influenced by general task difficulty. By extension, the 
current results indicate that the finding of increased awareness at high levels of 
perceptual load in individuals with ASD reported in this thesis is unlikely to be the 
result of any effect of task difficulty on attention. This therefore provides further 
support for the hypothesis that individuals with ASD are characterised by an 
increased perceptual capacity. The implications of this finding in ASD will be 
discussed in full in the following chapter. Note that in the high perceptual load 
condition, groups did not differ on detection measures (i.e. detection rate and 
detection sensitivity). This was to be expected given the findings in the previous 
experiment that demonstrated that detection was similar across groups at the highest 
level of perceptual load (also set size 6). In fact, sensitivity at a group level was very 
similar across experiments at the hightest set size (ASD: d’ = 1.9 vs. d’= 1.8; TD: d’ 
= 1.9 vs. d’ = 1.8). This observation therefore further adds to the robustness of the 
conclusions presented here. 
In accordance with Lavie and de Fockert (2003), the current results have 
shown that the effects of perceptual load can be distinguished from more general 
effects of task difficulty on attention. This was demonstrated using a dual-task 
paradigm requiring participants to perform a visual search task whilst also detecting 
171 
 
an additional auditory stimulus. Importantly however, the current experimental set-
up provided a ‘dilution-free’ test of the predictions of perceptual load theory. 
According to Dilution theory, the reduction in distractor processing observed in high 
perceptual load conditions is the result of the diluting effect of non-target items on 
processing the distractor (e.g. Tsal & Benoni, 2010a). However in this study, the 
additional stimulus was neither a distractor, nor was it presented in the visual 
modality and hence did not share any visual features with the neutral letter items that 
could have diluted its processing. Given that the auditory stimulus (beep sound) also 
did not share any semantic information with the neutral letters (e.g. K, V, H, Y or Z) 
further supports the conclusions drawn here. Taken together, the current findings 
confirmed the load-specific effects on perceptual resources within a cross-modal 
context of selective attention in both typically developing adolescents and 
adolescents with ASD. Perceptual load theory therefore remains the most 
parsimoneous theory to account for the results obtained in this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 General discussion 
As outlined in chapter two, altered patterns of perception and attention are 
often associated with the phenotype of autism. Many of these findings are based on 
research in the visual domain, and illustrate the various changes underlying these 
cognitive processes. A review of the relevant literature revealed that atypicalities are 
observed across a range of different attentional components. This includes for 
example arousal (Rogers & Ozonoff, 2005), orienting (Bowler, 2007; Townsend, 
Courchesne, et al., 1996), disengaging and shifting attention (Courchesne, 
Townsend, Akshoomoff, et al., 1994; Reed & McCarthy, 2012), and deficits in 
selectivity and filtering (Adams & Jarrold, 2012; Burack, 1994; Lovaas & 
Schreibman, 1971; Mann & Walker, 2003). The expression of these attentional 
abnormalities in ASD is, however, often diverse and contradictory. In addition, 
relatively little work has focused on whether these atypical patterns of attention also 
translate to cross-modal contexts of selective attention. 
Based on recent advances in research on visual selective attention in ASD 
that proposed that individuals with ASD are characterised by an increased perceptual 
capacity, this thesis investigated patterns of cross-modal selective attention in 
children and adolescents with ASD. The increased perceptual capacity account 
(Remington, Swettenham, et al., 2012; Remington et al., 2009; Swettenham et al., 
2014) posits that while people have a finite capacity for processing perceptual 
information, this capacity seems to be enhanced in individuals with ASD.  
Preliminary support for this account suggested that an increased perceptual capacity 
in ASD can lead to enhanced awareness of additional information presented 
simultaneously during performance of a visual search task (Remington, Swettenham, 
et al., 2012) or perceptual judgment task (Swettenham et al., 2014), but can also lead 
to increased distractor processing (Remington et al., 2009). By applying Lavie’s 
perceptual load theory of attention (Lavie, 1995), I reasoned that children and 
adolescents with ASD would also show enhanced auditory awareness across a range 
of cross-modal experiments that manipulated the level of visual perceptual load. 
Prior to these experiments on individuals with ASD, it was important to 
address the developmental effects of visual perceptual load on auditory awareness in 
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a sample of neurotypical children, adolescents and adults. An inattentional deafness 
task similar to that used by Macdonald and Lavie (2011), but adapted to suit younger 
participants, was used. Participants from different age groups (5-6 years, 9-10 years, 
14-15 years and adults) performed either a low perceptual load (more gross) or high 
perceptual load (more subtle) line-length discrimination task. On a critical trial, an 
unexpected auditory stimulus was played concurrently with the visual stimulus and 
participants were asked whether they had noticed anything else. On a subsequent 
control trial, participants were told to ignore the cross stimulus. Only those 
participants who successfully identified the auditory stimulus on the control trial 
were included in further analyses. 
In line with the initial predictions, the results indicated that with increasing 
age, participants reported more often the presence of an additional, but unexpected 
auditory stimulus whilst being engaged in a visual discrimination task. It was also 
found that increasing the perceptual load of the task reduced awareness for children, 
but not adolescents and adults. Together, these findings suggested that awareness for 
stimuli outside the focus of attention increased with age, and older children have an 
increased perceptual capacity compared to younger children. The differential effect 
of visual perceptual load on awareness in younger children therefore reflected the 
smaller capacity in children compared to adolescents and adults being 
disproportionately taxed by an increase in perceptual load. An alternative 
explanation of these results in terms of a trade-off in line discrimination accuracy 
could also be ruled out. There were no differences in task performance between 
perceptual load conditions for all age groups, including the youngest age groups. The 
results from the first experiment therefore demonstrated how typical development 
involves the maturation of perceptual capacity and its relevance for inattentional 
deafness rates at different levels of visual perceptual load.  
The next chapter investigated the effect of visual perceptual load on auditory 
awareness (i.e. inattentional deafness rates) in children with ASD and a neurotypical 
comparison group matched on chronological age and non-verbal ability scores. 
Based on the findings in the previous chapter that visual perceptual load modulated 
the incidence of inattentional deafness in typically developing children and the recent 
findings suggesting that perceptual capacity is increased in ASD (Remington, 
Swettenham, et al., 2012; Remington et al., 2009; Swettenham et al., 2014), it was 
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hypothesised that children with ASD would also show a differential effect of visual 
perceptual load on auditory awareness. If autism is characterised by an increased 
perceptual capacity that allocates resources across sensory modalities, then 
performing a high visual perceptual load task should leave processing capacities 
available to also attend to and detect an additional auditory stimulus. In typically 
developing individuals however, this capacity should be exhausted at high perceptual 
load resulting in reduced awareness for an unexpected auditory stimulus (critical 
stimulus: CS) presented on a critical trial. 
Participants were presented with the same inattentional deafness paradigm as 
in the previous experiment. As predicted, children with ASD demonstrated greater 
awareness overall and a reduced effect of visual perceptual load on CS awareness 
compared to typically developing children. Whereas awareness for the CS continued 
to be high in children with ASD even at high levels of perceptual load, TD children 
experienced a significant drop in awareness rates as a function of perceptual load. 
This suggested that children with ASD had processing resources left-over to attend to 
the auditory stimulus. The findings from this experiment therefore extended existing 
work on the effect of perceptual load on visual selective attention in ASD to show 
that also in cross-modal contexts of attention, individuals with ASD have an 
increased perceptual capacity. 
A number of observations provided further support for this conclusion. For 
example, despite equally high task performance as controls, children with ASD 
demonstrated increased CS awareness when the level of visual perceptual load was 
high. This indicated that increased CS awareness could not be explained by a 
deterioration in task performance on the line discrimination task. Still, it has to be 
noted that task performance was only indexed by participant’s accuracy and not 
reaction time. The small number of trials and therefore larger variability in reaction 
times across trials makes it unlikely that with this task design, reaction time would 
have been a reliable measure of task performance. While it was important for this 
study to keep trials to a minimum in order to ensure that as many children as possible 
continued to engage with the task, it limits the conclusions drawn from the data on 
task performance. Overall cognitive abilities (non-verbal ability scores) and ASD 
symptomatology (SCQ scores) were also not able to account for the increased 
awareness rates of the CS in the ASD group, suggesting that the results were not 
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simply driven by a subgroup of more able children with ASD (i.e. those with higher 
non-verbal ability scores and lower SCQ scores). 
Having examined the cross-modal effects of attention on awareness of a 
neutral, socially-meaningless auditory stimulus, the purpose of the following chapter 
was to examine these cross-modal effects for social attention, and in particular, the 
effects of visual perceptual load on awareness of a speech sound. There is some 
evidence that in the visual domain, adults with ASD do not seem to prioritise 
processing of social information over processing of other information. Whereas in 
typically developing individuals, processing of distracting visual social stimuli (i.e. 
faces) has been shown to be unaffected by the perceptual load of the relevant task 
(Lavie et al., 2003), in individuals with ASD, processing of distractor faces was only 
evident at low-, but not at high levels of perceptual load (Remington, Campbell, et 
al., 2012). This may suggest that typically developing individuals possess a dedicated 
capacity for social stimuli, which however is absent in individuals with ASD. In 
other words, in TD individuals, there are extra processing resources for social stimuli 
regardless of the level of perceptual load, which may not be the case however in 
individuals with ASD. 
In light of such evidence, it was hypothesised that increasing the perceptual 
load of the visual task would not affect awareness of an unexpected speech sound in 
TD individuals, i.e. awareness rates will remain high across perceptual load 
conditions, yet increasing perceptual load would reduce awareness rates of a speech 
sound in individuals with ASD. A new sample of participants performed a similar 
inattentional deafness task as in the previous experiments, which was however 
improved in a number of ways. First, to control for alternative accounts in terms of 
rapid forgetting or a weak memory trace of the auditory stimulus (Wolfe, 1999), the 
surprise question was presented after a short and fixed amount of time following the 
critical trial. Second, the number of trials was increased to allow measurement of 
participant’s reaction time to obtain a more nuanced measure of task performance. 
This also permitted us to evaluate whether increased awareness rates in the ASD 
group in the previous experiment might have been a consequence of them diverting 
attentional resources from the visual to the auditory modality. And lastly, 
participants were required to perform a perceptual threshold task following the main 
experiment that measured perceptual sensitivity of the auditory stimulus to ascertain 
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whether any differences in awareness relate to higher sensitivity to the auditory 
stimulus. The results demonstrated that for both groups, awareness of a speech sound 
was not affected by the level of perceptual load in the visual task, i.e. both the ASD 
and TD group continued to report the presence of an unexpected speech sound 
despite an increase in the level of perceptual load. For the TD group, this pattern of 
awareness at high perceptual load was considerably different to the previous 
experiment, where a reduction in awareness of a neutral stimulus was seen at high 
perceptual load. This provided preliminary support for the notion that in typically 
developing individuals, speech stimuli capture attention regardless of the level of 
perceptual load. 
While these results were expected for TD individuals, they were somewhat 
unexpected for individuals with ASD, who showed high awareness rates for the 
speech sound across perceptual load conditions. However, based on these findings, it 
is difficult to say whether individuals with ASD also processed the social CS 
differently than the neutral CS presented in the previous experiment. An additional 
experiment was required to further investigate this issue. To more confidently 
determine whether speech sounds indeed capture attention differently than neutral 
sounds, these results were compared to data from an identical task that used a 
carefully matched neutral sound instead (matched on a number of acoustic properties 
including pitch, frequency range and intensity). On this task, the pattern of awareness 
in experiment 2 was replicated: increasing the perceptual load of the task resulted in 
significantly reduced awareness rates in TD adolescents, but not in adolescents with 
ASD who continued to report awareness of the CS. Comparing these two 
experiments suggested that in the TD group, an unexpected yet ecologically salient 
speech sound captured attention regardless of the level of visual perceptual load, 
whereas a neutral sound did not. This disparity was shown to be statistically 
significant. For the first time, these findings provided evidence that in TD 
individuals, processing of unexpected auditory social stimuli in a cross-modal 
context of attention may also be automatic and mandatory, whereas processing of 
neutral auditory information relies on general capacity limits. A possible explanation 
for this finding could relate to the special biological and social significance of speech 
sounds. It may be crucial for adaptive behaviour that socially meaningful auditory 
information, unlike other neutral information, is processed regardless of the level of 
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visual perceptual load. Even if unexpected auditory information is not relevant for 
current task behaviour, as was the case in the current experiment, it can potentially 
carry important information including social cues that could be disadvantageous not 
to attend to. The results for the ASD group however were less clear. In the absence 
of any differences in awareness under high perceptual load of the neutral CS 
compared to the social CS, it is difficult to tell whether individuals with ASD also 
processed the unexpected speech sound in any special way. It may be that social 
auditory information captures attention similarly as socially neutral information, i.e. 
individuals with ASD treat social and non-social information in a similar manner. To 
further explore these issues, it would be interesting to measure the effect of visual 
perceptual load on awareness of a social vs. socially neutral stimulus in ASD at very 
high levels of perceptual load to see if there is a point at which a socially neutral 
stimulus CS does not reach awareness while a social stimulus does, or whether both 
types of stimuli suffer the same fate of not being noticed at higher levels of 
perceptual load. Experiment four also replicated the previous finding of a differential 
effect of visual perceptual load on awareness of a neutral CS in individuals with 
ASD, providing further support for the hypothesis of an increased perceptual 
capacity in ASD that operates across sensory modalities. With the addition of more 
robust performance measures (i.e. reaction time), as well as sensitivity measures (i.e. 
perceptual load threshold task), the findings from this experiment further 
strengthened these conclusions. There were no group or interaction effects for these 
measures, suggesting that both groups performed similarly on the task and across 
perceptual load conditions. Both groups did also not differ in perceptual thresholds. 
Any differences in awareness between groups are therefore unlikely to be the result 
of differences in sensitivity to auditory signals. 
The aim of Experiment 5 was to establish whether an increased perceptual 
capacity in ASD also has implications for auditory detection sensitivity. The 
increased perceptual capacity account would predict that increased awareness in 
conditions of high perceptual load in individuals with ASD reflects a perceptual 
detection advantage rather than a more lenient response criterion. However, given 
the single-trial nature of the inattentional deafness paradigm used in the previous 
experiments, measures of detection sensitivity (d’) and response criterion (c) could 
not be assessed. In addition, although the surprise question followed the critical trial 
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immediately after recording the visual response, thereby minimising any 
confounding effects, alternative explanations in terms of rapid forgetting (Wolfe, 
1999) or a weak memory trace (Barber & Folkard, 1972) cannot be completely ruled 
out. To further investigate the effects of visual perceptual load for cross-modal 
selective attention in ASD, a dual-task paradigm was adapted from Remington, 
Swettenham, et al. (2012) to examine how the perceptual load of a visual task can 
influence perceptual sensitivity of a critical auditory stimulus. Participants performed 
a visual search task (search a central array for a target letter X or N) while 
simultaneously attending to a target sound embedded in noise. Perceptual load in this 
task, in contrast to the previous experiments, was manipulated by increasing the 
number of similar non-target letter stimuli in the search display. Because the 
additional stimulus was presented multiple times, the design allowed for a signal 
detection analysis of the data so that the effects of perceptual load on perceptual 
sensitivity could be assessed independently from any effects of response bias. In 
order to account for any individual differences in perceptual sensitivity that could 
bias the results, the auditory target stimulus in noise was adjusted to participant’s 
individual perceptual threshold. By presenting participants with an auditory tone 
embedded in noise adjusted to their individual threshold, yet keeping the absolute 
difference between signal (target sound) and noise the same across all participants, 
the effect of perceptual load on auditory detection could be examined without any 
confounding effects of individual differences in perceptual sensitivity. 
In line with predictions, the results indicated that at the lowest levels of 
perceptual load (1 or 2 items in the central search array), detection rates for the 
auditory stimulus did not differ between groups. At higher levels of perceptual load 
when 4 additional items were presented in the search array, auditory detection rates 
were significantly reduced in TD adolescents compared to adolescents with ASD, 
who maintained a high level of detection. At the highest level of perceptual load (6 
search array items), the ASD group showed the same modulation of awareness as a 
function of perceptual load as the TD group. The fact that auditory detection rates in 
the ASD group were not affected by the perceptual load of the visual task until there 
were 6 items in the search array (compared to 4 items in the search array for the 
neurotypical group) suggests an increased perceptual capacity in ASD. Signal 
detection measures also confirmed that the observed advantage in detection in 
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individuals with ASD reflects a superior perceptual sensitivity rather than a shift 
towards a more lenient response criterion. This was shown by a significant difference 
between groups in detection sensitivity at higher perceptual load levels (set size 4). 
An alternative account of increased detection in the ASD group as a result of a 
tendency to respond with ‘stimulus present’ was therefore ruled out. Although 
individuals with ASD demonstrated superior detection at higher levels of perceptual 
load, they showed equivalent performance as controls at the highest level of 
perceptual load. This indicated that if the level of perceptual load is high enough, the 
perceptual capacity of individuals with ASD was exhausted and resulted in early 
selection and therefore reduced detection of the auditory stimulus.  
In all experiments presented so-far, an increase in error rates or reaction time 
was taken as evidence for a successful manipulation of perceptual load. While this is 
in line with previous manipulations of perceptual load (e.g. Lavie & Cox, 1997), it 
also reflects an increase in task difficulty. Thus, potentially, one could argue that the 
differential effect of higher perceptual load on awareness in individuals with ASD 
can be attributed to an increase in general task difficulty rather than reflecting load-
specific effects on perceptual resources. In the final experiment, it was therefore 
important to separate the effects of perceptual load on attention from the more 
general effects of task difficulty on attention. In this study, participants were required 
to perform the same dual-task as in the previous experiment, consisting of a central 
letter search task and an auditory detection task. Three conditions of interest were 
created: a low perceptual load condition (target letter presented alone), a high 
perceptual load condition (target letter + five additional neutral letters), and a low 
perceptual load with a degraded target letter condition. This new condition featured a 
target letter presented alone (as in the low perceptual load condition), yet the size and 
contrast were reduced relative to the ones used in the other conditions. It was 
predicted that in line with previous findings on neurotypical adults (Lavie & de 
Fockert, 2003) that increasing both perceptual load and sensory degradation would 
result in increased RTs and error rates. However, only an increase in perceptual load 
would reduce detection sensitivity, whereas manipulating sensory degradation would 
have no effect on detection sensitivity. These effects were hypothesised to be similar 
for both groups. 
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The results indicated that the extent to which detection sensitivity was 
modulated depended upon the type of processing demand imposed on participants in 
the visual task. Increasing the visual perceptual load of the task by varying the 
relevant search set size resulted in a reduction in detection sensitivity (i.e. increasing 
data “resource limits” (Lavie, 2005, 2010). In contrast, increasing general task 
difficulty by altering the sensory quality of the target stimulus (i.e. altering sensory 
“data limits” by reducing its size and contrast) did not reduce sensitivity. Although 
both manipulations resulted in longer RTs and higher error rates compared to a low 
perceptual load condition with an intact target stimulus, only an increase in 
perceptual load modulated detection sensitivity. Task difficulty in turn disrupted task 
performance while having no effect on auditory processing. It was also shown that 
when controlling for relative speed difference between these conditions, the 
differential effect of perceptual load on detection sensitivity compared to sensory 
degradation still remained. These findings therefore indicated that the reduction in 
sensitivity at high levels of perceptual load cannot simply be attributed to a general 
increase in task difficulty. This effect was also shown to be equivalent across groups, 
meaning that the extent to which participants were able to attend to an additional 
stimulus critically depended upon the level of perceptual load in the relevant task and 
available attentional resources, rather than any differences in more general task 
difficulty. The finding of load-specific effects on attention also provided further 
support for the hypothesis that individuals with ASD are characterised by an 
increased perceptual capacity. That is, increased awareness at high levels of 
perceptual load in individuals with ASD reported in earlier experiments is not the 
result of a differential effect of task difficulty on attention. 
It is also important to highlight that the experimental set-up of all 
experiments presented in this thesis provided a ‘dilution-free’ test of the predictions 
of perceptual load theory. According to Dilution theory, the reduction in distractor 
processing observed in high perceptual load conditions is the result of the diluting 
effect of non-target items on processing the distractor (e.g. Tsal & Benoni, 2010a). 
However, in all studies reported here, the additional stimulus was neither a distractor, 
nor was it presented in the visual modality and hence did not share any visual 
features with the neutral letter items that could have diluted its processing. Indeed, 
the auditory stimulus (either a non-social or social sound) also did not share any 
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semantic information with the neutral letters (e.g. K, V, H, Y or Z) that could have 
influenced its processing (in experiment 5 & 6). This therefore further supports the 
conclusions drawn here. 
Taken together, the current findings confirmed the load-specific effects on 
perceptual resources within a cross-modal context of selective attention in both 
typically developing adolescents and adolescents with ASD. Perceptual load theory 
therefore remains the most parsimoneous theory to account for the results obtained in 
this thesis. 
Increased perceptual capacity in ASD - Implications 
In everyday situations, attention is required to operate in a multisensory 
environment where incoming sensory information is rarely confined to a single 
modality. For example, in one instance we find ourselves concentrating on a visual 
task, e.g. reading a book, whilst simultaneously being exposed to other information 
from other modalities – such as people talking loudly nearby. Successful adaptive 
functioning in these situations requires effective attention to select the information 
that is relevant and ignore what is irrelevant.  Clinicians and parents however often 
report that individuals with ASD are able to perform in a well-controlled 
environment, yet experience difficulties and even distress if the environment features 
too many sensory stimuli (Marco, Hinkley, Hill, & Nagarajan, 2011). How do the 
findings presented within this thesis fit with these behavioural observations? 
Although the results from experiment 2, 4, and 5 suggest that an increased 
perceptual capacity can be conceived as a perceptual advantage rather than a deficit, 
being able to process more information can also have adverse effects. Perceptual 
load theory posits that while attention is a limited capacity system, all stimuli falling 
within this limit are processed regardless of whether they are irrelevant and 
potentially distracting. Being able to process more information at once, particularly if 
that information is distracting, would necessarily lead to over-arousal, anxiety and 
distress. An interesting case study in this context is Temple Grandin, an author with 
autism. She described how minor background noises distracted her: “I still have 
problems with losing my train of thought when distracting noises occur. If a pager 
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goes off when I am giving a lecture, it fully captures my attention and I completely 
forget what I was talking about” (Grandin, 1995, p. 67-68). The evidence presented 
within this thesis would suggest that these behaviours might be related to an 
increased perceptual capacity that operates across sensory modalities. 
The increased perceptual capacity account might also be able to provide some 
insight into why individuals with ASD have been found to demonstrate higher 
distractibility in situations of multiple auditory inputs.  Teder-Sälejärvi, Pierce, 
Courchesne, and Hillyard (2005) for example found that individuals with ASD have 
more difficulty selectively attending to a target stimulus whilst ignoring distracting 
noise bursts relative to controls. When presented with eight sound sources and a 
continuous stream of sounds, individuals with ASD were slower and less accurate at 
identifying a target signal from a specific spatial location, but performed as accurate 
as controls on a less demanding task with only three sound sources. ERP results also 
confirmed this finding, with broader N1 and shallower P3 peaks in the autism 
compared to the control group, indicative of  a diminished ability to attend to one 
sound source among many (Teder-Sälejärvi et al., 2005). The finding that individuals 
with ASD were slower and less accurate than typically developing subjects when 
presented with eight sound sources indicates that they were processing competing 
information, despite being told to ignore them. Interestingly, the more demanding 
condition with eight sound sources could potentially reflect a high perceptual load 
condition, whereas the less demanding condition with three sound sources might 
represent a low perceptual load task. The finding of equivalent performance between 
groups in the less demanding task, yet higher distractibility in individuals with ASD 
relative to controls on a more demanding task would fit with the increased perceptual 
capacity account. An increased perceptual capacity in ASD would allow enhanced 
processing of auditory information even if it interferes with the relevant task. It is 
however also important to stress that because participants were required to segregate 
sounds from multiple input streams, an underlying impairment in auditory streaming 
abilities might have also been responsible for these results. 
In another study, Hismjatullina (2006) presented a set of experiments that 
measured selective attention in the auditory modality in children with ASD and 
various matched control groups. When presenting participants with a dichotic 
listening task, she observed no differences between groups in reaction times, yet 
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significantly higher error rates in the ASD group. Although the authors mentioned 
that they are unsure as to how reaction times can be unaffected whilst error rates 
were increased, this pattern of results would in fact be predicted by an increased 
perceptual capacity account. The observation that reaction times were unaffected (i.e. 
subjects were still able to attend to the relevant stream), whilst error rates were 
increased (i.e. reflecting processing of information in the unattended channel), 
suggests that individuals with ASD had processing resources left-over to also attend 
to the unattended stream. 
In the speech domain, individuals with ASD are also reported to have 
difficulty focussing on spoken target sentences embedded in background speech 
noise (Alcántara, Weisblatt, Moore, & Bolton, 2004). This was reflected in higher 
speech reception thresholds, particularly for background noises that contained 
temporal dips. Plaisted, Saksida, Alcántara, and Weisblatt (2003) suggested that this 
might be due to a wider than normal auditory filter in individuals with ASD, making 
them more susceptible to masking by interfering sounds. While it is difficult to 
ascertain whether higher distractibility by background noise could also relate to an 
increased perceptual capacity, it would be worthwhile to pursue this question in the 
future. Taken together, the conclusions presented in this thesis could potentially 
account for some of the findings on selective attention in ASD in the auditory 
modality. It would therefore be important for future studies to re-examine these 
findings in light of perceptual load theory. In both the auditory streaming task and 
dichotic listening task for example, different conditions of perceptual load could be 
created to examine processing of distracting information at different levels of 
perceptual load.  
Opposing predictions for the effect of perceptual load in the auditory 
modality alone however comes from a recent study on typical adults that found that 
increasing auditory perceptual load had no effect on auditory distractor processing. 
Murphy, Fraenkel, and Dalton (2013) asked participants to respond to a target letter 
(P or T, spoken in a female voice) presented at random positions within a sequence 
of spoken letters at either high perceptual load (e.g. A, P, G, C, H, J) or low 
perceptual load (e.g. X, X, X, P, X, X). These letters were played one after the other 
through central speakers. A distractor letter (congruent or incongruent to the target 
letter, spoken in a male voice) was played on two thirds of the trials through either a 
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left- or right speaker. While the target letter could be presented on any position, apart 
from the first and last position in the sequence, the distractor was always presented at 
the mid-point of the sequence in between the third and the fourth letter sound. 
Interference effects (i.e. longer RTs) that reflect distractor processing were observed 
across participants on incongruent trials compared to congruent trials. This effect 
was found to be similar across perceptual load conditions, suggesting that increasing 
auditory perceptual load did not reduce auditory distractor processing. However, 
there are several potential reasons why this effect was not observed. For example, the 
sequence of letters was always spoken in a female voice, whereas the distractor letter 
was always spoken in a male voice. It is plausible that this has led to a distractor 
“pop-out” effect, as the target and distractor letter differed in one important 
phonological feature (i.e. gender). In addition, given that the letter sequence was 
presented serially (i.e. one letter after each other) and presentation of the distractor 
and target letter only overlapped on two letter items (between the third and the fourth 
letter sound), it is likely that the high perceptual load condition did not impose a high 
enough demand on resources to exhaust capacity. The absence of a reduction in 
distractor processing at high levels of perceptual load could thus potentially be 
attributed to a range of other factors unrelated to perceptual load. An alternative 
manipulation of perceptual load by increasing the complexity of operations might be 
more applicable to investigate load effects in the auditory modality. For example, 
one could ask participants to judge two syllables presented together on either pitch 
(low perceptual load) or pitch and semantic content (high perceptual load). This 
would control for some of the limitations outlined above.  
On a range of auditory processing tasks, individuals with ASD often display 
enhanced performance on tasks that require processing of simple, low-level auditory 
stimuli (see Haesen, Boets, & Wagemans, 2011; O’Connor, 2012 for a review). For 
example, compared to typically developing children, children with ASD often show 
superior pitch processing (Heaton, Hermelin, & Pring, 1998), including superior 
pitch memory and labelling (Heaton, 2003), frequency categorisation (‘high/low’ 
judgments) and frequency discrimination (‘same/different’ judgments). This superior 
processing has been shown for pure tones (Bonnel et al., 2010; Bonnel, Mottron, 
Peretz, Trudel, & Gallun, 2003; Jones et al., 2009; O'Riordan & Passetti, 2006), 
complex tones (Järvinen-Pasley & Heaton, 2007) and speech stimuli (Järvinen-
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Pasley, Wallace, Ramus, Happé, & Heaton, 2008). In addition, there is some 
evidence of auditory hyperacuity in ASD (Ney, 1979; Talay-Ongan & Wood, 2000), 
which may hint at over-arousal in the auditory modality. Musical savants are also 
more common in individuals with ASD compared to the non-clinical population 
(Rimland & Fein, 1988). Consistent with the behavioural findings, the majority of 
electrophysiological studies using event-related potentials (ERPs) also found larger 
auditory mismatch negativity (MNM) amplitudes and shorter MMN latencies to 
changes in pitch in individuals with ASD, indicative of enhanced neural processing 
of auditory stimuli at the pre-attentive level (Ceponiene et al., 2003; Ferri, Elia, 
Agarwal, Lanuzza, Musumeci, & Pennisi, 2003; Gomot, Giard, Adrien, Barthelemy, 
& Bruneau, 2002). However, these findings are not unequivocal, with others 
reporting longer MMN latencies in children with ASD, particularly in response to 
infrequent speech stimuli (Jansson-Verkasalo et al., 2005; Kuhl et al., 2005; Lepistö 
et al., 2006). Could an increased perceptual capacity in ASD also lead to enhanced 
perceptual auditory processing? As the studies outlined above relate to a variety of 
different processes and mechanisms, it is important to not overstate the possible 
contribution of an increased perceptual capacity in ASD for these results. It may 
however be conceivable that an increased perceptual capacity in ASD interacts with 
the development of other perceptual mechanisms to give rise to these atypical 
patterns of behaviour.  
Whilst the findings presented in this thesis suggest a perceptual advantage for 
children and adolescents with ASD attending to information in two sensory 
modalities, there is some evidence in the literature that suggests that perceptual 
processing may be impaired in ASD when participants are required to integrate 
stimuli from different sensory modalities (see Marco et al. 2011, for a review). 
Whereas typically developing individuals generally benefit from the presentation of 
multisensory stimuli, showing enhanced performance on detection and 
discrimination tasks (Perrott, Saberi, Brown and Strybel, 1990; Spence and Driver, 
1997; Stein, London, Wilkinson and Price, 1996), individuals with ASD often show 
reduced behavioural facilitation and reduced cortical activation in response to 
multisensory stimuli (Russo et al. 2010; Brandwein et al. 2013). Brandwein et al. 
(2013) for example, found that children with ASD were slower to respond to audio-
visual (AV) stimulus pairs on a simple reaction time task than TD children, and 
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showed less widespread cortical activation in the AV condition, particularly at early 
stages of information processing. Integration of multisensory stimuli in the context of 
speech perception also seems to be impaired in ASD. For example, individuals with 
ASD are reported to be less susceptible to the McGurk effect (De Gelder et al. 1991; 
Smith and Bennetto, 2007, but also see Iarocci et al. 2010; Williams et al. 2004), in 
which the simultaneous presentation of a speech sound (e.g. /ba/) with an 
incongruent visual stimulus (e.g. /va/) can result in inaccurate auditory perceptions. 
These findings indicate that individuals with ASD do not integrate visual and 
auditory information in the same manner as TD children. Others however have 
suggested that these differences are due to poorer lip reading abilities in ASD 
(Iarocci et al. 2010; Williams et al. 2004), as well as the confounding effects of using 
social (e.g. faces) and/or linguistic stimuli, which are inherently more difficult for 
individuals with ASD to process. Indeed, when using basic, non-social stimuli, Van 
der Smagt et al. (2007) found that children with ASD were as susceptible as TD 
children to the sound-induced double-flash illusion where the number of beeps has 
been shown to produce the percept of additional illusory flashes (Shams et al. 2002). 
However, the experiments in this thesis and the above work on multisensory 
integration (MSI) in ASD differ considerably in terms of task requirements. While 
both the MSI tasks and the current experiments involve the processing of 
simultaneously presented stimuli from different sensory modalities, a typical MSI 
task is a perceptual task where perception of a stimulus in one modality is enhanced 
by the presence of a stimulus in another modality through a process of integration. 
Both the inattentional deafness procedure as well as the dual-task paradigm 
employed here, however, are selective attention tasks where the additional auditory 
stimulus does not facilitate the processing of the visual stimulus (or vice versa). 
Instead, the emphasis is on whether an unexpected and therefore genuinely 
unattended auditory stimulus captures attention (experiment 2, 3, 4) or an additional 
and expected stimulus can also be attended to (experiment 5, 6) according to the 
level of visual perceptual load of a central task. 
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Psychological theories 
How do the findings reported within this thesis relate to cognitive theories of 
autism such as weak central coherence (WCC) and enhanced perceptual functioning 
(EPF)? As outlined in chapter 1, WCC considers a deficit in extracting the overall 
‘gestalt’ of a stimulus to be a central feature of autism, resulting in a tendency or 
cognitive bias to process local parts of information (Frith, 1989a). In support of this, 
several studies have found superior performance of individuals with ASD on tasks 
where a preference for local processing and/or resistance to process the overall 
gestalt is advantageous for performance such as the Navon task (Plaisted et al., 1999) 
and the embedded figures task (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 1983). 
The EPF account also proposes that individuals with ASD are characterised by a 
more locally biased perceptual processing style, but in turn does not predict a 
weakness in global processing. Instead, EPF suggests that lower-order cognitive 
processes take precedence over the development of higher-order processes. Thus, 
according to this account, superior performance in individuals with ASD is the result 
of enhanced low-level perception rather than a weak global processing style. 
These theories fit some of the results obtained in this thesis. At high 
perceptual load for example, individuals with ASD demonstrated enhanced 
perceptual processing compared to typically developing controls. According to both 
WCC and EPF, these findings could be interpreted in terms of enhanced attention to 
detail rather than increased perceptual capacity. However, both accounts would also 
predict that enhanced processing of low-level detail is observable across all 
perceptual load conditions, including low perceptual load. Yet in all experiments 
presented in this thesis, enhanced processing at low levels of perceptual load in 
individuals was not observed, reflected by equivalent awareness rates for an 
unexpected critical stimulus (experiment 2, 4), as well as similar detection rates and 
detection sensitivity (experiment 5, 6) at low levels of perceptual load.  
Could the differential pattern of findings be related to reduced top-down 
influences in individuals with ASD (e.g. Greenaway & Plaisted, 2005)? Top-down 
processing is important to determine what stimuli are attended to and involves 
higher-order processes such as working memory, expectations and prior knowledge. 
It is also considered to be a more active and adaptive form of processing compared to 
bottom-up processing, which is driven by salient stimulus features in an automatic 
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fashion and is therefore more passive and reflexive (Loth, Gómez, & Happé, 2010). 
Lavie and colleagues extended perceptual load theory to also account for these top-
down effects of attention (Lavie et al., 2004). They proposed that successful focused 
attention depends on two mechanisms of selective attention. The first is a perceptual 
selection mechanism that details how distractor interference can be prevented in 
conditions of high perceptual load. This is a rather passive mechanism whereby 
distractor processing is dependent on a ‘spill-over’ of untapped attentional resources. 
Performing a high perceptual load task simply leaves no resources available for any 
additional distractor processing. The second mechanism is an executive cognitive 
control mechanism that is required to minimise interference from distractor stimuli 
when these are perceived (as in low perceptual load conditions). This mechanism is a 
more active mechanism of cognitive control that depends on higher cognitive 
functions such as working memory to ‘shield’ task performance from distractor 
interference by maintaining current task priorities and goal-directed behaviour. 
Contrary to the predicted effect of perceptual load on focussed attention, loading 
these control functions (e.g. by increasing working memory load) disrupts the ability 
to prioritise processing of task-relevant information and instead leads to increased 
distractor processing (Lavie et al., 2004). Lavie et al. (2004) demonstrated this effect 
experimentally. When participants were asked to remember a large set of digits (6 
item set) prior to performing a trial on a typical flanker task, response interference 
effects were increased compared to when participants only had to remember one 
digit. Thus, whereas high perceptual load  leads to less distraction, a high level of 
load on cognitive control functions leads to more distraction (Lavie, 2010).  
Could differences in cognitive control between TD individuals and 
individuals with ASD account for the findings reported within this thesis? While 
some cognitive control is necessary to keep task priorities online, it is important to 
stress that active cognitive control functions only determine selective attention when 
(1) additional information is interfering with a target response (i.e. in form of a 
potent distractor) and (2) the distractor is perceived as in low perceptual load 
displays (Lavie et al., 2004). In all experiments within this thesis however, the 
additional stimulus was not interfering with the target response and instead was 
required to be attended to. Cognitive control functions in these task situations should 
therefore not have had an effect on detection rates. Furthermore, if we assume that 
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the working memory load of the task (i.e. keeping task instructions in mind) 
disproportionally taxed the individuals with ASD more than the TD subjects, then we 
would expect impaired task performance in individuals with ASD across perceptual 
conditions (given that task instructions remained constant across conditions). This 
however was not observed, as indicated by the absence of any group differences on 
task performance measures such as reaction times and accuracy rates across 
experiments. Although a cognitive control deficit in ASD cannot account for the 
findings observed within this thesis, it will be important in future research to explore 
the interplay between perceptual load and working memory load in ASD.  
Future work 
A number of potential studies have already been mentioned in this discussion. 
For example, it would be important to ascertain whether an increased perceptual 
capacity in ASD that has been shown to be a factor in visual selective attention 
(Remington, Swettenham, et al., 2012; Remington et al., 2009; Swettenham et al., 
2014) and cross-modal selective attention (evidence presented in this thesis), is also 
relevant for auditory-only contexts of selective attention. In this respect, existing 
dichotic listening paradigms could be manipulated to test the predictions of an 
increased perceptual capacity. For example, an unexpected word or syllable that is 
easily discriminable when attended to could be presented in the unattended channel 
whilst participants perform either a low perceptual load or high perceptual load 
categorisation task in the attended channel. Alternatively, response competing 
distracting words could be presented in the unattended channel and the extent to 
which perceptual load modulates interference from these words is measured. Prior to 
carrying out these experiments with individuals with ASD however, it would be 
important to ascertain whether these effects of auditory perceptual load can be 
observed in the typically developing population. 
In addition, a direct test of perceptual capacity of individuals with ASD 
would be desirable to rule out a host of alternative explanations (i.e. task difficulty, 
top-down factors). In this regard, a study could measure how individual differences 
in visual short-term memory can predict performance on a range of visual and cross-
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modal selective attention tasks. It should also be highlighted that the samples across 
experiments in this thesis only included participants with ASD with IQs within the 
typical range. To date there have been no studies examining perceptual capacity in 
children with ASD who also have learning difficulties. 
A limitation of the current research is the use of a blocked design across 
experiments, where each block only contained trials of the same level of perceptual 
load. In typical adults, it has been shown that distractor interference depends on 
participants’ anticipation of high-load or low-load displays irrespective of the actual 
display presented (Handy & Mangun, 2000; Murray & Jones, 2002; Theeuwes et al., 
2004). Thus, based on these findings rather than bottom-up it is the top-down factors 
such as load anticipation that are most critical to performance. These differences in 
strategy rather than the level of perceptual load could have influenced the effects 
seen on awareness of a critical stimulus and detection rates/sensitivity. However, it 
must also be noted that other studies have found the opposite (Brand-D'Abrescia & 
Lavie, 2007; Lavie et al., 2009), including those that have used similar paradigms 
such as the dual-task paradigm (Macdonald & Lavie, 2008) or inattentional deafness 
paradigm (Macdonald & Lavie, 2011). In these studies, randomly intermixing low-
and high load trials produced the same perceptual load effect as presenting 
participants with a blocked design. It would nonetheless be important in a future 
study to explore the possibility of strategy effects within both the dual-task paradigm 
and inattentional deafness paradigm used here in individuals with ASD. 
There is some preliminary evidence in the literature that points to the 
underlying neural mechanisms of an increased perceptual capacity in ASD. One 
candidate is larger extrastriate population receptive field maps in individuals with 
autism (Schwarzkopf et al., 2014). Clearly, further work particularly in children is 
required to better understand these neural underpinnings. The use of complementary 
techniques (e.g. EEG) would also help to investigate these effects. For example, the 
dual-task paradigm used in experiment 5 & 6 could be adapted to measure attentional 
effects related to different ERP markers (e.g. P300).  
Lastly, an enhanced perceptual capacity also seems to correlate with autistic 
traits in the typical population, where individuals with higher AQ scores reported 
greater interference effects by distractors at high levels of perceptual load  (Bayliss 
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& Kritikos, 2011). Although this may suggest that an increased perceptual capacity is 
part of the broader autism phenotype, further work is required in this area. 
Conclusion 
The work presented here used the Perceptual Load Theory of Attention and 
Cognitive Control to investigate cross-modal selective attention in children and 
adolescents with ASD. Recent advances in visual selective attention suggest that 
autism is characterised by an increased perceptual capacity. The current work tested 
the predictions of this increased perceptual capacity account in ASD for cross-modal 
contexts of selective attention. Across a range of experiments, the level of visual 
perceptual load was manipulated using converging operational definitions of 
perceptual load. It was shown that individuals with ASD continued to report 
awareness of both unexpected and expected auditory information even at high levels 
of visual perceptual load. This pattern of awareness was distinctively different to 
typically developing individuals matched on age and non-verbal ability scores, who 
showed a reduction of awareness at high levels of perceptual load and also 
experienced this reduction at a lower level of perceptual load than individuals with 
ASD. 
The findings therefore demonstrated that in cross-modal contexts of attention, 
individuals with ASD are characterised by an increased perceptual capacity. Whilst 
this can be seen as a perceptual advantage rather than a deficit, being able to process 
more information can have important implications for everyday adaptive functioning 
in a multisensory environment for individuals with ASD. For example, these findings 
might provide an explanation for the common observation by parents and clinicians 
that children with ASD experience difficulties and even distress if the environment 
features too many sensory stimuli. An increased perceptual capacity in ASD that 
operates across sensory modalities would allow children with ASD to process more 
sensory information at any one time, even if in some circumstances this information 
is distracting for their current task behaviour. 
In addition, the work presented here might be able to shed light on some of 
the atypicalities reported in ASD that relate to both higher distractibility on auditory 
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processing tasks, but also savant-like abilities in some individuals. Future 
educational and therapeutic programmes could therefore aim to exploit the 
advantages of such an enhancement, but equally provide a learning environment 
within which the potentially detrimental effects are minimised. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 8.1 Distribution of participants across experiments 
 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 Exp. 6 
Exp.1 -      
Exp. 2 TD: 44 -     
Exp. 3 - - -    
Exp. 4 - - - -   
Exp. 5 - - 
ASD: 9 
TD: 10 
ASD: 10 
TD: 10 
-  
Exp. 6 - - 
ASD: 9 
TD: 10 
ASD: 9 
TD: 9 
ASD: 16 
TD: 5 
- 
 
Note: This table provides a summary of the cross-over of participants across 
experiments. For example, 44 typically developing (TD) participants who performed 
in Experiment 1 also provided data in Experiment 2 (see Method section on page 80 
for further detail).  
Furthermore, 9 ASD (and 10 TD) participants who performed in Experiment 3 also 
performed in Experiment 5. 10 ASD participants who performed in Experiment 4 
also performed in Experiment 5. Thus, the sample of participants in Experiment 5 
was made up equally of participants who performed in Experiment 3 and 4. 16 ASD 
(and 5 TD) participants who also performed in Experiment 5 provided data in 
Experiment 6.   
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